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Abstract 
This thesis begins with an examination of the context of  nsk in which multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs) are being drafted and implemented. Through a 
discussion of the relationship between the characteristics of multinational corporations 
and the phenomenon of globalisation, the impetus behind globalisation practices is 
reveded. This is then contextualised with an examination of the contribution of the 
chemical industry toward the parailel globalisations of production and environmental 
h m .  A discussion of trade and investrnent liberalisation instruments is then undertaken 
to illustrate the current hierarchy between these instruments and MEAs. This analysis 
reveals the present incompatibility of these instruments and suggests the need, nom an 
environmental perspective, to reconceptualise the relationship. An examination of two 
emerging chemical management conventions for Pnor Informed Consent and Persistent 
Organic Pollutants m e r  illustrates the difficulties in drafting environmentally effective 
MEAs and discusses possibilities for change, such as the need to utilise a precautionary 
approach. The thesis concludes by finding that the present hierarchy of interests, in 
which MEAs are secondary to those of trade and investment instruments, must be 
reversed in light of the serious implications of continuing to maintain the status quo. 
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1.0 Introduction 
The work of  Ulrich Beck provides a basis for inquiring into the present purpose and 
utiiity of international environmental law. His book, entitled Risk Sociew Towards o 
New Modernifyl, characterises industrialised society as one in which "risk'" has become 
the principal policy consideration. Under such a conceptualisation environmental law 
becomes a means of both controlling and allocating risk. 
We are therefore concerned no longer exclusively with making nature 
usefid, or with releasing mankind fiom traditional constraints, but also and 
essentially with problems resulting fiom techno-economic development 
itself. ... Questions of the development and employment of technologies 
(in the realms of nature, society and personality) are being eclipsed by 
questions of the political and economic 'management' of the risks of 
actually or potentially utilized technologies - discovering, administering, 
acknowledging, avoiding or concealing such hazards with respect to 
specidly defined horizons of relevance.3 
For Beck the production of nsk is directly related to the production of weaith and, 
therefore, the globalisation of industrial production has resulted in a globalisation of risk? 
Because risk has traditionally been calculated in the context of spatial and temporal 
markers, science and law that utilise these means fail to provide effective remedies 
against risk and instead become sources for its legitimisation.5 This legitimisation 
occurs when the inability to circumscribe risk with traditional means is not taken into 
account in decision-making. 
Along with the growing capacity of technical options ...g rows the 
incalacuabiliiy of their consequences. Compared to these global 
consequences the hazards of prirnary industrialimtion indeed belonged to 
Iu. Beck, Rkk Society.- 
2 ~ h e  t rm 'risk society' 
induced and introduced 
31bid. at 19-20. 
Towardi: a New Modernity, trans. M .  Ritter (London: Sage, 1992). 
is used to describe "the systematic way of dealing with h m &  and insecurities 
by modernization", ibid at 2 1 .  
a different age. The dangers of highly developed nuclear and chernical 
productive forces abolish the foundations and categories according to 
which we have thought and acted to this point, such as space and time, 
work and leisure tirne, factory and nation state, indeed even the borders 
between continents. To put it differently, in the risk society the unknown 
and unintended consequences corne to be a dominant force in history and 
society.6 
The work of Donald Wells' provides an explanation of how risk has traditionally been 
assessed. He suggests that risk analysis is shaped by our linear perception of the 
ecosystem, which characterises the ecosystem's reactions to intervention as logical, 
incremental and predictablea In contrast, a non-linear view recognises that the 
ecosystem is sensitive to its initial conditions and, therefore, is dynamic, sensitive and 
unpredictable in its reactions.9 From a linearist perspective, movement across the 
threshold between acceptable and unacceptable risk produces incrementai and predictable 
results.iO With a non-linearist perspective, the boundary is between order and chaos, and 
when crossed, nonincremental and unpredictable results occur.ll Based upon this 
analysis, Wells suggests that environmental policies should be formulated in a context of 
"substantial uncertainty" .12 
In addition to the observations of Beck and Wells, the perception of risk has also been 
found to be shaped by extemal factors such as market forces, political pressures, and 
61bid. at 22. 
'D.T. Wells, Environmental PoIicy: A Global Perspeciivefor the Twenty-First Cenfury (Upper Saddle 
River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996). 
8 ~ b i d  at 186. 
91bid at 187. 
Iolbid at 188. 
1 ' lbid 
121bid at 189. 
3 
personal and professional biasesY By combining these three opinions an insight into the 
factors which influence negotiatoa of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) 
can be obtained. Not only are negotiatoa influenced by the presence and perception of 
risk as defined by science, but they are also faced with the influences of liberalised 
market policies and extenial factors. 
Therefore, the context of MEAS is one in which liberalisation policies not only globalise 
the market but also nsk. This risk, being incapable of delineation with traditional means 
of nsk analysis, is further compounded by the presence of extemal factors which 
influence environmentai decision-rnakers. It can M e r  be reasoned that the use of 
international law as a means of globalising production, through trade and foreign direct 
investment instruments, both supports and implicitly sanctions the globalisation of risk. 
So how does this affect MEAs? If international environmental law is a means for 
controlling and allocating risk, and if Beck and Wells are correct, then decision-making 
on the basis of nsk assessrnent would appear to be futile. Perhaps international 
environmental law needs to be designed to achieve new goals, predicated upon 
preempting risk rather than merely managing it. 
In order to reconceptualise international environmental law it must also be assessed 
within its role of harmonising the competing perceptions of nature inherent in pnvate and 
public environmental interests.14 international environinental law fulfils this role by 
- .  
"M.R Auer, "Risk Perception and International Environmental Affairs: The Organochlorine Debate 
Behveen Sweden and Finland" (1997) 26(6) Ambio 359 at 362, 
I41n this contexf a private interest refers to the perception of the naairal environment as being a nsource 
available for exploitation using persona1 initiative. A public interest, in contmt, is one that perceives the 
natural environment as a resource which should be utilised according to the principles of egalitarianism and 
cornmunalism. See R. Cowling, "The Canadian Environment and the Politics of Public and Private 
Domains: Environmental Policy in Theory and Practice" (January 1997) No. 236 ISS Working Paper Senes 
at 2 [hereinaftet "Canadian Environment"]. 
determinhg the extent of access to global natural resources and thereby accommodathg 
both the protection of nature, and the need to integrate environmental scarcity into 
economic decision-maki.ng.15 It has been suggested that environmental policy needs to 
be designed so as to explicitly recognise the social, economic and political necessity of 
safeguarding both the cornpethg public and private interests, but to also provide a public 
over-ride of the private interest, when the public interest is jeopardised. I6 While such a 
mechanism "rnust not be used recklessly" it could be useful when "the competing public 
and pnvate interests cannot be reconciled, and where to allow the private interest to 
supenede the public would result in unnecessary harrn to the natural environment".17 If 
international environmental law were to advance such a goal for itself, in addition to a 
need to move beyond its present fixation upon risk analysis, then this neo-law would 
have to originate in a context where there is no doubt that private interests must, for the 
good of the global environment, be subjugated to the public interest and that the harm not 
merely be deferred, but prevented. 
I t  is proposed that the realm of the chemical industry provides a forum for such an 
analysis and discussion. The chemical industry, through its production of pesticides and 
hazardous chemicais, illustrates the nature of globalised risk. These products have been 
characterised by Bec k in the following manner : 
They induce systemic and often irreversible h m ,  generally remain 
invisible, are based on causal interpretatiom, and thus initially only exist 
in terms of the (scientific or anti-scientific) knowledge about them. 'ïhey 
can thus be changed, magnified, dramatized or minimized within 
knowledge, and to that extent they are particularly open to social 
definfion and construction. Hence the mass media and the scientific and 
1 5 ~ .  Siebert, "Trade Policy and Environmental Protection" (1996) The World Economy: Global Trade 
Poi'y 183 at 1 83. 
I6"Canadian Environment", supra note 14 at 14. 
I71bid at 14-5. 
Iegal professions in charge of defining risks become key social and 
political positions. 18 (emphasis in original) 
Furthennote, the management of pesticides and hazardous chemicals provides a good 
example of the problems inherent in risk assessment. Risk assessment in this context has 
been criticised on the basis that it seeks to describe a d e  or acceptable level of use for 
these productslg and in doing so, fails to take into account alternatives to their use.20 
In conducting such an assessment of international environmental law the recent 
negotiations of multilaterai chernical management instruments provide an example for 
inquiring into the utility of MEAs. In undertaking this andysis, the chernical industry as 
a contributor to the phenomenon of globalisation will be discussed, followed by an 
l8lbid. at 22-3, 
19h4. O'Brien. "Facing Down Pesticide Risk Assenment" (1994) 4(1) Global Pesticide Campaigner, cited 
to (visited 27 August 1998) ~gopherJlgopher.igc.apc.org:2998/0PESTIS/r.9042232 10.24709.5> at 2. In 
relation to the reliability of pesticide risk assessment, this author stated at page 2: 
What is not scientifically defensible is a claim of "safety" for a pesticide that has not k e n  
tested for al1 possible types of h m ,  for al1 types of physical conditions and al1 types of 
organisms, by al1 routes of exposure, and in combination with al1 other toxic chemicals 
those organisrns are encountering ..At is impossible scientificatly to daim "safety" for 
pesticides. 
An example of the misleading nature of risk analysis in refation to pesticides can be found in a product 
description of Bayer's Folidol Dust, produced in India, as "an effective insecticide which decomposes 
completely in the environment without the slightest risk to humans or ânimals". Folidol is rnanufactured 
from one of the most hazardous pesticides, Parathion, which is acutely toxic to the central nervous system 
and has been linked both in developed and developing States with acute worker poisoning and deaths of 
wildlife and fish. 
M i l e  it does ordinarily decompose rapidly in the environment, conditions of temperature 
and hurnidity, especiaily in soi1 and water, can greatly slow the decomposition time. 
See A. Wright, "Where does the Circle Begin? The Global Dangers of Pesticide Plants" (1994) 4(4) Global 
Pesticide Campaigner, cited to (visited 27 August 1998) 
< ophe~//gopher.igc.apc.org:2998/OPESTiS/r.92232 102470920> at 1-2. 8 O'Brien. ibid at 2. In addition. there is a large volume of literature which descnbes the ability to use 
alternative practices, such as Integrated Pest Management (IPM). For a discussion of some alternatives see 
M.A. Altieri, & C.I. Nicholls, "Indigenous and Modem Approaches to [PM in Latin America" (1997) 13(4) 
ILEiA Newsletîer 6; W. Legg & M. Potier, "Reconciling Agricuiture and the Environment" (1 998) No. 2 10 
The OECD Observer 32; B. Libert, "The Transition of Baltic Agriculture" ( 1997) 26(7) Ambio 473; F. 
Meerman, et al., "Integrated Pest Management: Smaliholders Fight Back with IPM" (1 997) 13(4) ILEIA 
Newsletter 4; T.W. Mew & M.B. Cohen, "Future Reseatch Priorities in International PIant Protection - 
Focus on Rice" (1995) 2(2) Agri. + Rural Dev. 24; G. Stoll, T r o p  Protection in the 1990s" (1997) 13(4) 
ILEIA Newsletter 10; LJ. Unnevehr, P.L. Pingali, & D. Zilberman, "Changing Pesticide Policies: 
Introduction" (1997) 22(2) Food Pol'y 105; and, D. Zilberman, & K, Millock, "Financial Incentives and 
Pesticide Use1' ( 1997) 2 ( 2 )  Food Pol'y 133. 
6 
examination of international liberalisation policies. Together this will assist in the 
coniextuaiisation of the global political environment in which the new conventions are 
being drafted. This is then followed with an analysis of the two emerging chernical 
management conventions on Pnor Infonned Consent and Persistent Organic Pollutants 
and their (in)ability to remedy the present environmental harm caused by the use of toxic 
chernicals and pesticides. Suggestions are made to strengthen these chernical 
management instruments through the introduction of stronger measures to control 
industry's actions, thereby generating a public over-ride of private interests. In 
conclusion, the need to redefine the hierarchy between MEAs, and tmde and investment 
instruments is proposed. 
2.0 A Potent Mù: MNCs, Chernicals and Globalisation 
Globalisation is a complex process, in which the relationships between global acton are 
affected by strategic, political, social, cultural and economic  influence^,^^ and are 
unhindered by temtorial and jurisdictional barriers? 
Globalization denotes a shift in the spatial form and extent of human 
organization and interaction to a transcontinental or Niterregio~l fevel. It 
involves a stretching of social relations across t h e  and space such that 
day-to-day activities are increasingly Suenced  by events happening on 
the other side of the globe and the practices and decisions of highly 
localised groups and institutions can have significant global 
reverberations. Globalization is neither a singular condition nor a linear 
process; neither is it a final end point of social change. Rather it is best 
thought of as a multidimensiond phenornenon applicable to a variety of 
forms of social action - econornic, politicai, cuitural - or sites of social 
activity, like the environment? (emphasis in original) 
In an econornic sense, it can be defined as "the increasing integration of international 
markets" caused "by rapidly expanding worldwide flows of goods, services, capital, 
information, and sometimes peoplefl.24 Globaiisation also concems the increasing 
privatisation of the naturd environment as corporate enterprises increase their global 
reach in search for components and markets for their products. 
2 1 ~ .  Tonelson, "G lobalization: The Great American Non-Debate" (1 997) 96(6 13) Current History 353 at 
355. I 
U ~ . ~ .  Rosenau, "The Complexities and Contradictions of Globalization" (1997) 96(613) Current History 
360 at 361. 
23~. Goldblatt, et al., "Economic Globalization and the Nation-State: Shifting Balances of Power" (1997) 
22 Alternatives 269 at 27 1. 
24~onelson. supra note 2 1 at 353. 
2.1 MNCs as Globalking Agents 
Multinational corporations (MNCs)2S are perceived as the "driving impulse1Q6 behind 
globalisation and therefore, their interaction with, and cornmitment to, environmental 
concems becomes paramount. An examination of the literature reveals that four MNC 
characteristics can be linked to globalisation, and hence environmental deterioration: 
their size and global power; their structural organisation; their inherent competitiveness; 
and, their lack of regulation. 
2.1. I MNC Size and Global Power 
The first factor contributing to globalisation is the importance attributed to these acton 
because of their size and global reach.27 Present in most states of the world, they conml 
not only many advanced technologies and raw materials, but entire economic sectors.28 
Currently the world economy is driven by approximately "20,000 MNCs [who] account 
for between one-quarter and one-third of global output and 70 percent of international 
traden,29 and, who are 5 1 of the 100 largest economies in the world.30 
Additionally, it is important to recognise that MNCs, and not states, control a majority of 
the world's natural resources as well as their production, distribution and marketing 
25The term 'multinational corporation' is utilised in a broad manner, thereby encompassing transnational 
corporations (TNCs) as weil. While at least one author has drawn a distinction between the two on the 
basis that a TNC is one that "draws on global resources, management, production, and other capabilities" 
this distinction is not required here, In this paper it is those enterprises that operate, in even a limited sense, 
in more than one nation-state which are important. Quote cited fiom D.S. Papp, Conternporaty 
International Relations: Frameworks for Understanding, 44th ed. (New York: Macmillan College, 1994) at 
96. See also P.F. Drucker, "The Global Economy and the Nation-State" (1997) 76(5) Foreign Affairs 159 
at t67-168. 
2 6 ~ . ~ .  Oman, "The Policy Challenges of Globalization and Regionalization" (1997) 40(2) Dev. 43 at 5 1. 
27~app, supra note 25 at 95. 
281bid. at 96. 
2g~oldblatt, supra note 23 at 277. 
)@I-. Clarke, Silent Coup. Confionting the Big Business Takeovw of Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for 
Policy Alternatives and Jake Lorimer & Company, 1997) mereinafter Silent Coup]. 
activities,31 and by extension, the environmental impacts of these activities as well. In 
fact, MNCs have k e n  lauded as "the midwives of the new world economyn.3* 
In the 1990s large business enterprises, even sorne smaller ones, have the 
technological means and strategic vision to burst old b i t s  - of time, 
space, national boundaries, language, custom, and ideology. By acquiring 
e a r t h - s p e g  technologies, by developing products that can be produced 
anywhere and sold everywhere, by spreading credit around the world, and 
by connecting global c h a ~ e l s  of communication that can penetrate any 
village or neighborhood, these institutions we normally think of as 
economic rather than political, private rather than public, are becoming the 
world empires of the twenty-first century.33 
In short, contrary to what MNCs would have people believe, their decisions have 
enormous national and political importance." The fact that this power may not be 
requested is irrelevant because it exists due to their size.35 
In an econornic sense, multinational corporations cm make or break a 
local economy and in the case of smaller states, even a national economy. 
MNCs provide investment funds, jobs, advanced technologies, and 
educational services ... With their ability to move production facilities from 
high labor-cost areas, MNCs have proven to be the groundworks on whic h 
several national economic "miracles" such as Singapore, Hong Kong and 
31~uppon for this statement can be found in the opinion expressed in "TNCs and Globalisation: Prime 
Sources of Worsening Ecological Crisis" (1997) 81/82 Third World Resurgence 12 at 13 [hereinafter 
"TNCs"] : 
that MNCs create more than half of the greenhouse gases emitted by industry; 
that they have almost exclusive control over al1 production and use of CFCs and ODSs; 
that they dominate and have intensified their mining activities; 
that they control80% of global lands cuitivated for export crops, with only 20 fims accounting for 
90% of pesticide sales; 
that they "manufacture most of the world's chlorine" contained in several toxic substances (PCBs, 
DDT and dioxins); 
that they transport "envimnmentally unsound production systems, hazardous materials and pmducts" 
to the South; 
that they are the pdmary traders of natural resouces and commodities; and, 
that they promote unsustainable living patterns though thei. advertising and product promotion. 
3 2 ~ ~ .  Barnet & J. Cavanagh, Global Dreomi: Imperiul Corporazionr and the New WorZC Or&r (New 
York: Touchstone, 1995) at 15. 
33~bid at 14. 
"~app, supm note 25 at 97. 
35ibid at I 02. 
Taiwan have based their prosperity..Because of their aggregate collective 
holdings of currency, MNCs collectively have the ability to influence 
exchange rates.36 
2.1.2 MNC Organisational Structure 
The second MNC characteristic is found in the structural organisation which they have 
adapted over time. MNCs' growth and spatial expansion can be explained in relation to 
three different time periods.37 In the f w  MNCs operated in a mercantilist capacity as  
central nations withdrew comrnodities rnanufac tured in peri p heral nations." This was 
followed by a second period in which MNCs were concerned with extraction and 
production and the third, current, period in which MNCs are engaged in an 
internationalisation of capital and an integration of the world's labour forces9 This 
change in MNC behaviour, between the second and third periods, can be partially 
attributed to the changing global political structures of the past 60 yean. Prior to World 
War II, MNCs operated in a vastly different political environment. At that time, 
governments relied upon barriers to trade, and consumer preferences and industrial 
standards differed between states.40 This made operating intemationally dificult and 
therefore, MNCs operated with a national and decentralised organisational form.4 This 
changed following the end of World War II as harmonisation took place in both 
consumer preference and industrial standards, and trade barriers were decreased." This 
was also the time when the General Agreement on Turzrs and Trode was adopted.43 This 
36ibid. at 102. 
3 7 ~ .  Banerjee-Guha, "Industriai Geography and Studies on Multinational Corporations" (1998) XXXIII(4) 
Economic and Political Weekly 159. 
38ibid at 16 1. 
39ibid 
JQ~app, supra note 25 at 97. 
jlibid 
42ibid. at 97. 
43~eneral Agreement on Tar@ and Trade, 30 October 1947.55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafier GA TT 194q. 
changing political environment provided a new opportunity for MNCs to expand their 
reach, and they began to market and manufacture products making use of the additional 
cheap raw materials and sources of labour now availab1e.M 
Today, subsidiaries of MNCs tend to be organised geographically and are generally used 
as conduits for the transfer of money and as generaton of made between t h e m ~ e l v e s ~ ~  
In their desire to maximise profits MNCs cm minimise the cost of inputs, dominate a 
state or regional market with a particular product, or find a more favourable political or 
economic location for a s~bsidiary.~6 This even extends to decisions of a parent 
corporation to ignore a subsidiary if a host state's policies are unfavourable. Al1 of these 
factors contribute to the realisation that MNCs are a difficult type of organisation to 
control.47 Such an enterprise "has the ability to see the advantages of and to irnplement 
policies that maximise the interests of the system, even if they corne at a cost of profits to 
an individual subsidiary" .48 
The multinational enterprise is important because of its ability to move 
resources across international boundaries. It is also important, in some 
instances, as a transnational actor that makes decisions without regard to 
the direct interests of its operations in any single country. It is equally 
important because of the responses that it engenders fiom governments of 
nation-states that react to its potential for weakening their contml.J9 
In sum, it is their centralised structure which results in the diminution of state influence 
over MNC decision-making. 
"~app, s u p  note 25 at 97. 
4 S ~ . ~ .  Wells, Jr., ''The Multinational Business Enterprise: What Kind of International Organisation?" in 
R.O. Keohane & J.S. Nye, Ir., eds., Transnational Relations and W d d  Politics (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972) 97 at 105 Fereinafter "Multinational"]. 
&~app,  supra note 25 at 100. 
47"~ultinational", supra note 45 at 105. 
48 1bid 
jg1bid. at 113-4. 
To host nations ... oversight and centraiisation irnply a loss of control over 
their own political, economic, and social destinies. With operations 
overseen and decisions made for a subsidiary in a corporate headquarten 
that may be half a world away, the governrnents and peoples of a host 
state may legitimately question whether the decisions made by the MNCs' 
management have the interests of the host state and its inhabitants at 
heart.50 
2.1.3 MNC Competitiveness 
A further factor which influences globalisation is MNC competitiveness. As MNCs 
strive to increase their global markets, they compete with nationaily-based corporations 
whose own national environmental regulations may be more lenient and who have a 
greater knowledge of local markets, consumers and governments.sl 
MNCs have been known to consider the lower regulatory standards for pollution 
abatement and environmental protection as an incentive for relocation, particulady for 
"traditionally heavily polluting industries such as steel, non-ferrous metals, asbestos and 
some toxic chemicais".s2 This phenornenon of corporate flight" was examined in an 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) study on 
environmental policies and industrial competitiveness. This study concluded that the cost 
to corporations to comply with environmental regulations had less impact upon their 
decision-making than the factors of market access, raw materials, political stability, 
"~app, supra note 25 at 104. 
5 1 ~ .  BlomsWm & R.E. Lipsey, "The Competitiveness of Countries and their Multinational Firms" (1994) 
No. 1 16 Reprint Series, Department of International Economics & Geography, Handelsh6gskoIan 1 
Stockholm, reprinted fiom L. Eden & E.H. Potter, eds., Multinationals in rhe Global Political Economy 
(New York: St. Martins Press, 1993) 129 at 129, 
5 2 ~ .  El-Hinnawi & M.H. Hashmi, The Srare of the Environment (London: Buttenvorths, 1987) at 168. 
5 3 ~ h e  t nn korporate flightt refers to a corporate decision to relocate production facilities to a nation-state 
with lower environmental regulations. See C. Stevens, "Synthesis Report: Environmental Policies and 
Industrial Competitiveness" in OECD, Environmental Policies und Industriaf Competitiveness (Paris: 
OECD, 1993) 7 at 1 1 [hereinafter "Synthesis Reportn]. 
infiastructure and transportation costs in a given host state." In fact environmental costs 
were found to be less than those paid by industry for "labor, real estate, transportation, 
energy, and tax considerations1'.5~ While environmental regdatory costs do not appear to 
motivate MNC relocation, industrial migration does occur within sectors as a result of 
lower environmental standards, 
Environmentally-dirty industries, particularly resources-based sectors, 
have rnigrated over the 1s t  two decades to lower income countries with 
weaker environmental standards; the result is a geographical shift in 
production capacity within sectors with a consequent acceleration of 
industrial pollution intensity in developing countries.56 
The fourth factor contributing to globalisation is the (in)ability of states to regulate 
MNCs. While states are certainly capable of legislating nationally in a manner which 
they deem to be necessary, they are also influenced by several extemal factors, such as 
their foreign debt burden and their international law comrnitments. Intemal and external 
factors contribute to a states' ability to enact environrnental regulation and to enforce it.S7 
Not only does a state require the intemal capability to develop an environmental policy, 
and to enact it, but it M e r  requires the fmancial, technical and infrastructural means to 
implement it. Furthermore, a state must feel capable of such an enactment on an 
international basis. Obligations, especially in the case of a foreign debt burderQ8 make 
54~bid. at 7. 
5 S ~ .  Graham. "Environmental Protection & the Statesw (1998) 16(1) The Brookings Rev. 22 at 23. 
56''~ynthesis Report", supra note 53 at 1 1. 
57~actors which have been cited as influencing a state's implementation and cornpliance with 
environmental regulation are: its physical conditions; history; culture; economy; political institutions; 
public opinion; administrative capacity ; leadership; NG Os (non-governmental organisations); know ledge 
and information; epistemic communities; pre-existing traditions, legislation and regulations; and, the 
international environment, including international momenturn. See H.K. Jacobson & E.B. Weiss, 
"Strengthening Cornpliance with International Environmental Accords: Prelirninw Observations fiom a 
Collaborative froject" (1995) 1 Global Gov. 119 at 144. 
5 8 ~ o r  a discussion of the environmental implications of foreign debt see P. Adams. Odious Deors: Loare 
Lending, Corruption and the Thiid World's Environmental Legacy (Toronto: Earthscan, t 99 1). 
the implementation of environmental regdations impractical, if not impossible. The 
result is that states balance the degree of environmental regulation which they are capable 
of maintainhg and enforcing, against the costs of such a reguiation and its projected 
relative success. In this regard the policy choices of developed and developing states will 
Vary. Because the rnajority of transnational corporations are owned by citizens of 
developed states," these governments are pressured and Iobbied to a greater extent to 
make policies which are favourable to their corporate citizenry. In contrast, developing 
states' govemments who act as a host to a MNC will find themselves in a different 
situation, and may offer incentives as an inducement for a MNC to locate. 
In an effort to control MNCs, governrnents have attempted to regulate them nationally in 
various ways, such as by requiring a percentage of local ownership in a subsidiary." In 
addition they can attempt to control the amount of repatriation of profits from a 
subsidiary, or the exports of certain types of capital and products.61 Some govemments 
have even utilised blacklists or embargoes against particular MNCs.62 
At the international level, the most eamest attempt began in the mid- 1970s when the 
United Nations was approached by a group of developing states with the request that a 
Code of Conduct be drafied to regulate MNCs.63 Work on a ciraft code was conducted by 
the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) from 1977 to 1992, 
consisting of 19 rounds of negotiationa However, industry lobbying at the United 
59~app, supra note 25 at 106, where it is stated that out of the world's largest 44 MNCs, only one is based 
in a developing state. 
6016id at 107. 
611bid 
621bid. 
63 lbid. at 107. 
"M. Finger & J. Kilcoyne, "Why Transnational Corporations are Organizing to 'Save the Global 
Environment"' ( 1997) 27(4) The Ecologist 138 at 138-9. 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), in 1992, was 
successful in excluding any mention of the regulation of MNC activities fiom the fmai 
text of Agenda 21-65 Not only were al1 the UNCED agreements silent with respect to any 
regulation of MNCs, but the regulation of these entities was in fact decreased66 when the 
UNCED secretariat "promoted self-regdation through a Business Council for Sustainable 
Development1'.67 In 1993 the draft Code of Conduct for MNCs was rejected and the 
UNCTC was closed.68 
It is the fact that MNCs are private enterprises which makes the ability to regulate them 
using international law difficult, but notwithstanding this, MNCs can be regulated by 
international law in both direct and indirect ways.69 While international guidelines and 
codes can provide non-binding direct ways to influence MNC decision-making, 
international conventions can indirectly regulate MNCs by requiring their Parties to 
implement national legislation in accordance with the convention's intent." Indirect 
regulation is problematic because the proper application of the instruments' pnnciples is 
uncertain, and procedurally they are inadequate to meet the needs of environmental 
65/bid. at 139 and also United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Agendo 
2 1: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, UN Doc. NCONF. 1 5 Ii26IRev. 1 (Vol.I), cited to 
(visited 4 December 1997) <http://www.igc.apc.org/habitat/agenda2 l> mereinafter Agenda 2 I l .  
""TNCS", supra note 3 1 at 13. 
67/bid 
6 8 ~ .  Khor, "Effects of Globalisation on Sustainable Development After LMCED" ( 1997) 8 1/82 Third 
World Resurgence 5 at 10. 
6 9 ~ . ~ .  Hamilton, "Regulation of Corporations Under International Environmental Law" (Address to the 
Canadian Council on International Law, 19-2 1 October 1989, Ottawa, Ontario) in Canadian Council on 
International Law, ed., Preserving the Global Environment: Proceedings of 1989 Conference of the 
Canadian Council on International Law 72. 
70~bid. at 73-84. Examples cited for direct regulation are: the UN. draR Code of Conducr, the OECD 
Guidefines fir Multinational Enterprises, the international Labour Organisation Tripartite Declaration on 
Principles Concerning Multinafional Enterprka and Social Policy, and the ICC Environmental Gui&lines 
for World Industry. The examples cited for indirect regulation are: the Trail Smelter decision, the Co& 
Channel case, and the Basel Convention on the Control of Transbounabry Movements of H~ardous Wastes 
and their Disposai. For a discussion of these international instruments and decisions see fbid 
claims? In addition, few states enact national legislation in accordance with their 
international obligations, thereby leaving many MNCs free fiom regdation, and those 
who do enact legislation, cannot apply it against those MNCs who operate outside of 
their home state? 
Recently international agreements have begun to place restrictions directly upon private 
parties." This hybrid form of instrument contains provisions which both directly 
regulate MNCs and require member states to execute national legislation with the same 
intentions.74 Examples of this type of instrument are the international conventions which 
proscribe third party liability for nuclear darnage and oil pollution.75 
An M e r  illustration of the difficulty in regulathg MNCs can be found in their recent 
adoption of a 'green' facade. Since 1984, MNCs have been attempting to portray 
themselves, not as the harbingers of environmental destruction, but as  
environmentalists.76 Recognising the challenge of developing a global sustainable 
economy, MNCs see themselves as agents of global progress: 
... corporations are the only organisations with the resources, the 
technology, the global reach, and, ultimately, the motivation to achieve 
sustainability.77 
7 5 ~ o r  a discussion of these instruments see Section 5.4 of this thesis. 
a discussion of the origins of the World Industry Council for the Environment, who lobbies on 
environmental issues for industry, see P, Chatte jee & M. Finger, The Emh Brokers: Power. Politics and 
World Datelopment (London: Routledge, 1994) at 1 14. 
7 7 ~ . ~ .  Hart., "Beyond Greening: Strategies for a Sustainable World" (1997) 75(1) Harv. Bus. Rev. 66 at 67. 
Following UNCED, industry began to embrace sustainable development as a slogan and 
aim for itself. 
The Earth Summit marked the coming of age of corporate 
environmentalism - the melding of ecological and economic globdisation 
into a coherent ideology that has paved the way for the transnationals to 
reconcile, in theory and rhetoric, their ubiquitous hunger for profits and 
growth with the stark realities of poverty and environmentai destniction.78 
While MNCs have instigated some changes in their technologies and practices which 
have had a positive environmental effect, they have also allegedly been able to 
"appropriate the language and images of ecology and sustainability" to their own 
advantage, thereby slowing down the public pressure to make greater changes.79 
Sustainable development.0 as a term, has also been coopted by transnational corporations 
through their "absorbing the question of ecological sustainability into theu ovemding 
agenda of economic globaii~ation".8~ As another author has stated: 
Sustainable development ... has brought us to this point, where the rich 
and powerful have become the self-appointed stewards of the welfare of 
the masses and the environment in their global village, where concem for 
the environment has become a critical way through which to claim that 
political stewardship and the rïght to create the values which will govem 
the human comrnunity." 
As a slogan, sustainable development is used by corporations in the context of a need for 
strong economic efficiency, rather than in c o ~ e c t i o n  with wider issues or a real 
'*J. Karliner, "The Greening of Global Reach: Corporate Environmentalism Cornes of Age" ( 1 997) 85 
Third World Resurgence 6 at 7. 
79 1bid 
8"The term 'sustainable development' gained international acceptance after its appearance in 1987. It States: 
a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, 
the orientation of technical development, and institutiona1 change are al1 in harmony and 
enhance both current and friture potential to meet human needs and aspirations. 
World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1987) at 46. 
8i  ~arliner, supra note 78 at 7. 
"E.B. Ross, "Environment, Economy and Equity: Challenging the Consensus on Sustainabie 
DeveIopment" (Address for SCHOLAS Public Lecture, 1 November 1996). 
cornmitment toward change? However, this confiscation of sustainable development 
has worked in their favour, because public perception of MNCs has changed: 
Industry . ..enjoys an enhanced reputation as a force for environrnental 
hprovement, with increasing public acceptance of the message that it is 
possible to be both 'c1eant and profitable. Processes and products have 
been rethought and, more and more, solutions appear which benefit both 
the environment and product sales." 
Part of this transformation can be attributed to the Business Council on Sustainable 
Development (BCSD), a group of 48 chief executive officers, of  some of the largest 
corporations in the world, which later merged with the World Industry Council for the 
Environment to form the World Business Council for Sustainable Development.8S A 
publication released by the BCSD, pior  to the Earth Summit, highlighted the four pillars 
of corporate environrnentalism, and therefore, of sustainable development: open and 
cornpetitive trade; pncing mechanisms to reflect environmental costs; self-regulation; 
and, cleaner production and more efficient use of resources.86 
The question is, are corporations really becoming more environmentally aware? While 
corporations have begun to adopt voluntary environrnental standards,87 corporate 'green' 
executives Say that their greatest intemal contact and support cornes from legal, 
production and public relations departments and their lowest with fuiancelaccounting and 
8 3 ~ .  Casagrande, Ir. & R. Welford, "ïhe Big Brothers: Transnational Corporations, Trade Organizations 
and Multi lateral Financial Institutions" in R. Wel for& ed., Hijacking Environmentaiism: Corporate 
Responres to Sustainable Deveiopment (London: Earthscan, 1997) 13 7 at 152. 
8 4 ~ . ~ .  Long, "Environmental Regulation: The Third Generationn (1 997) 206 The OECD Observer 14 at 15. 
8s~arliner, supra note 78 at 8. 
861bid. at 8. 
8 7 ~ o r  a discussion o f  this pint see J. Nash & J. Ehrenfeld, "Code Green: Business Adop& Voluntary 
Environmental Standards" (1996) 38(1) Env. 16. 
8 8 ~ .  lames, "What Makes a Green Executive?" (1996) 7(6) Our Planet 28 at 28. 
This suggests that legislation and image remain the drivhg forces behind 
environmental action and that most companies still pay too Iittle attention 
to integrating the environment with the finances and people that make up 
thei. IifebloodP 
As such, the current trend of states toward deregdation of MNCs may be a big rnistake. 
Having established the global context of MNCs, it is now possible to undertake an 
examination of the chemical industry and its environmentai impact. 
2.2 The ChemCaf lndustry 
In 1998 the chemical industry celebrated its past seventy-five years of progress? This 
industry in 1923 was "a handhil of companies that made organic compounds and 
marketed them to users such as textile makers, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and 
explosives producers", but since then the industryfs product range has diversified to 
include petrochemical products, rubber, pharmaceuticals, paints, fertilisers, polymers, 
textile dyes, artificial fibres, photographie products, pesticides, and napalm.9t 
The global market for chemical sales for the world's top 50 chemical producers92 was 
estimated at $383 billion in 1996P3 The global market for pesticides alone in that year 
89 1bid 
90~or  a discussion of the changes in the chemical industry in the past seventy-five years see M.S. Reisch, 
"75 Years of Industrial Progress: From Coal Tar to Crafting a Wealth of Diversity" (1998) 76(2) Chem. & 
Eng. News 79. 
91~bid.  at 79,79-109. 
92~hese  producen, listed in descending rank by sales volume for 1996, are: BASF, Hoechsî, Bayer, Dow, 
DuPont, Shell, Novartis, ICI, Exxon, Elf Aquitaine, Rhône-Poulenc, Dainippon Ink & Chemicals, Toray 
Industries, Mitsubishi Chemical, Monsanto, Veba, Surnitorno Chernical, Norsk Hydro, ENI, Akzo Nobel, 
General Electric, Union Carbide, Henkel, Formosa Plastics Group, Solvay, DSM, Amoco, Air Liquide, 
SABIC, British Petroleum, Asahi Chemical, Showa Denko, Total, Eastman Chemical, Unilever, Huntsman 
Corp., Occidental Petroleum, Praxair, BOC, Degussa, Sekusui C hemical, Zeneca, AlliedSignaI, Rohm and 
Haas, Roche, Acro Chemical, Ashland, Mitsui Petrochemical, Air Products, and Mitsui Toatsu. See P.L. 
Layman, "Slowdown for Global Top 50: Petrochemical Cycle Pulled Down Total Sales of World's Largest 
Chernical Producers Last Year Following Strong 1995" (1997) 75(29) Chem. & Eng. News 15 at 16. 
931bid at 15. 
was $30 billion.% Even though total chernical sales had dropped by 3% for the world's 
50 largest chernical producers in 1996P5 it did not stop economists fkom forecasting a 
"rosy" 1997 for U.S. chemical producers, including projected growth in developing 
Markets outside the US. offer the greatest growth potential for chernicals 
and pharmaceuticals businesses (sic) over the long terrn. Many 
companies are more willing to make investments in developing countries 
because many of those counhies have embraced liberalized trade policies, 
allow companies to take majority ownership positions, and permit 
companies to take their profits home? 
Even industry presidents subscribe to such a view, as DuPont's president and chief 
executive officer, John A, Kr01 stated: 
Countries worldwide would benefit from continued DuPont expansion, but 
that will happen only if govemments reduce trade restraints, protect 
intellectual property, and formulate rational environmental policies..P8 
DuPont announced that it anticipates to "double its business in Central and Eastern 
Europe, the Middle East, and Africa from around $650 million ... to $1.4 billion in 
2000".w Part of the reason for industry expansion into the developing States is likely 
attributable to the existence of Export Processing Zones which can provide advantages to 
corporations through their physical, social and economic isolation from the host state. lm 
W " ~ ~ ~ :  Convention on Dangerous Chernicals and Pesticides" (1998) 28(2) Env. Pol'y & L. 75 at 76 
hereinafier " Dangerous"] . 
I5Layman, supro note 92 at 15. 
%M. Reisch "Global Chemical Outlook Bright: Stmng Demand Will Especially Benefit US. Producers" 
(1997) 75(12) Chem. & Eng. News 1 l(1) at 1 l(1). 
97~uoting Roger E. Brinner, executive director and chief economist for DRVMcGraw-Hill. Lexington. 
Massachusetts, ibid 
98~uo ted  to M. Resich, "lmprove Business Climates, DuPont Urges Governments" (1997) 75(9) Chem. & 
Eng. News 12(1) at 12(1). 
991bid 
 or M e r  information on Export Processing Zones, see: M. Barlow. "Maquiladoras of the North" 
(October 1997) Cdn. Forum 9; A. Dowla, "Export Processing Zones in Bangladesh: The Economic Impact1' 
(1997) XXXVII(6) Asian Survey 561; D.W. Eaton, "Transformation of the Maquiladora Industry: The 
Driving Force Behind the Creation of a NAFTA Regional Economy" (1997) 14(3) Ariz. J. Intll& Comp. L. 
746; E.A. Ellis, "Bordering on Disaster: A New Attempt to Control the Transboundary Effects of 
Maquiladora Pollution" (1996) 30 Val. U.L. Rev. 621; D. Keet, "Export Processing Zone: Strategies in the 
The year 1997 did prove to be kind to the indutry, with the Asian financial crisis causing 
little impact.lol Looking ahead at 1998, and using predictors such as forecasted G r o s  
Domestic Product (GDP), consumer spending and innation, it has been said that this year 
the industry may experience modest growth if there is no trade war arising fiom the 
Asian currency cnsis and if the trends continue to follow the GDP. Io2 Initial reports for 
the 30 major U.S. chemical producers, on the second quarter for 1998, show that there 
has been a decline of 4% fiom last years' second quarter with sales falling 2% to a 
combined $43.6 billion. '03 
In addition to having a history of economic prowess, the chernical industry has one of 
extensive environmental impacts. While some of these impacts are evidenced by the 
aniline dye manufacturers of the 1800'~,10~ the spraying of DDT,IOS the continuing 
production and manufacture of the pesticide methyl bromide,106 and the antics of the 
Context of Regional Cooperation and Development, and a Globalized Economy" (1996) 26(4) AFn'ca 
Insight 354; D.J. Smith, "Survey on Free Zones: How Far WiIl the Gulf's Ftee Zones Go?" (1998) 276 The 
Middle East 37; L.S. Vanhoose, "Extemal Harms: Toyota, the Japanese "Maquiladora", and the Need for 
Countries to Regulate Their Nationals Abroad" (1992-93) J. Nat. Res. & Env. L. 439; and, E.J. Williams, 
"The Maquiladora Industry and Environmental Degradation in the United States - Mexico Borderlands" 
(1996) 27 St. Mary's LJ. 765. 
101"~acts & Figures for the Chemical indumy" (29 June 1998) Chem. & Eng. News, cited to (visited 15 
August 1 998) <http://pu bs.acs.org/hotartci/cenear/980629/facts2.htm1~. 
Io2"world Chemical Outlook" (1997) 75(20) Chem. & Eng. News 17. See this edition of the journal for a 
more detailed analysis of the projected 1998 market for the global chemica1 industry. 
lo3w. Storck, "Earnings Slump in Second Quarter: lmproved Productivity and Lower Costs Helped Hold 
the Decline in Check" (1998) 76(33) Chem. & Eng. News, cited to (visited 26 August 1998) 
<httpY/pubs.acs.org/isub~~riWjounial~i33/htmV7633bus 1 .html#7633bus 1 tab 1 >. 
lMSee AS. Travis, "Poisoned Groundwater and Contaminated Soil: The Tribulations and Tria1 of the First 
Major Manufacturer of Aniline Dyes in Basel" (1997) 2(3) Env. Hist. 343. 
OSsee R. Carson, Silent Spring (Boston: Houghton Mi fflin, 1962). 
lo6~ethy1 bromide, manufactured by giant corporations like Elf Autochem, is toxic to human health and 
the environment. 
The features which make methyl bromide "almost the perfect pesticide" - its high toxicity 
to pests and its ability to penetrate fùmigated substances - also increase its toxicity to 
humans. Exposure to rnethyl bromide can cause acute damage to the centrai nervous 
system, Iungs, kidneys, eyes and skin. In theù "risk assessment" research, scientists have 
not found a dose of methyl bromide Iow enough for them to deem "safe". 
Notwithstanding a recognition of this pesticide's hannfid effects, the industry has been: 
22 
asbestos and rubber corporations,l07 its environmental impact can be more profoundly 
illustrated by the production of pesticides. 
The pesticide industry has production facilities in both developed and developing states, 
but of the fi@ top chemical producers in the world only two originate kom developing 
and newly industridised states.1°8 Some of the production facilities of the world's top 
producers can be found in Brazil, India, China, Mexico, Argentina, Indonesia, Venezuela, 
Malaysia, Turkey, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand and Colombia.Iog Larger 
developing states such as BraP1, India and Mexico also produce their own pesticides for 
domestic and exporting needs, using active ingredients purchased fiom other faci1ities.I Io 
These products generally are those for which patent rights no longer exist, such as DDT 
and Parathion.ul While developing states account for only 25% of al1 worldwide 
... lobbying hard for the Montreal Protocol to institute a later phase-out date for Third 
World countries while simultaneously circumnavigating the globe to create thriving 
methyl bromide markets throughout Asia, Africa and Latin Arnerica, in particular, 
Mexico, Kenya, Morocco, Jordan and China. Global methyl bromide sales increased by 
more than 50 percent from 1984 to 1992, growing fiom roughly 45,000 tonnes to more 
than 75,000 tonnes. 
See Elf Autochem, "There are Faster Routes to Building Your Molecules" (1997) 75(22) Chem. & Eng. 
News, Back Cover, J. Karliner, A. Morales, & D. OfRourke, "The Barons of Bromide: The Corporate 
Forces Behind Toxic Poisoning & Ozone Depletion" (1997) 27(3) The Ecologist 90 at 90-97- Methyl 
bromide was one of the banned substances under the Montreal Protocol, see Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Delete the &one Lqer  (as amended), 16 September 1987.26 1.L.M. 1 550, cited to (1996) 
2 1 Int'l Env. Rep. 3 1 5 1, article 2H mereinafter Montreal ProtocolJ. 
l o7~or  an account of the lobby against ending the trade in asbestos, see J. Harrod & V. Thorpe, Asbesfos: 
Politics and Economics of a Lethal Produet (Geneva: international Federation of Chemical, Energy and 
General Workers' Unions, 1984). See also an account of the rubber industry in J. Harrod, Health Hazarrds 
in the Rubber Industty: An International Report (Brussels international Federation of Chemical, Energy 
and General Workers' Unions, 1988). 
Io8see footnote 92. In this list al1 producers originate in the states of Germany, US., U.K., Netherlands, 
France, Japan, Norway, Italy, Belgiwn, or Switzerland, except for Formosa Plastics Group fiom Taiwan, 
and SABIC from Saudi Arabia. 
109~righk supra note 19 at 2-3. 
l0lbid at 3-4. 
llbid at 4. 
pesticide use,l12 it is the danger associated with these products and the unregdated nature 
of their expoa which is problematic. 
The US., a major pesticide producer, exported in 1996 a total of 687,601,508 pounds of 
pesticides.113 This increased substantidly fiom the 100.4 million pounds exported in 
1992. 14 However, these figures have been described as coaservativei '5 because: 
... between 1992 and 1996, more than 2 billion pounds of pesticides left 
U.S. ports with their specific chernical names omitted from publicly 
accessible shipping records. In many cases the description is simply 
"pesticide", or "weed killing compound"; in others, trade names or 
abbreviations are used which cannot be found in publicly-accessible 
pesticide dictionaries, reference books or online databases. 1 l6  
In addition, for confidentiality reasons pesticide exporters can have their names withheld 
from the Port Import Export Reporting Service transcripts.117 This means that the shipper 
of an export will only be identified as "Order" in the port records. 1 18 In 1 994 the volume 
of pesticides shipped with the exporter identified as "Order" reached a total of 281.1 
million pounds, nearly doubling fiom the 1992 volume. l9 
To compound this situation, at least 2 1 million pounds of the pesticides exported in 1995- 
96 were forbidden for use in the U.S.120 Pesticides c m  be classified in severd different 
12~. Knirsch, "Pesticide Life Cycle Analysis: A Case Study in Niger" (1 995) 5(1) Global Pesticide 
Campaigner, cited to (visited 27 August 1998) 
< opher?//gopher.igc.apc.org:2998/OPESïIS/r.9042232 10.247093 1 > at 1. 5 C. Smith, "Exporting Risk: Pesticide Exports h m  U.S. Portsn ( 1998) 8(2) Global Pesticide 
Campaigner, cited to (visited 27 August 1998) 
<gophetl//gopher.igc.apc.org:2998/OPESTfS/r.9042232 1024709. IO> mereinafier "Exporting"]. 
14c. Smith, "Exporting Risk: Pesticide Exports from US. Ports 1992-94" (1 996) 6(2) Global Pesticide 
Campaigner, cited to (visited 27 August 1998) 
<gopher?/lgopher.igc.apcpcorg:2998/0PESTI2232 10.24709.28> bereinafter "Exporting 1992-94"]. 
i151bid at 1. 
I 16n~xporting". supra note 1 13 at 1. 
17"~xporting 1992-94", supra note 1 14 at 4. 
l 18ibid 
l 19ibid 
120'*~xporting", supra note 1 13 at 1. 
categories in relation to their permissible use within a state such as unregistered, 
suspended, discontinued registration, restricted, severely restricted, or banned, but this 
does not affect their ability to be exported to other states. Between 1995-96, at least 14 
tons of banned and unregistered pesticides, 8 tons of severely restricted pesticides, and 
106 tons of restricted pesticides were exported from the U.S each day.122 The majority of 
these pesticides were exported to developing states. '23 
Developing states are generally il1 prepared to handle these compounds because of lower 
worker safety rneasures and inappropriate storage and disposal methods.124 A case study 
in Niger, concentrathg on three commonly used insecticides, found problems with 
storage and transportation, deficiencies in labelling, packaging and product quality, and a 
lack of safety equipment for workers such as rubber boots and face r n a s k ~ . ~ ~ ~  In addition, 
the study found that manufacturers of the products had not complied with the 
requirements for product responsibility found in the voluntary United Nations Food and 
Agricultural Organisation (FAO), International Code of Condm on the Distribution and 
Use of Pesticides.126 Based on this information, it is not surprising that 50% of pesticide- 
related illness and 72.5% of fatal pesticide poisonings occur in developing states. 12' 
I 2 h e  classifications of banned, restricted and severely restricted reflect the acceptable risk associated 
with a pesticide's use based upon environmental and health considerations. A banned pesticide is one 
which is forbidden for use, a restricted pesticide has certain restrictions placed upon who c m  use the 
chernical or in what context, and a severely restricted pesticide is one for which almost al1 uses have been 
prohibited. For a discussion of a11 of these terms see "Exporting 1992-94", supra note f 14 at 1-2, and 
"Exporting", supra note 1 13 at 4-5. 
lU"~xponing", ibid at 4. 
lulbia! at 1. 
124Knirsch, supro note 1 12. 
'Zlbid at 2- 3. 
1261bid at 3-4. Also see Internoional Code of Conduct on the Distribulion and Use cf Perticidec (as 
amended), t 985, cited CO H. Hohmann, ed., Basic Principles of International Emironmental Law, vol. 1 
(London: Graham & Trotman, 1992) 173 hereinafter International Code]. The International Code is 
discussed in Section 4.1 of this thesis. 
127Knirsch, supra note 1 12 at 1. 
Another problem faced by developing states is the need to destroy obsolete pesticide 
stocks. It has been estimated that there are more than 100,000 tonnes of obsolete 
pesticide stocks in developing states, many of which are highly toxic and persistent 
compounds, such as "Aldrin, DDT, Dieldrin, Endrin, HCH, Lindane, Malathion, [and] 
Parathion" .12* The $80 million required to clean-up these stocks has prirnarily corne from 
a few developed states, although recently the chemical industry has agreed to "finance on 
a case-by-case bais up to 30 percent of disposal co~ts".'~g 
These examples highlight the dangers associated with the use of pesticides and also 
demonstrate the intercomectedness between producers and users. The chemical 
industry's fiiture needs to be legaily shaped so as to balance the need for environmental 
protection and human health, against the economic drive which these corporations 
exhibit. The future of the chemical industry, fiom its own perspective, c m  perhaps best 
be stated using the words of Robert B. Shapiro, chairman and chief executive officer of 
Monsanto Company. 130 
The multinational corporation is an impressive innovation for dealing with 
the tension between the application of broadly interesting ideas on the one 
hand and economic and cultural differences on the other. Companies like 
ours have gotten pretty good at figuring out how to operate in places 
where we can make a living while remaining tme to some Cundamental 
rules. As more countries enter the world economy, they are accepting - 
with greater or lesser enthusiasm - that they are going to have to play by 
1 2 8 ~ ~ ~ ,  FAO: Problem of Obsolete Pmicide Stocks Desemes Greater Attention by Donor Countria and 
fndusfry? Press Release 98/15 (1998), cited to (visited 27 August 1998) 
~http~lw.fao.org/waicent/ois/press%5 Fne/presseng/ 1 998/pren98 1 S.htm> at 1 .  The unique qua1 i ties of 
persistent organic pesticides are discussed in a Chapter 5.0 of the thesis. See footnote 587 and 
accompanying text. 
1291bid. at 2. 
1301. Magretta, "Growth Through Global Sustainability: An Interview With Monsanto's CEO. Robert B. 
Shapiro" (1997) 75(1) Harv. Bus. Rev. 78. 
some rules that are new to them. My guess is that, over time, 
sustainability is going to be one of those ruies.13' 
What is troublesome is not the need for sustalliability, but that the chernical industry may 
be allowed to define sustainability to match their own 'greent image. 
2.3 Summing Up 
The ability of MNCs to move globally according to their own preferences, while having 
merit, also has obvious disadvantages, especially if environmental regulations are 
permissive and therefore capable of being abused by corporate agendas. A main 
contributor to this ability to relocate is the increasing liberalisation of trade and 
investment policies. The fear is that the global trend toward harmonising liberalisation 
policies "may create incentives for companies to relocate to jurisdictions with lower 
levels of environmental regulation and lower cornpliance costsfl.132 While recognising 
that liberalised capital and investment can aid in the move toward sustainable 
development, some cal1 for the integration of environmental conditions directly into trade 
agreements. 133 The merits of such an assertion will be examined next. 
13'lbid at 88. 
u2"~ynthesis Report" supra note 53 at 1 I . 
Hudson, "Explonng the Relationship Between Investment, Trade and Environment" in OECD, 
Environmental Policies and Inhsrrial Compefifiveness (Paris: OECD, 1993) 130 at 1 30. 
3.0 Liberalisation of Trade and Foreign Direct Investment 
Liberalisation refers to policies which have been undertaken in an attempt to privatise 
and deregulate the global market. In such a conceptualisation, "production and 
distribution are ... organized in accordance with decentralimd, private-sector patterns 
coordinated by the market," rather than in a centralised manner by govemrnentsP 
The importance of examining trade and investment policies stems Eom the fact that these 
policy decisions affect, not only the extent of "urban and rurai poverty, [the] globalization 
of capital, and the survival of the state"i35 but the heaith of the global environment. 
Therefore an analysis of the effects of liberalisation upon the environment, and the means 
through which it is being expressed, will be undertaken. 
3.1 Trade Versus Environment 
A discussion of liberalisation requires an examination of the nexus between trade and the 
state of the environment. It has been said that "trade policy is becoming the f o m  for 
deciding whether the global economy will be based on the ethics of sustainable 
development or on laissez-faire market prin~iples"."~ Therefore, trade liberalisation 
becomes a focal point of any de teda t ion  of the future of the global environment. The 
fact that "trade liberalisation initiatives have been generally carried out without attention 
i 3 4 ~ .  Ricupero, "Privitization, the State and International Institutions" (1997) 50(2) J. Int'l Affairs 409 at 
409. 
i 3 S ~ . ~ .  Chrisîy, "Markets or Govemment? Balancing Imperfect and Complementaiy Alternatives" (1 996) 
78(5) Amer. J. Agr. Econ, 1 145 at 1 155. 
136T. Wathen, "A Guide to Trade and the Environment" in D. Zaelke, P. Orbuch & RF. Housman, eds., 
Trade and the Environment: Law. Economics, and Poiicy (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1993) 3 at 4. 
to environmental efle~ts"I3~ M e r  supports the need to advance academic discussion in 
this area. 
A prirnary liberaiisation policy is the promotion of free trade, which has been associated 
with the dominant discourses of comparative advantage, internationalisation, 
globalization and the growth of world markets.138 The term 'free trade' refers to the 
"unlimited exchange of commerce between buyers and sellers across national borders" 
and it is predicated upon the principle of comparative advantage.139 This economic 
principie states that d l  states should produce those products which they can produce most 
efficiently, and trade these with other states for those products which are less efficient for 
them to produce. Theoretically, such a system of trade results in an overall enhancement 
of economic activity for al1 states.140 
There has been a contentious academic debate sunounding the benefits of free trade in 
relation to the environment. The two opposing views which have been advanced are that 
free trade benefits the environment and conversely, that it harms it. Several arguments 
c m  generally be attributed to advocates of free trade, such as an opposition to 
environmental measures that may be detrimental to corporate competition and advocating 
for a harmonisation of environmental regutations.141 This is done in the belief that 
increased trade will be beneficial to the environment because it will stimulate economic 
I3'c. Stevens, "The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Re-emergence of 
the Trade and Environment Debate" in D. Zaelke, P. Orbuch & R.F. Housman, eds., Trade and the 
Environment: Law. Econornics. and Policy (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1993) 83 at 90. 
13*~asagrande, supra note 83 at 137. 
13g~athen ,  supro note 136 at 5. 
140/bid, and United Nations, The Global Partnershipfir Envirotment and Devdopmenf: A Guide to 
A enda 21, Posf Rio Edition (New York: United Nations, 1993 ) at 48. d 'Wathen, supra note 136 at 10. 
development and irnprove environmental protection. 142 Advocates also assert that open 
markets will lead to a more efficient use of naturd resources "by utilizing economies of 
scale, penalizing overproduction, and eliminating subsidies" and, advocate the 
intemalisation of environmental costs in product prices through the use of "process 
standards, pollution taxes and pollution permit[~]".~u International business is a 
supporter of fiee trade: 
Internationally cornpetitive business believes that open markets are the 
most - and perhaps only - effective stimulus to the development of new 
products and technologies needed to both lower costs and to promote 
wider use of products and processes that will reduce environmentally 
destructive and wasteful practices. Open trade, buttressed by 
multilaterally agreed-upon rules that constrain arbitrary government 
actions, is the best way to assure that markets are in fact open to 
cornpetition-1" 
In contrast, some opponents of fiee trade fear increases in corporate flight to states with 
lower environrnental standards, and that specialisation, as a consequence of comparative 
advantage, will continue to focus developing states upon exports of cornrnodities, which 
can be detnmental to the enviroment.145 Contrary to the assertions of free trade 
advocates, environrnentalists also believe that fiee trade will hurt the environment unless 
sustainable development principles are intenvoven into trade policy.146 In addition, they 
assert that a fiee trade system may serve to decrease existing environmental protection if 
a harmonisation of international environmental regulations should result. This is because 
14Z~athen,  supra note 136 at 18. 
143~bid at 1 O, 1 8. 
1 4 4 ~ ~ .  Morris, "A Business Perspective on Trade and the Environment" in D. Zaelke, P- Orbuch & R.F. 
Housman, eds., Trade and the Environment Law, Economics, and Policy (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 
1993) 121 at 123. 
145~athen,  supra note 136 at 10. 
i 46~6 id  at 18. 
harmonisation may serve to lower environmental standards in order to accommodate the 
interests of business and developing States. 147 
A third position present in the literature is that trade and environmental concerns are not 
mutually exclusive. 
There are few inherent conflicts between Iiberal trade and environmental 
protection. Many of the apparent conflicts aise either because countries 
have failed to take appropriate domestic environmental protection 
measures, in which case trade can be the agent but not the root cause of 
environmental degradation, or because the persistence of irnport barriers 
and subsidies themselves misallocates the use of environmental and 
natural resources. Environmentally motivated trade restrictions will not 
solve these conflicts.148 
In this third position, free trade advocates and opponents are described as having the 
same economic ideal: that of making the most efficient use of natural resources. 
Trade liberalization seeks to achieve this goal by allowing countries to 
specialize more fùlly in producing goods and services in which they have 
a comparative advantage, and by allowing consumers to purchase goods 
and services from countries that produce them most efficiently. 
Environmental regulation seeks to achieve the same efficiency goal by 
ensuring that the full incremental costs of production and consurnption, 
including costs imposed on other parties through environmental impacts, 
are reflected in the decisions that producen and consumers face.149 
14'1bid at 1 O. 
I4*C.s. Pearson, "The Trade and Environment Nexus: What is New Since '72" in D, Zaelke, P. Orbuch Br 
R.F. Housman, eds., Trade and the Environment: Law, Econornics, and Policy (Washington, D.C.: Island 
Press, 1993) 23 at 32. 
1 4 9 ~ .  Repetto, "Complementaries Between Trade and Environment Policies" in D. ZaeIke, P. Orbuch & 
R.F. Housman, eds., Trade andthe Environmenri Law, Economics, and Policy (Washington, D.C.: Island 
Press, 1993) 237 at 237. 
One author has suggested that an integration of international trade and environmental 
policy making rnay be the fust step toward improving environmentai protection.Is0 This 
is based upon the observation that there may be a positive relationship between 
competitiveness and environmental quaiity.151 This finding was made in a case study of 
Australia, where "there appear to be economic incentives in the industry, and its markets, 
that enhance environmental quality, which in turn enhances companies' international 
competitiveness".~52 However, how to intepte these two realms remains unclear, and 
would likely have to begin with a sufficient nurnber of GATT and World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) member states expressing such a desire. 153 The author does caution 
that this hypothesis requires more investigation before it is used to replace the current 
presumption that corporations located in states with greater environmental protection are 
less cornpetitive. 154 
This review of the literature reveals that there is a central position between the two 
polarised positions of free trade advocate and free trade opponent. If there is to be any 
change in thk mutuai antagonism it must, of necessity, corne from the international arena, 
because it is from here that the dominant trends towards the liberalisation of trade and 
investrnent are coming. 
Therefore, what is currently lacking intemationaily is an integration between trade and 
investment liberalisation, and sustainable development.155 This lack of integration has 
I 5 O ~ . ~ .  Clark, "Global Cornpetition and Envuonmental Regdation: 1s the 'Race to the Bottom' Inevitable?" 
in R. Eckersley, ed., Mwkets, The State and the Envimnmen~ Tuwards Integtarion (London: Macmillan 
Press, 1996) 229. 
15' lbid. at 247. 
I5*1bid at 250. 
i531bîd at 247. 
i541bid at 253. 
1 5 5 ~ . ~ .  Gontales, "Trade, Invesmient and Sustainable Development" ( 1  997) 7(4) Dev. Alternatives 8. 
32 
been attributed to a contiming separation and compartmentaiisation of environment, 
development, trade and economic policy concems, whether within govemmental 
mi nistries, or amongst intergovermnental organisations.156 In addit ion, a fai lure to 
incorporate all relevant actors into the policy integration process and a lack of political 
will to integrate these policy concerns have resulted in this outcome.ls7 
It would appear that the challenge for govemments is not to lean too far in either 
direction (trade versus environment) but instead to recognise that these two policy 
directions need not be antithetical and therefore, to "design and implement mutually 
supportive policies". 158 As another author has said: 
... the question really becomes not whether trade is bad for the environment 
but whether there are sufficient international safeguards that can 
encourage sustainable trade and discourage trade that is environmentally 
destructive. 159 
It is to an analysis of the current trade and investment initiatives that the discussion now 
turns. 
3.2 GATT and the WTO: 
Intemationally the tems of trade have pnmarily been set by the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), and more recently, the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). In an effort to restore economic activity after World War II, governments 
needed to re-establish international trade. This was dificult due to the use of high tariffs 
i561bid 
1571bid, at 8. 
i 5 8 ~ .  Eglin, "Enlisting the Suppon of Liberal Trade for Environmental Protection and Sustainable 
Development" (1993) 23 Env. L. 697 at 697. 
lSg.l.~. Nissen, "Achieving a Balance Between Trade and the Environment: The Need to Amend the 
WTO/GATT to Include Multilateral Environmentai Agreements" (1997) 28(3) L. & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 90 1 at 
903. 
placed upon imported goods and quota restrictions.160 For this reason, it was decided that 
a multilateral trade agreement was required, and GA ïT 1 94 761  was negotiated. 
GATT 1917 entered into force on January 1, 1948,162 and "is [a] major multilateral 
agreement on trade rules, providing a framework for international trade policy and a 
forum for trade disputes".1s It was premised upon three key ideas: that tanffs should be 
reduced; that there be non-discrimination amongst GATT 1947 members; and that there 
be a transparency of non-tariff barrien to trade.164 
GATT 1947 was originally only intended to be a provisional agreement until the 
International Trade Organisation (ITO) agreements were signed. l65 Later, when the ITO 
agreements failed to be ratified, GATT 1947 became an "dl-purpose trade treaty".166 
Since 1947, the GATT 1947 has been amended on various occasions with the most recent, 
and eighth round of negotiations, beginning in 1986. The premise behind these 
negotiations, also known as the Uruguay Round, was that continued expansion and 
liberalisation of trade was necessary for al1 States. 
The growth of worid trade and financial flows over many years has 
provided an important basis for the development of nations; in the past 
year it has provided virtually al1 growth in the industrial nations. The 
opportunity to enhance the contribution of trade to overall economic 
activity in the decades to corne, through providing greater stability by 
6 0 ~ . ~ .  H udec, Enforcing hternationaf Traie Law: The Evohtion of zhe Modern GA TT Legai System 
(Salem, New Hampshire: Butterworth Legal, 1993) at 4. 
I 6 b ~ 7 T  1947, s u p  note 43. 
1 6 2 ~ .  GroOmann, "Fi@ Years of GATT" (January/Februaiy 1998) Intereconomics 1 at 1. 
163 ~athen ,  supra note 136 at 6. 
1641bid at 1 1. 
1 6 5 ~ .  Stiles, "Negotiating Institutional Reform: The Uruguay Round, the GATT, and the WTO" (1996) 2 
Global Gov. 119 at 121. 
'%1bid. at 12 1 . 
updating and strengthening rnultilateral trading d e s  and liberalized trade 
in al1 secton is within grasp.167 
States were also warned of the dangers of failing to complete the Uruguay Round 
negotiations: 
Failure to conclude would validate the rishg wave of protectionist rhetoric 
and increase the danger of a vicious circle in which heightened 
protectionkm irnpedes economic recovery, and the lack of recovery in 
tum feeds protectionist pressure. Experïence shows that defensive 
measures to protect sensitive industries may preserve jobs in those 
industries for a short tirne, but will destroy jobs elsewhere - nationally and 
globally - through increased prices and taxes, lower wages, and lower job 
growth. Liberal trade, based on clear and predictable d e s ,  on the other 
hand, leads to a virtuous circle of lower prices, higher wages, and more 
vigorous job growth.1" 
States obviously heeded this advice as the Uruguay Round negotiations were concluded 
on December 15, 1993.169 The new multilateral trade agreement, the Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiationsl70 sets both the 
structure of international trade law and has sought "to further the goal of free 
international tradew.I7' To this end, new multilateral rules for the conduct of trade in 
services, intellectual property, agriculture, and textiles and clothing, were includedY2 
The negotiations also resulted in a proposal for the WTO "which would finaliy fiIl the 
gap in the post-war econornic reconstruction established at Bretton Woods".[n 
i 6 7 ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  Media Relations Division, "Bretton Woods Institutions Urge Decisive Action to Conclude the - 
Uruguay Round" (1993) 102 Focus: GATT Newsletter 1 at 3. 
1681bid, at 3. 
1 6 9 ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  Media Relations Division, "Success! The Most Comprehensive Round Ever is Concluded" 
( 1993) 1 O4 Focus: GATT Newsletter 1 at 1 Fereinafter llSuccessl']. 
70~ina i  Act Enrbodying the Resuits of the Uruguay Round of MuItifateraf Trcde Negotiatiom, 1 5 A prïl 
1994, (1994) 33 1.L.M. 1 143, cited to (visited August 16, 1998) 
<http://www.wto.or~Wto~egavfinaIact.ht [hereinafier Final Acf]. 
1 7 1 ~ . ~ .  Schoenbaum, "International Trade and Protection of the Envimnrnent: The Continuing Search for 
Reconciliation" (1997) 9 1 Amer. J. Int'l LI 268 at 271. 
172"~uccess", supra note 169 at 2. 
73 1bid 
The WTO was oficially established on April 15, 1994, in Marrakesh, Morocco, when 
more than one hundred govemment Ministers signed the Final Act of the Uruguay 
Round.174 The Final Act contains 28 agreements and is estirnated will "add some U.S. 
$755 billion to world exports and raise incomes by some $235 billion anouallyt1.~7s 
The WTO is an umbrella organisation designed to administer GATT and other 
international trade agreements.176 The WTû's role is to "oversee the implementation of 
the Round's results, administer al1 the agreements in goods, services and intellectual 
property, and mange the unified dispute senlement system", as well as raising the 
political profile of trade and acting as a forum for future trade negotiationsY7 The 
legally-binding rules of the WTO has led it to be characterised as evidence of the 
increasing institutionalisation of the globalisation process.178 
In a speech by His Majesty King Hassan II, at the closing of the signing ceremony for the 
Final Act, the environment is mentioned as a challenge which requires further 
consideration: 
By bringing into being the World Trade Organization today, we are 
enshrining the rule of law in international economic and trade relations, 
thus setting universal d e s  and disciplines over the temptations of 
unilateralisrn and the law of the jungle ... Regardless of the size of our 
economies, fiom now on we shall al1 enjoy the sarne rights and be subject 
to the same obligations. We share the same goals and must meet the same 
challenges: tackling the scourge of unemployment, redressing the problem 
I7%~TT, Media Relations Division, "The WTO 1s Born" (1994) 107 Focus: GATT Newsletter 1 at 1 
[hereinafter " WTO 1s Born"], and Finui Act, supra note 1 70. 
17511WT0 1s Born", ibid 
1 7 6 ~ . ~ .  Snoderly, "Clearing the Air: Environmental Regulation, Dispute Resolution, and Domestic 
Sovereignty Under the World Trade Organization" (1996) 22(1) N.C.J. Int'l L. & Corn. Reg. 24 1 at 242. 
1 7 7 ~ .  Sutherland., "Global Trade - The Next Challenge" (1994) 105 Focus: GATT Newsletter 5 at 5. 
178"~lobalisation Must be Brought Under UN Fmework" (1 997) 8 1/82 Third World Resurgence 40 at 4 1. 
of social exclusion, or hding appropnate ways of responding to Our 
environmental and other concems.179 
The environment, as an issue, was not a concem to original GAZT 1947 negotiators, and 
as such, the word does not appear in the te~t. '~O Environmental issues were only a 
concern for a member state who believed that another member's environmental 
regulations adversely affected them. In such an instance, they could request that the 
matter be resolved through GATT I9V.s  dispute resolution process, in an attempt to fmd 
the regulation invalid by virtue of its inconsistency with GA ïT 1947's trade rule~.~gl 
The Final Act  also did not result in the inclusion of any provisions dealing specifically 
with the environ ment,'^ even though negotiators did recognise that "it was no longer 
redistic for GATT representatives to leave environmental issues to environmentai experts 
because trade and environrnental issues now often intersect".lg3 The Preamble of the 
Agreement Establishing the WorZd Trade Organization states: 
... relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be 
conducted with a view to raising standards of living, enswing full 
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and 
effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and 
services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in 
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to 
protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing 
so in a marner consistent with their respective needs and concems at 
different levels of economic development. ls4 
i 7 9 ~ . ~ .  King Hassan II, Address (GATT Ministerial Conference, 15 April 1994) as quoted in G A m ,  
Media Relations Division, "WTO: Rule o f  Law in Economic Relations" (1994) 107 Focus: GATT 
Newsletter 4 at 4. 
'**~athen, supra note 136 at 13. 
l ~noderly, s&wa note 176 at 244. 
l 821bid at 245. 
i 8 3 ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  Media Relations Division, "GATT Stans Follow-up of Eanh Summit Results" (1993) 101 
Focus: GATT Newsletter 10 at 10. 
i84~greement Estabfbhing the Wodd Traak Organkation, Finai Act Ernbodyng the R~erulrs of the U m p q  
Round ofMulriIateraf Trade Negotiations, I 5 Apri 1 1 994, ( 1 994) 33 I L .  M. 1 1 44. 
Through a Ministerial Decision, adopted at M d e s h  on April 14, 1994, a Comrnittee 
on Trade and Environment (CE) was estabIished.'Ss The mandate of the CTE is to 
make recommendations for d e s  to promote sustainable development through a positive 
relationshi p between trade and environmental measures. [fi6 
The work of the CTE was constrained by only two parameters: f a  that the mandate of 
the WTO must not be exceeded, as it extends oniy to trade, and second, that if problems 
of policy CO-ordination between trade and environmental concerns were to arise, that 
trade would prevail. Es7 M e r  two years of deliberation the CTE reported their progress at 
the first WTO Ministenal Conference in December 1996. The report, which discussed 
the debates within the CTE and the opinions of its members, has been descnbed in the 
following manner: "[tlhere is very little analysis and evaluation and virtually no 
l f i ~ e c ~ i o n  on Tra& ami Environment, Final Act Embodyng the Resufts of the Uruguay Round of 
Multitateraf Trade Negotiations, 14 April 1994, (1994) 33 C.L.M. 1267, preamble [hereinafter Minhteriaf 
Decision]. 
186~choenbaum, supra note 17 1 at 269. This mandate included: 
(a) to identiQ the relationship between trade measures and environmental measures, in 
order to promote sustainable development; 
(b) to make appropriate recommendations on whether any modifications of the provisions 
of the multilateral trading system are required, compatible with the open, equitable and 
non-discriminatory nature of the system, as regards, in particular: 
the need for ru les to enhance positive interaction between trade and environmental 
measures, for the promotion of sustainable development, with special consideration 
to the needs of developing countries, in particular those of the least developed 
among them; and 
the avoidance of protectionist trade measures, and the adherence to effective 
muitilateral disciplines to ensure responsiveness of the multilateral trading system 
to environmental objectives set forth in Agenda 2 1 and the Rio Declaration, in 
particular Principle 12; and 
surveillance of trade measures used for environmental purposes, of trade-re Iated 
aspects of environmental measures which have signifiant trade effects, and of 
effective implementation of the multilateral disciplines goveming those rneasures; 
Minkterial Decision, supra note 1 85 at 1 268. 
l S 7 ~ ~ T T ,  Media Relations Division, "WTO Briefing: Trade and Environment" (1994) 107 Focus: GATT 
Newsletter 15 at 1 S. 
[Ss~choenbaum, supra note 17 1 at 269. 
recommendations for specific actionst'.189 The CTE as an avenue for change therefore 
f iords  little hope fiom an environmentalist vantage point. The fact that the WTO has 
recognised the importance of environmental issues at d l  has been attributed to the 
general acceptance of trade liberalisation as a means of producing "a coordinated policy 
response to environmental problems by allocating scarce resources, including 
environmental resources, more efficientiy and by generating ~ e a l t h " . ~ ~  
While the Final Act does not preclude states fkom implementing extensive environmental 
regulations, it will not allow trade measures to be used to enforce domestic environmentai 
regdations where they create an unnecessary barrier to trade. This prernise is contained 
within three GA 7T 1 991 provis ions: most- favo ured-nation; national treatment; and, non- 
discrimination, which state: 
1. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed or in 
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international 
transfer of payrnents for imports or exports, and with respect to the 
method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to al1 niles 
and formaiities in connection with importation and exportation, and with 
respect to al1 matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any 
advantage, favour, pnvilege or immunity granted by any contracting party 
to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be 
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating 
in or destined for the temtories of al1 other contracting parties. 
III. The contracting parties recognize that interna1 taxes and other intemal 
charges, and laws, reg dations and requirements af3ecting the intemal sale, 
purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and intemal 
quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of 
products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to 
1891bid. at 270. 
I g O ~ ~ ' T T ,  Media Relations Division, "Round Results Build Basis for Environmental Protection and 
Sustainable Development" (1994) 109 Focus: GATT Newsletter 2 at 2. 
irnported or domestic products so as to f io rd  protection to domestic 
production. 
XIII. No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any contracting 
party on the importation of any product of the temtory of any other 
contracting party or on the exportation of any product destined for the 
temtory of any other contracting party, unless the importation of the like 
product of ail third countries or the exportation of the Like product to ail 
third countries is sirnilarly prohibited or re~tricted.'~~ 
The interpretation of these articles must be made in accordance with the exceptions 
contained within GATT 1994 Article XX, which allows States to justify national 
environmental legislative measures which rnay appear to be a consaaint on trade. 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party 
of measwes: 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or con~umption;~~~ 
The interpretation of these articles by GATT and WTO Panels, such as in the Tuna- 
Dolphin II case and the Reforrnulated Gasoline case,193 indicate that the narrow 
l9 l ~eneral Agreement on Tor,@s ami Trade 1994, Final Act Embodjing the Resulrs of the Uruguay Round 
of Multifateral Trade Negoriatiom, Annex lA:  Multifateral Agreements on Trude in Gooak, 15 April 1994, 
(1994) 33 I.L.M. 1 154, cited to (visited August 16, 1998) <http://www.wto.orglwto~egavf?nalact.ht at 
articles I, III, XIII [hereinafter GA7T 19941. 
1921bid at article XX. 
193These cases are briefiy mentioned here as they have already k e n  extensively dealt with in other 
academic papers. For a full discussion of these cases the reader is referred to: M. Meier, "GATT, WTO, 
and the Environment: To What Extent Do GAîT/WTO Rules Permit Member Nations to Protect the 
Environment When Doing So Adversely Affects Trade?" ( 1 997) 8(2) Colo. J. Int'l Env, L. & Pol'y 24 1 ; 
Schoenbaum, supra note 17 1 ;  Snoderly, supra note 176; J. Waincymer, "International Economic Law and 
the Interface Between Trade and Environmental Regulation" (1998) 7(1) J. Int'l Trade & Econ. Dev. 3; and 
R J .  Zedalis, "The Environment and the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement: Did the Reformuluted 
Gasoline Panel Miss A Golden Opportunity" (1997) Neth. intll L. Rev. 186. 
interpretation of article XX exceptions affords little relief for states who legislate to 
protect the environment but in doing so, place limitations upon trade. The Tuna-Dolphn 
II case dealt with a United States ban on the importation of tuna caught with drift-nets 
which were dangerous to dolphins. The Reformulated Gasoline case deait with the 
imposition by the United States of gasoline standards which adversely irnpacted upon 
non-Amencan producers. In general, the Panels of these cases held that states cannot 
unilaterally impose measures with extratemtorial effects when aitemative measures, 
which do not arbitrarïly or unjustifiably restrict trade, are available to them.194 
The recent WTO Panel decision, United States - Irnport Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products,l9* provides another illustration of the impact of GAïT 1994 upon 
environrnental decision-making. Following the recognition that sea turtlesl96 were 
subject to incidentai capture during the process of shrimp trawling, the United States 
enacted legislation, in 1973, requiring shrimpers to employ the use of turtle excluder 
devices. This was later followed in 1989 with the enactment of Section 609 of Public 
Law 10 1-1 62, which in combination with guidelines issued in 199 1, 1993 and 1996, 
prohibited the importation of shrimp after May 1, 1996, f?om al1 states which harvested 
wild shrimp with technology which might adversely affect sea tu r t l e~ . I~~  
Iwsee articles cited in footnote 193. 
Ig5~nited~tate.s - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrinp undshrimp Products (India, et al v. United States) 
(1 W8), WTIDSSUR, cited to (visited 16 August 1998) <httpY/www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.h~~ 
[hereinafter ShrimpSea Turtle Decision]. 
19%ea tunles are recognised by the international community as deserving of protection as they are an 
endangered, or threatened species. They are listed in Appendix 1 of the 1973 Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species, in Appendices I and II of the 1979 Corneniion on Migratory Species of Wild 
Animais and in the IUCN Red List. See ShrimpSea Turtle Decision, ibid at paragraph 2.1-2.3. 
197~bid. at paragraphs 7.1-7.4. 
India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand claimed that the United States legislation was a 
violation of GATT 1994 article XI: 1,198 and the United States, having conceded that their 
legislation did violate this article, premised their defence upon the exceptions within 
article m ( b )  and (g).l99 In the ShrimpSecl Turtle Decision, the Panel referenced both 
previous decisions and the GATT 1994 text, to fmd that article XI: 1 had been v i o l a t e p  
and that the legislation could not be defended under the exceptions found within article 
XXlo l  This latter finding focused upon the correct interpretation of the chapeau of 
article XX, and the Panel stated: 
... we are of the opinion that the chapeau Article XX, interpreted within its 
context and in the light of the object and purpose of GATT and of the 
WTO Agreement, only allows members to derogate from GATT 
provisions so long as, in doing so7 they do not undermine the WTO 
multilateral trading system, thus abusing the exceptions contained in 
Article XX ... 
In our view, if an interpretation of the chapeau of Article XX were to be 
followed which would allow a Member to adopt measures conditioning 
access to its market for a given product upon the adoption by the exporting 
Members of certain policies, including conservation policies, GATT 1994 
and the WTO Agreement could no longer serve as a multilateral 
frarnework for trade among Members as security and predictability of 
trade relations under those agreements would be threatened.202 
In response to the United States' assertion that its legislation was justifiable by reference 
to international agreements allowing for trade bans to protect animals, whether located 
Ig8'This article States: 
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made 
effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted 
or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory 
of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale of any product destined for the 
temtory of any other contracting party. 
GATT 1994, supra note 19 1 at article XI(1). See also ibid. at paragraph 3.1. 
Ig91bid at paragraph 33.  
2oofbid a paragraphs 7.1 1 - 1 7. 
201fbid at paragraphs 7-24-62. 
202fbid- at paragraphs 7.44,7.45. 
within or outside a states' jurisdiction, the Panel noted that there was no international 
agreement which required them to place an import ban on shrimp to protect sea wtles.203 
In conclusion the Panel stated: 
Our fmdings with respect to international noms cofim our reasoning 
regarding the WTO Agreement and GATT. General international law and 
international environmental law clearly favour the use of negotiated 
instruments rather than unilateral measures when addressing 
transboundary or global environmental problems, particularly when 
developing countries are concemed. Hence a negotiated solution is clearly 
to be preferred, both nom a WTO and an international environmental law 
perspective. However, Our findings do not imply that recouse to 
unilateral measures is always excluded, particularly after senous attempts 
have been made to negotiate; nor do they imply that, in any given case, 
they would be permitted. Nevertheless, in the present case, even though 
the situation of turtles is a serious one, we consider that the United States 
adopted measures which, irrespective of their environmental purpose, 
were clearly a threat to the multilateral trading system and were applied 
without any serious attempt to reach, beforehand, a negotiated solution.2~ 
This decision reinforces the WTO position that generally states may only restrict trade on 
environmental grounds when there is a previously negotiated environrnental agreement 
upon which it is premised. This is a difficult position for states wishing to implement 
legislative measures for environmental protection and an impossible one given the nature 
of environmental issues. It is impossible to have the specificity of coverage for 
environmental harms to be legislatively anticipated. The fact that internationally sea 
turtles are recognised as endangered but are still not adequately covered by a MEA, from 
a WTO perspective, is indicative of this. If the chapeau to article XX is to be given such 
a restrictive interpretation, than how will parties be able to make use of the exceptions 
within the article itself. 
2*3?bid at paragraph 7.50. 
2al?bid at paragraph 7.6 1. 
In some instances the threat of a trade dispute may be enough to get a state to change its 
restrictions, as occurred when the United States placed an import ban on European whes 
containhg procymidone, a Japanese manufacturecl fungicide.205 This fungicide, not 
approved in the United States, caused a trade dispute until the United States decided to 
set an interim tolerance for the fungicide residue, thereby pennitting the importation of 
The EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] determined that the 
economic impact of not establishing an interim tolerance for procymidone 
would be severe. The ban of these imported wines would be detrimental 
to the producers, importers, and distributors of the product and would 
disrupt the U.S. balance of tmde.207 
Preliminary assessments on the fungicide had indicated that it was carcinogenic, and had 
effects on reproduction and the development of reproductive organs.208 
At the Uruguay Round, two supplemental agreements to GATT 1994 were also 
negotiated which have environmental consequences: the Agreement on ~ h e  Application of  
Saniiary and Phyîosanitary M e a s u r e P  and the Agreement on Technical Burriers to 
Tradez'o. 
2 o S ~ . ~ .  Pitts, The International Implications of Pesticide Regulation and the Need for Hannonized 
Environmental Law" (1992) l(2) Dickinson J. Env. L. & Pol'y 1 17 at 121, and B.P. Miller, "The Effect of 
the GATT and the NAFTA on Pesticide Regulation: A Hard Look at Harmonization" (1990) 6 Colo. J. Int'l 
Env. L. & Pol'y 20 1 at 2 13-4. 
206/bid at 122. 
2071bid 
2081bid at 12 1 .  
2W~greement on the Application of Sanitcuy and Phytmanitaty Mesures, Final Act Embodyng the 
Raults of the Umguuy Round of Mtrlriiateral Trade Negotiations, 15 April 1994, cited to (visited 16 
August 1998) <http://w.wto.org/wto/legavfinaIac~h~ Fereinailer SPS Agreement]. 
21 O~~reement  on Technical Barriers to Trade, F i m i  Act Emboàying the Results of the U'guqv Round of 
Mulrilarerul Trade Negotiationr, 15 April 1994, cited to (visited 16 August 1998) 
~http~/www.wto.org/wto/legavfinalact.ht mereinafter TBT Agreement]. 
The SPS Agreement extends the protection offered by Article XX(b), by establishing 
d e s  which the environmental laws of states must comply with in relation to food safety, 
and animal and plant heaith2" 
The agreement recognises that govemments have the right to take sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures, but that they should be applied only to the 
extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health and 
should not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members 
where identical or similar conditions prevail.212 
States are to use international standards, guidelines and recommendations where possible, 
or to use higher standards where scientific proof or risk assessrnent makes it justifiable to 
do ~ 0 . ~ ~ 3  The tems of the SPS Agreement prevail over the other terms of GATT 1994, 
such that an environmental measure fouod to be inconsistent with Article =@) may 
remain valid under the terms of the SPS Agreerne~zt .~'~ 
The TBT Agreement is designed to cover "processing and production methods related to 
the charactenstics of the product itself 'Fis It therefore seeks "to ensure that technical 
negotiations and standards, as well as testing and certification procedures, do not create 
unnecessary obstacles to tradeM.2i6 Ail product regulations are caught by the TBT 
Agreement, such as product size and quality, but it only covers those processing and 
production methods which are 'related' to a productF7 It therefore deals with the 
application of technical regulations and standards and their relationship to imported 
2i  l ~ e e  Meier, supra note 193 at 273, and Miller, supra note 205 at 2 14-8. 
2 1 2 ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  Media Relations Division, "The Final Act of the Uruguay Round: A Summary" ( 1993) 104 
Focus: GATT Newsletter 5 at 7 [hereinafter "Summary"], and SfS Agreement, supra note 209at article 2. 
213"~ummary", ibid at 7. and SPS Agreemew* ibid at article 3. 
214~eier ,  supra note 193 at 273, and SPS Agreement, ibid at article 1. 
2i s ~ e i e r ,  ibid at 277. For a more detailed discussion of the TBT Agreement see Zedalis, supra note 193. 
216tt~ummary", supra note 2 12 at 8, and TBT Agreement, s u p  note 2 10 at article 2.2. 
217~ .~ .  Garvey, "The GATTNTO Committee on Trade and the Environment - Toward Environmental 
Reform" (1 995) 89(2) Amer. J. Int'l L. 423 at 426-7, and TBT Agreement, ibid at annex 1, definition 1. 
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products.218 The TBT Agreement also encourages the use of international standards, but 
recognises that states have the right to establish protection at levels which they believe to 
be appropriate and therefore, "does not require them to change their levels of protection 
as a result of standiudization" ,219 
Not everyone is pleased with the establishment of the WTO because of the extent of its 
legislative and judicial power. Its creation has allegedly afTorded to unelected trade 
representatives the opportunity "to ovemde the economic, social and environmental 
policy decisions of states and democratic legislatures around the ~ o r l d " . ~ ~  From the 
decisions of the WTO Panel, no appeal is ailowed and global conformity is required.221 
Another envuonmental issue which bas been raised in the titerature is the use of trade 
sanctions in MEAs and their validity under the GATT 1994WTO system. This is an 
important issue because while MEAs and the Final Act are expressions of international 
agreement, their terms can be in conflict. 
3.3 Tmde Sanctions in MEAs 
Not only is there a concern regarding the impact of trade upon the environment, but for 
the impact of the GATT 19941WTO system upon existing MEAs which use trade 
restrictions as a means of securing cornpliance with their terms." The use of such 
measures has been effective as evidenced by the success of the Montreal Protocol and the 
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movernents of Harardous Wastes and 
*I8~eier, supra note 193 at 277, and TBTAgreement, ibid at article 2.1. 
2i9'1~ummary", supra note 2 12 at 8, and TBTAgreemeni, ibid at articles 2.4,2.6,2.9. 
no~ilent Coup, supra note 30 at 65.. 
Zzllbid 
"~earson, supra note 148 at 30. 
Their dispos al,^ but these are only two of the twenty MEAs currently in force which 
contain a trade prescription? These trade restrictions act to secure cornpliance with the 
terms of the MEA by sanctionhg trade with states who rnay, or may not, be members of 
the MEA. Their use has been described as a "highly contentious issue": 
... the use of trade sanctions for breaches of environmental noms and of 
trade restrictions by one country to try and influence the environmental 
policies and practices of another is very divisive, and contradicts efforts to 
fmd cooperative, multilateral solutions.= 
Although MEAs are, by defuiition, international statements of mutual intention with 
respect to the environment, when they employ trade restrictions against non-parties, they 
potentially violate the GATT 1994MrTO system.226 Under this system they are illegal if 
they can not be upheld under the Article XX(b) and (g) exceptions or the SPS or TBT 
Agreements.227 What is required is a balancing of the GATT 1994NTO system to 
"protect legitimate environmental laws that benefit the environment, while shielding the 
world trading system From protectionist laws ... that have little to do with environmental 
preservation" .=* 
The CTEfs position, regarding the relationship between WTO provisions and trade 
measures found in MEAs, is that state govermnents should continue to address 
transboundary or global environmental problems under MEAs and not undertake 
m~arvey, supra note 2 17 at 433; Montreal Protocof, supro note 1 O6 at article 4: B d  Convention on the 
Control of Tramboundary Movements of Harordour Wmtes and Their Disposaf (as arnended), 22 March 
l989,28 I.L.M. 657, cited to ( 1  995) 2 1 Int'l Env. Rep. 370 1 ,  article 4.2(e) [hereinafter Basel Convention]; 
and, N ken, supra note 159 at 9 12-6. 
Z 2 4 ~ . ~ .  Esty, Greening the GAm: Trade. Environment. and the Future (Washington, D.C.: lnstitute for 
International Economics, 1994) at 2 19,275-8 1 .  
"~glin, supra note 158 at 699. 
Z 2 6 ~ ~ e n ,  supra note 159 at 9 14. 
2 2 7 h k i  at 9 15. 
*=D.M. Parks, "GATT and the Environment: Reconciling Liberal Trade Policies With Environmental 
Preservation" ( 1  996197) 15(2) U.C.L.A. J. Env, L. 15 1 at 1 84. 
unilateral courses of action.229 The reason being that MEAs provide "a more effective 
and durable approach ...[ than an] ad hoc resort to unilateral trade rneasures".~O However, 
they note that trade measures within MEAs may not be the "most effective policy 
insbument".=I The legality of MEAs containing trade sanctions has not yet been 
addressed by the WTO." 
An analysis of this predicament reveals that in the event of a conflict between the GATT 
1994/WTO d e s  and the treaty provisions found in MEAs, the GATT 1 9 9 4 M O  d e s  
would prevail. This is due to the fact that some of the MEAs were signed f i e r  the 
original GATT 1917 document was produced, the conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations has reset the GATT 1994/WTO clock to 1994.233 The international 'Later in 
Tirne' nile would not apply in this situation because it is only applicable in situations 
z z s W T ~ ,  The Relationship Berneen the Provisions of the Multifateral Trading System a d  Trade Measures 
for Enviionmenral Purposes, Including Those Pursuant to Muftifateral Environmentuf Agreements (visited 
26 June, 1998) <http://www,wto.orglwto/environlrelation,htm>. 
2 3 0 ~ ~ l T ,  "GATT Mem bers Urged to Build on Uruguay Round Success" ( 1994) 105 Focus: GA= 
Newsletter 1 at 3. 
WTO, supra note 229. 
u21bid 
233~arvey, p,, note 2 17 at 434. 
234 vienna Convention on the L m  of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1 155 U.N.T.S. 33 1, Article 30 [hereinafter 
Viema Convention], states: 
1. Subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the rights and obligations 
of  tat tes parties to successive üeaties ~ la t ing  to the same subject-matter shall be 
determinid in accordance w ith the f o l l o ~ i n ~ ~ a r a ~ r a ~ h s .  
2. When a treaty specifies chat it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as 
incompatibte with, an earlier treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail. 
3. When al1 the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the Iater treaty but the earlier 
treaty is not terminated or suspended in opemtion under article 59, the earlier treaty 
applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty. 
4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include al1 the parties to the earlier one: 
(a) as between States parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in paragraph 3; 
(b) As between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of the treaties, 
the treaty to which both States are parties govems their mutual rights and obligations. 
5. Paragraph 4 is without prejudice to article 41, or to any questions of the termination or 
suspension of the operation of a treaty under article 60 or to any question of 
where the two treaties have the same subject matter and where the states concemed are 
parties to both instruments-as 
Solutions to this dilemma have been advanced. The fvst is essentially that of the status 
quo, namely, that an MEA's vdidity is determined on a case-by-case basis.26 A second 
proposai is to amend the GATT 1994/WTO system so that it allows for legai certainty by 
"encouraging countries to negotiate [multilated environmental agreements] with the 
understanding that if they meet certain criteria, they will not be GATT-illegal".U7 This 
can be achieved by amending article XX in a similar fashion to that presently found in 
article XX(h) for cornmodity agreements.238 Alternatively, it could be accomplished by 
amending article XX so that it references specific international agreements, thereby 
"establish[ing] that actions taken in accordance with that treaty meet the basic test of 
environmental legitimacy, thus providing a presurnption of justification" to those using 
the trade sanctions.~g A further suggestion is to arnend GATT XX and append the 
relevant MEAs, in Ml, in an annex.240 
Amending the GA?T/WTO to allow for MEAs can ensure that important 
existing and future MEAs are effective and can yield important 
environmental results, while also ensuring that a nation does not use 
unilateral extrajurisdictional actions to achieve its environmental 
objectives.241 
responsibility which may arise for a State fiom the conclusion or application of a maty 
the provisions of which are incompatible with its obligations towards another State under 
another treaty. 
235~issen, supra note 159 at 9 16-7. 
usMd at 917-8. 
U71bid at 924. 
= * ~ s t ~ ,  supra note 224 at 2 19 and GATT 1994, supra note 19 1 at article XX(h). 
239~ty ,  ibid. at 2 19. 
240~issen, supra note 159 at 925. 
2411bid at 928. 
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While some of these suggestions may be more beneficial than others, the CTE has 
resisted suggestions that GATT 1994MrTO provisions should be broadened to include 
trade measures of MEAs as  an e~ception.2~2 Experts at a WTO symposium in April 1998 
felt "generally that the WTO's dispute senlement system was not the best place to senle 
environmental disputes", but that the WTO does have a role "in ensuring consistency 
between multilateral trading d e s  and international environmental agreements while 
resisting attempts by member countries to use unilateral measures to achieve 
environmental objectives" -243 
Unfominately, this is an issue which will not be resolved in the near hture. International 
progress in the trade versus environment debate would have been useful recently, because 
efforts to liberalise foreign direct investment would have been wiser for an infonned 
envuonmental viewpoint. 
3.4 Foreign Direct In vestment: 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a form of in\ lestment which acq yires operational 
control over corporations.244 FDI by MNCs has been increasing annually. Between 
1980 and 1997, FDI from MNCs grew fiom $500 billion io nearly $3 trillion per year.245 
FDI investment is primarily focused in three regions of the globe: Japan and Korea, The 
United States, and Europe;246 and has become particularly important with the growing 
recognition that "investment has become the driving force of deepening integration in the 
2 4 2 ~ ~ ~ ,  supra note 229. 
2 4 3 1 ' ~ x p e ~  Say WTO Should Have Limited Role in Dealing With Trade, Environment Nexus" (1998) 
2 1( 10) Int'l Env. Rep. 46 1 at 46 1. 
244~oldblatt, supra note 23 at 277-8. 
24S~art, supra note 77 at 76. 
246~oldblatt, supra note 23 at 279. 
world ec0nomy".2~7 Dunng the past 25 years FDI in developing states has been 
concentrated in China, Nigeria and India248 While FDI flows in the 1990s bave begun to 
include Vietnam, Ghana and Bangladesh, for other developing states it remains 
minimal.249 Reasons for this have been cited as "[tlhe structural weaknesses of these 
econornies, the inefficiencies of their smdl markets, their ski11 shortages and weak 
technological capabilities ...".m In response to this, several states have begun to 
unilaterally liberalise their investment regimes, but there has dso  been a growing 
recognition that there is a need for international investment d e s  which cover FDI.ZS1 
The need for international agreements that provide a framework for the 
promotion and protection of investment has been widely felt. This has 
been manifested, in part, in a great increase in interest in bilateral 
investment treaties; some 60 percent of the more than 900 bilateral 
investment treaties that presently exist have been negotiated during the 
course of this decade.252 
M e r  the formation of the WTO in 1994, attention turned toward the creation of a global 
investment treatyX3 Although the GATT I994MITO system contained ihree agreements 
which mentioned investment concems: Trade-related lnvestmenf Meusures, Trade- 
Relafed Aspects of Intellectual Properîy Righfs, and the Generul Agreement on %de in 
Services; they were al1 considered to provide too marginal a coverage for F D I P  At the 
fust WTO Ministerial meeting held in Singapore in December 1996, some delegates 
2 4 7 ~ .  Sauvé, "Qs and As on Trade, Investment and the WTO" ( 1997) 3 1(4) J. WorId Trade 55 at 57. 
2 4 8 ~ .  Marr, 'Foreign Direct Investment Flows to Low-Income Counaies: A Review of the Evidence" 
(September 1997) 3 ODI Briefing Paper at 4. 
249 1bid. 
250~bid. 
z ' ~ .  Ruggiero, "Foreign Direct Investment and the Multilatenil Trading System" (1996) 5(1) Transn'l 
Corp.1 at 5. 
z2 Ibid 
2S3~ilent Coup, supra note 30 at 66-7. 
w ~ . ~ .  Witherell, "The OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment" (1995) 4(2) Transn'l Corp. I at 5. 
See also A.A. Fatouros, "Towards an international Agreement on Foreign Direct Investment?" ( 1  995) 1 O(2) 
ICSID Rev. - Foreign Invest. L.J. 1 8 1 at 189,202. 
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pushed for the commencement of negotiations for an investment treaty.255 However, this 
proposed Multilateral Investment Agreement (MIA), was opposed by developing States 
who feared that such a treaty would not only result in a loss of sovereignty but that it 
represented a "virulent fonn of colonialism". This resulted in the formation of a 
working group on Trade and Investment,~' who were given a mandate to make a report 
at the next Ministerial meeting in 1998.z8 
AAer the failure of the M A ,  a second Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) was 
proposed by the OECD.=g It was hoped that this agreement would later serve as a 
prototype for the WTO 
The development of the MAI and its relationship with environmental protection requires 
analysis because investment liberalisation has k e n  linked to a growing detenoration in 
the global environment. 
Investment liberalisation, without corresponding tightening of regulation 
but instead accompanied by further deregulation, can be predicted to 
accelerate the process M e r .  The higher flows of FDI in recent years to 
developing countries is increasing the tempo of ecologically-darnaging 
activities. The proposed multilateral agreement on investment ... and 
similar moves in the WTO to liberalise investment rules will have wide 
environmental implications, and have raised senous concerns with many 
environmental groups.26' 
2 5 5 ~ .  Clarke & M .  BarIow, MI: The Muitih~eral Agreement on Investmeni and the Threat to Canadian 
Sovereignty (Toronto: Stoddat, 1997) at 26 [hereinafter Theut]. 
x61bid 
a7~iienf Coup, supra note 30 at 67. 
z8~hreat ,  supra note 255 at 26. 
x9~iïent Coup, supra note 30 at 67. 
2M1~hreat,  supra note 255 at 27. 
2 6 i ' ~ ~ ~ s " ,  supra note 3 1 at 14. 
To what extent has the MAI been designed to reflect these environmental concerns or 
does it, like the GATT 1994/WTO systern, sirnply propose to add in environmental 
concerns as an aflerthought? To what extent can the MAI be accurateiy characterised as: 
... a whole new set of d e s  for investrnent that will grant transnational 
corporations ... the unrestricted "right" and "fieedom" to buy, sell, and 
move their operations whenever and wherever they want around the 
world, unfettered by govenunent intervention or regulati~n.~~* 
3.4 1 The MuZtiZateral Agreement on Investmenl: 
The OECD was formed in 1961, with a mandate to promote the Iiberalisation of cross- 
border transactions.263 It presently provides a forum for twenty-nine industrialised 
s t a t e ~ ~ ~  "to coordinate monetary, trade and economic development poiicies".265 The 
OECD's primary role is to assist members in "improv[ing] the economic performance of 
theïr countries".266 To this end, the organisation is not assigned a specific way through 
which its mandate m u t  be achieved.267 
They simply recognise - though not without reservations of various kinds - 
that there would be benefits to al1 their countries, and indeed to the world 
as a whole, fiom moving towards a more liberal international economic 
order. They use the Organisation both as a means of identifying, 
reviewing and agreeing on specific ways of advancing in that direction, 
2 6 2 ~ .  Clarke, "A Treaty For Corporate Rule: The Multilateral Agreement on Investment Seeks to 
Consolidate Global Corporate 'Power"' (JuIy/August 1997) Cdn. Forum 19 at 19 [hereinafter "Corporate 
Rule"]. 
2 6 3 ~ .  Henderson, "The Role of the OECD in Liberalising International Trade and Capital Flows" (1996) 
The World Economy: Global Trade Poi'y 1 1 at 1 1. 
264~he  OECD member States are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Icetand, Ireland, Itaiy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, 
The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, and United States. See OECD, OECD News Release: OECD Meeting at MinrSteriaI Level, Paris, 
26-27 May 1997 (visited 7 December 1997) 
<httpY/~.oecdwash.org/PRESS/PRESRELS/news974 1 .htmI>. 
265 ~ a t h e n ,  supra note 136 at 6. 
266~enderson, supra note 263 at 14. 
267/bid at 15. 
and as a rnechanism by which departues from accepted liberal practice 
can be averted or kept within bounds. 
The OECD has k e n  called the "club of the rich industridized nations" because "477 of 
the Global Fortune 500 corporations" are based within them.269 It is reasonabie to infer 
fiom this that MNC interests are of concem to the OECD, and especially since business 
has been a strong supporter of the development of the MAI. 
Many members of the business community have strongly supported this 
objective, have advised the OECD on the nature, scope, fonn and content 
of the Agreement, and have strongly urged that it prescribe the highest 
standards of market access liberalkation, transparency, non-discriminatory 
treatment and investrnent protection, supported by effective dispute- 
settlement mec hani~rns.~~O 
In 1995 the OECD commenced negotiations to draft the MA.i.271 Onginally intended to 
be fmalised by mid-1997?* this agreement was heralded as "the constitution of a single 
global economy" by Renato Ruggeno, Director General of the WTOF Although the 
agreement would initially only bind OECD member states, non-memben will be allowed 
to accede to the treaty.274 During the negotiations, non-OECD memben have been kept 
apprised of  the draft2- and meetings have been held with investment policy officiais 
representing 36 developing states."6 Not ail reviews of the document have been 
z681bid 
269~ilent Coup, supra note 30 at 67. 
2 7 0 ~ .  W. Messing, "Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Investment" ( 1997) 6(1) Transn'l Corp. 123 at 
133. 
27i"Greenhouse Gas Emission Talks, Update on Rio Earth Summit to Top 1997 Agenda" ( 1  997) 20(2) Int'l 
Env. Rep. 79 at 8 1. 
272 witherell, supra note 254 at 1 .  
"AS quoted by the Economic Justice Working Group, "M.A.1 .... The End of Dernocracy" (1997) Pamphiet 
at 1.  
274"Corporate Rule", supra note 262 at 19. 
2 7 5 ~ .  Engering, "The Multilateral Investment Agreement" (1996) S(3) Transn'l Corp. 147 at 160. 
2 7 6 " N ~ ~  Coalition Inciuding Environmentalists Vows Campaign Against MAI Under Way at OECD" 
(1997) 20(22) Int'l Env. Rep. 1 007 at 1008 [hereinafter "NGO Coalition"]. 
favourable,n7 and environrnentalists have spoken out regarding the lack of environmental 
protection within the draft agreement, and the potential harm to the environment from 
some of the proposed clauses. 
The prearnble presently contains mention of the environmenf278 although this inclusion is 
[Recognising that investment, as an engine of economic growth, can play 
a key role in ensuring that economic growth is sustainable, when 
accompanied by appropriate environmental policies to ensure it takes 
place in an environmentally sound ma~e r . ]  Fecognising that appropnate 
environmental policies can play a key role in ensuring that economic 
development, to which investment contributes, is sustainable], and 
resolving to [desiring to] implement this agreement [in accordance with 
international environmental l m  and] in a manner consistent with 
sustainable developrnent, as reflected in the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development and Agenda 2 1, [including the protection 
and preservation of the environment and principles of the polluter pays 
and the precautionary principle;]280 (emphasis added) 
Footnotes within the negotiating text reveal concem with the inclusion of the italicised 
portion of the preamble, and whether it raises a presumption that MEAs will take 
precedence over the MAI.281 This is an important consideration given the present 
concem regarding this same issue under the GATT 1994/WTO system. 
277~ee J. Ash, "Beginner's Guide to the MAI" (1998) S(35) The Coast 10; Economic Justice Working 
Group, supra note 273; and, S. Nova & M. Sforza-Rodenck, "Multilateral Agreement on Investment: "The 
Constitution of a Global Economy"" (1997) 27(1) The Ecologist 5. 
"*ln attendance at the OECD annual ministerial meeting May 26-27, 1997, ministen agreed that 
"economic, social and environmental objectives should be a fundamental aspect of govenunental efforts to 
adapt to new economic realities" however later discussions on the MAI reached consensus on the point that 
"environmental conditions should not be used as an FDI barrier". See "Environmental Objectives Must Be 
Integrated into Policies on Global Economy, Group Says" (1997) 20(12) Int'l Env, Rep. 55 1 at 551-2. 
279~ee "Environment Still Major Issue in Talks on OECD's Multilateral lnvestment Accord" (1998) 2 l(2) 
Int'l Env. Rep. 46. As discussed later, see footnote 334 and accompanying text, it remains uncertain 
whether or not this wording will remain because the future of the MAI itself is unknown. 
2 8 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  The Multiiateral Agreement on Im>estmenc The MAI Negorirting T a t  (as of 14 February 1998), 
cited to (visited 20 July 1998) <http://web.uvic.ca/german/hendriklmai-0298, Preamble Fereinafter 
UAI Negolia t ing Text]. 
2811bid. at Preamble, Footnote 7. 
A legal analysis authored by the OECD regarding the relationship between the MAI and 
MEAs, assessed the extent of any incompatibilities between thern.282 The study 
concluded that there were no "prima facie legal incompatibilities" since no MEA 
currently "has sought to impose investment related sanctions or measures, and the 
obligations established by MEAS to date do not require or cal1 for hplementation which 
would clearly conflict with MAI  obligation^".^^ In addition the study States, that MAI 
parties have the ability to address this matter explicitly in their MEAs if they so desire. 
If a fbture MEA were to contain specific investrnent measures or require 
treatment of investors which would violate the MAI, it would fairly clearly 
be intended to over-ride incompatible provisions of the earlier MAI...2" 
The study also notes that it is with "the power of a future MAI Contracting Party to take 
national environmental measures in general, with or without an MEA" which raises the 
most questions about the environmental impact of the MAI.285 In this context the 
environmental impact of the MAI appears to be &in to that previously discussed in 
relation to the GATT 1 994NTO system.2g6 
It is also worth noting that this concem over the inclusion of these words may be moot, 
because another footnote to the Preamble states, "[ilt was the strong feeling of many 
delegations that preambular reference to the environment be limited to one paragraph and 
that it be as short as p0ssible".~8~ This may reflect the intention of some parties not to 
2820 ECD, Relaiomhips Between lhe U4 I and Sefected MulrilateraI Environmen ta1 Agreements (MEAs) 
(visited 20 July 1998) ~http~/w.oecd.org/daVcmis/mai/meaenv.h [ ereinafier MAI and M a s ] .  The 
decision to initiate this examination followed the outcry fiom NGOs over the Iack of attention to 
environmental issues. in addition to this report, nation-states were also requested to review their national 
environmental legislation to determine its relationship to the proposed MAI. See L.J. Speer, "OECD 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment to Give More Consideration to Environment" (1997) 20(23) Int'l 
Env. Rep. 1040. 
2 8 3 ~ 1  and MEAs, ibid at 1 .  
2841bid at 3. 
2851bidd at 9. 
286~ee footnote 193 and accompanying text 
2 8 7 ~ ~  Negotiating T a t ,  supra note 280 at Preamble, Footnote 9. 
continue to expand the preambuiar reference to the environment because the statement in 
this draft has been expanded îrom that found in an earlier version.2" 
In Part III of the draft, the articles for National Treatment and Most Favoured Nation 
Treatment are found. 
1. Each Contracting Party shall accord to investon of another Contracting 
Party and to their investments, treatment no less favourable than the 
treatment it accords [in like circurnstances] to its own investors and their 
investments with respect to the establishment, acquisition, use, enjoyment 
and sale or other disposition of investments.289 
2. Each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of another Contracting 
Party and to their investments, treatment no less favourable than the 
treatment it accords [in like circumstances] to investors of any other 
Contracting Party or of a non-Contracting Party, with respect to the 
establishment, acquisition. expansion, operation, management, use, 
enjoyment, and sale or other disposition of investments? 
3. Each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of another Contracting 
Party and to their investments the better of the treatment required by 
Articles 1.1 and 1.2, whichever is the more favourable to those investors 
or investments.291 
The inclusion of these articles has attracted a lot of attention. For developing states there 
is a concem that these articles allow foreign corporations and investors to "be treated 
better than locals, but not less favourably".292 These clauses also serve to protect 
corporations frorn being discriminated against by governments who disapprove of their 
actions in other states whether on the bais  of hurnan rights, labour or cnvironmental 
2 M ~ ~ C  D, MuItiIateraI Agreement on Investmem Conrofidated Text and Commeniary, 
DAFFE/MA1(97)/REV2 (1997), cited to (visited 2 December 1997) <http'J/~~~.isIandnet.com/plethora~, 
Prearnble. For a discussion on this earlier drafi text in relation to environmental concerns see R. Cowling, 
"PIC, POPs and the MAI Apocalypse: Our Environmental Future as a Function of Investors Rights and 
Chemical Management Initiatives" (Faculty of Law, Daihousie University, 1997) [unpublished]. 
2 8 9 ~ /  Negotiating T a ,  supra note 280 a< Part III, Article 1. 
290~bid at Part III, Article 2. 
291~bid at Part III, Article 3. 
2 9 2 ~ .  Khor, "What is the MAI?" (1998) 9O/9 1 Third World Resurgence 5 at 7 [hereinafter " What"]. 
57 
grounds.293 States that wish to make reservations, thereby listing sectors or economic 
activities in which investon would face restrictions, were to provide these to the MAI 
negotiating group no later than Febniary 1 997.2M 
Protests over the proposed MAI have taken place with citizen's groups from both the 
Northem and Southern states.295 Northern NGOs mobilised after a leaked ciraft of the 
MAI was obtained and its potential consequences upon national sovereignty, the 
environment and consumen, was found to be unacceptable.296 In addition a statement 
"endorsed by more than 500 environmental, development, labour, consumer, church and 
women's organisations from 67 countries" was presented to the OECD, requesting them 
to suspend negotiations.297 This statement, presented to OECD officiais on October 27, 
1997,298 characterised the MAI as "completely unbalanced" because "[i]t elevate[ed] the 
nghts of investors far above those of govermnents, local cornmunities, citizens, workers 
and the environrnentM.299 The statement also addressed other concems including the 
absence of any binding obligations for corporate conduct toward the environment, and 
the ability of corporations to attack existing national environmental regulations.3" 
2 9 3 ~ .  Clarke, "The Corpomte Rule Treaty" (1998) 9O/9 1 Third World Resurgence 1 1 at 14 [hereinafter 
"Treaty "1, 
294This date was premised upon an expectation that the agreement would be ready for adoption by the 
summer of 1997. Engering, supra note 275 at 15 1-2, 160- 1. It is interesthg to note that the inclusion of 
these restrictions may in fact have ken  part of the reason for the demise of the MAI, see footnote 335 and 
related text. 
2gS~ee What",  pro note 292; M. Khor, "NGOs in OECD Countries Rotest Against MAI" (1998) 9019 1 
Thini World Resurgence 25 [hereinafter 'WGOs"]; and "565 Groups Say 'NO' to MAI" (1998) 9019 1 Third 
World Resurgence 23 Fereinafter "565"]. 
2 g 6 ' ~ ~ ~ s " ,  ibid. at 25. 
297/bid 
298"~hat", supra note 292 at 5. Also TJGO Coalition", ~ p r a  note 276. 
299n~6S', supra note 295 at 23. 
300/bid at 24. 
Govemments have in the past used their power to regulate foreign investment to their 
own advantage, having been able to "choose [their] own independent policies on how to 
treat foreign companies and investments".30~ It has been suggested that in the case of 
developing states, granting investors the increased rights of the M N  may cause "the 
disappearance of many local enterprises, higher unemployment, greater outflow of 
fmancial resources, and, therefore to [balance of payment] problems".302 One study of 
national legislation from developing states Iisted potential regulations which might 
violate the MAI,303 while the ability to substantiate each of these regulations exceeds the 
scope of this analysis, the subject matter of these regulations as described in relation to 
proposed MAI articles is illustrative of some of the possible legal contlicts which may 
arise. 
The MAI need not be the only means of establishing relations between foreign investors 
and host states, because an alternative exists in the draft United Nafions Code of Conduct 
on Transnational Corporations.3" This document was designed out of two observations 
in relation to transnational corporations and their role in the world economy: 
... on the one hand, it is recognised that transnational corporations play a 
positive role as effective instruments of development in developed and 
developing countries dike and that this role should be strengthened; on the 
other hand, it has also been recognised that the pervasive role of 
transnational corporations in the world economy requires the formulation 
of guidelines for their conduct305 
301"The Need to Regulate Foreign Invesûnent" (1998) 9019 1 Third World Resurgence 15 at 15 [hereinafter 
"Regulate"]. 
3°21bid at 17. 
303~riends of the Earth, Exampies of Foreign Imtestment Reguiations that Could Violace the Muitiiateral 
Agreement on Imestment, cited to "How the MAI Would Affect the South" ( t  998) 9019 1 Third World 
Resurgence 18 at 18-20. 
3M"~egulate", supra note 30 1 at 17. 
3 0 5 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  The United Nations Code ofîondufr on Tram~t iomI  Corporations (New Y o k  1 986) (CM 
Doc. STlCTClSER.Al4) at 1 mereinafter Co& of Conduct]. 
The Code of Conduct was therefore designed to balance the interests of govemments and 
transnational corporations, thereby facilitahg the flow of investments intemationally for 
economic and industrial growth, and minimishg any negative effects caused by TNCs 
upon their host.306 Provisions relating to TNC activities encompassed several issues 
including "respect for national sovereignty and observance of domestic laws, regulations 
and administrative practices" and "adherence to economic goals and development 
objectives, policies and priorities". Other TNC provisions were in relation to "adherence 
to socio-cultural objectives and valuestt, "non-interference in internai political affairs", 
the "transfer of technology" and, to "environmental protection".'07 
With respect to environrnental protection, the Code of Conduct contained three pertinent 
clauses.3o8 These clauses placed obligations upon TNCs to undertake their activities in 
accordance with national environmental legislation and policies, with attention to 
international standards. Second, to take steps to protect the environment and to restore it, 
if damaged, and third, to supply information akin to an environmental impact assessrnent 
to national authonties for their products and processes, as well as related regulatory 
information from other States. Finally, TNCs were directed to CO-operate in the 
development of national measures for environmental protection.309 
306~bid at 2-3, 12-3. 
307~bid at 9. 
308~bid, at 36. 
309The hl1 text for these clauses is: 
4 1. Transnational corporations shalVshou1d carry out their activities in accordance with 
national laws, regulations, administrative practices and policies relating to the 
preservation of the environment of the countries in which they operate and with due 
regard to relevant intentionai standards. Transnational corporations shalVshould, in 
performing their activities, take steps to protect the environment and where damages to 
[restore it to the extent appropriate and feasible] [rehabilitate it] and should make efforts 
to develop and apply adequate technologies for this purpose. 
42. Transnational corporations shalUshould, in respect of the products, processes and 
services they have introduced or propose to introduce in any country, supply to the 
While this Code of Conduct was never comp1eted;"o there is an intention to append the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises as an annex to the MAIF These 
Guidelines are voluntary and therefore, not legally enforceable.312 They deal with 
"general policies, information disclosure, cornpetition, financing, taxation, employrnent 
and industrial relations, environment and science and technoiogy".3'3 The text used in 
relation to the environment states that MNCs should "[alssess and take into account in 
decision making, foreseeable environmental and environmentally related health 
consequences of their activities" and to "[CIO-operate with competent authorities" through 
the provision of information regarding the potential impacts of their activities upon the 
environment and through the provision of expertise.314 In addition, MNCs are directed to 
"minimise the risk of accidents and damage to health and the environment, and to CO- 
operate in mitigating adverse effects".)ls The text in the MAI introducing this annex 
States: 
competent authorities of that country on request or on a regular basis, as specified by 
these authorities, al1 relevant information concerning: 
Characteristics of these products, processes and other activities including 
experimental uses and related aspects which may h m  the environment and the 
measures and costs necessary to avoid or at least rnitigate their harmful effects; 
Prohibitions, restrictions, warnings and other public regulatory measures imposed 
in other countries on grounds of protection of the environment on these products, 
processes and services. 
43. Transnational corporations shalVshouId be responsive to requests From Governments 
of the countries in which they operate and be prepared where appropriate to cwperate 
with international organizations in thek efforts to deveIop and promote national and 
international standards for the protection of the environment. 
Ibid. at 36-7. 
310~ee the previous discussion regarding the Code of Con& at foomote 63 and accompanying text. 
31 'Mt/ Negoîiating Text, supra note 280 at Part X. 
I*OEC D, The OECD Guidelines rfw MdtinatÏona[ Enterprises: Overview (visi ted 2 1 July 1 998) 
~http://www.oecd.org/daVcmis/cimdmneguide.h at 1. 
3 i 3 ~ b i d  at 2. 
I 4 0 ~ c ~ ,  The OECD Guidefinesfor Multinational Enterprises: T a t  (visited 2 1 July 1 998) 
~http://www.oecd.oi.g/daWcmis/cime/mnete~hûn#top> at 6. 
51bid 
The following Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are a joint 
recommendation by participating Govemen t s  to muitinational 
enterprises operating in their temtory. Their purpose is to help 
multinational enterprises ensure that their operations are in hannony with 
the national policies of the countries in which they operate.216 
In contr;ist to the Code of Conduct, these Guidelines place a lower level of responsibility 
upon MNCs for their activities and conduct. 
These different obligations for MNCs can be contrasted with the Performance 
Requirements of the MAI for state governments: 
1. A Contracting Party shall not, in comection with the establishment, 
acquisition, expansion, management, operation, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment, sale or other disposition of an investment in its temtory of an 
investor of a Contracting Party or a non-Contracting Party, impose, 
enforce or maintain any of the following requirements, or enforce any 
commitment or undertaking: 
(b) to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content; 
(c) to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced or 
services provided in its temtory, or to purchase goods or services 
from persons in its temtory;317 
An exception to this is found in article 4: 
4. [Provided that such measures are not applied in an arbitrary or 
unjustifiable manner, or do not constitute a disguised restriction on 
investment, nothing in paragraphs I(b) and l(c) shall be construed to 
prevent any Contracting Party from adopting or maintaining measures, 
including environmental measures: 
(a) necessary to secure cornpliance with laws and regulations that are 
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant Me or health; 
(c) necessary for the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible 
resources.]3l~ 
3 1 6 ~ /  lVegotiuting T a t ,  supra note 280 at Part X .  
3'7~bid. at Part I I I .  
l s~bid 
A number of delegates do not believe that this clause should be included in the text at dl ,  
as they feel that the text is too broad, especially in part (a).319 This clause is sirnilar to the 
exceptions found in Article XX of GAlT 1994, which have been given a very strict 
interpretation in favour of trade liberalisation.320 Many delegates would in fact prefer the 
use of a more generai clause: 
Provided that such rneasures are not applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable 
manner, or do not constitute a disguised restriction on investment, nothing 
in paragraphs 1@) and l(c) shall be constnied to prevent any Contracthg 
Party from adopting or maintaining measures necessary to secure 
cornpliance with environmental [laws and regulations] [that are not 
otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement and] that are 
necessary for the conservation of Living or non-living resources, [or that 
are necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.1321 
In contrast, some delegates would simply prefer the inclusion of an additional clause later 
in the text to address environmental concerns: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which wodd constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable disct-irnination 
or a disguised restriction on investment, nothing in this agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption, maintaining or enforcement by any 
Contracting [Plarty of measures: 
(a) necessary to protect human, animai or plant life or health[;] 
(b) relating to the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible 
natural resources. 322 
Another, even more general clause has also been proposed.3a What is curious is the 
revealed anxiety by delegates regarding the continued ability of States to legislate andor 
uphold existing national environmental legislation. Since GATT 1994 has been 
3191bid at Pm III, Footnote 28. 
320~ee footnote 192 and attached text. 
3 2 i ~ ~  ~ e ~ o t i a t i n ~  T'supra note 280 at Part III, Footnote 28. 
3 U ~ b i d  at Part 111, Footnote 118. 
323 1bid 
interpreted in such a favourable manner with respect to trade, one can only assume that 
investment would be accorded a similar treatment as well. 
Another MAI clause worthy of mention is that related to the non-lowering of 
environmental standards: 
[Alternative 1 
The Parties recognise that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by 
lowering [domestic] health, safety or environrnental [standards] 
[measures] or relaxing [domestic] [core] labour standards. 
Accordingly, a Party shouid not waive or otherwise derogate fkom, or 
offer to waive or otherwise derogate fiom, such [standards] [measures] as 
an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or 
retention in its territory of an investment of an investor. If a Party 
considers that another Party has offered such an encouragement, it may 
request consultations with the other Party and the two Parties shdl consult 
with a view to avoiding any such encouragement. 
Alternative 2 
A Contracting Party [shdl] [should] not waive or otherwise derogate fiom, 
or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from [domestic] health, safety or 
environrnental [measures] [standards] or [domestic] [core] labour 
standards as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, 
expansion or retention of an investment of an in~estor.13~~ 
The fact that these clauses are still placed within square brackets indicates that their 
inclusion in the f m d  text is not yet certain. The footnotes are unhelpful in clarieing this 
point, mentioning primarily that the controversy between the two alternatives focuses 
upon the inclusion of the first sentence of alternative 1. The discussion surrounds the 
issue of "as to whether the provisions should refer to respect for universal standards or 
onIy to the relaxation of domestic standardstt.3z 
324i6id. at Part III. 
325~6id at Part III, Footnote 116. 
A final MAI investor entitlement worthy of reflection is found in the settlement of 
Investor-State disputes.326 This set of clauses has as its focus the granting of the right to 
investors to take legal action against a Contracthg Party for an alleged breach of a MAI 
provision. The potential damage which such a provision can inflict is evidenced in the 
case filed under the provisions of NAFTA by Ethyl Corporation against the Govemment 
of Ca11ada.32~ Ethyl, the sole manufacturer of a product called Methylcyclopentadienyl 
Manganese Tricarbonyl (MMT), filed the suit after the Canadian Government banned 
MMT on the bais  that it had adverse effects on automobile diagnostic systems w d  to 
assess automobile emissions, and concem regarding the release of manganese emissions 
on human health? Ethyl sought restitution of $251 million to cover losses resulting 
from an alleged expropriation of its MMT production plant and of its rep~tation.32~ 
However, on July 20, 1998, the Canadian government withdrew its ban and paid a surn of 
$13 million U.S. to Ethyl in exchange for Ethyl withdrawing its lawsuit.330 
This case was obviously in the mind of Canadian MAI negotiators as Canadian Trade 
Minister Sergio Marchi had previously expressed his intention of demanding a narrow 
interpretation of the MAI expropriation clause, stating: 
We have absolutely no intention of leaving the government open to the 
prospect of being hauled before an international tribunal by companies or 
investors.33 1 
3261bid. at Part V, Section D. 
)*'~ee "Canadian Government Withdraws Ban on Trade, lmpon of Gasoline Additive M M T  (1998) 
2 i(15) Int'l Env. Rep. 719 [hereinafier "Canadian Govemment"]; "Legal Challenge Against Canada on 
MMT' (1998) 2 1(2) Int'l Env. Rep. 47; and M. Sforza & M. Vallianatos, "Ethyl Corp vs. Govt. of Canada: 
Chernical Finn Uses Trade Pact to Contest Environmental Law" (1998) 9019 1 Third World Resurgence 21; 
and "Fuel Additive is an Environmentai Negative" (1997) No. 18 Sierra Legal Defence Fund Newslener 5. 
328~form, ibM, and "Canadian Govemment", ibid 
329~form, ibid at 2 1 . 
330"~anadian Govemment", supro note 327. 
3 3 1 ~ .  Scofield, "Canada, U.S. Dump on MAI", The Globe and Mail (14 February 1998) 83 at 83. 
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The relationship between this case and the MAI is that the MAI contains similar clauses 
dealing both with expropriation332 and investors' nghts to take legal action against a 
Contracting Party.333 The Ethyl case has therefore already set a precedent, regardless of 
the fact that it was settled prior to the adjudication. 
For now, it would appear that the progress of the MAI has been slowed or perhaps even 
ended. On Febniary 17, 1998 representatives at the OECD decided to defer their decision 
regarding the future of the MAI until a meeting in April 1998.334 Reasons given for the 
decisions were that the ciraft was too weak and subject to several state exemptions, 
making it largely ineffectud.335 It had also lost the support of the United States 
delegation.'" The OECD later decided to set a new target deadline of April 1999.337 
Whether the MAI will re-emerge as an issue in 1999 is a matter for the future, but what 
remains apparent is that the desire for an investors' agreement will not simply disappear. 
The MAI may simply retum as the MIA in the GATT 1994/WTO system in years to 
corne. 
3.5 The Road Ahead: 
With the GATT now 50 years old and ministen cheering the fdling of protectionist trade 
wallsP8 it is time for reflection not only on what is missing fiom the GATT 1994/WTO 
system, but upon where we are headed environmentally. While it may be compelling to 
3 3 2 ~ ~  Negorioring Tmt, supra note 280 at Part IV. 
333~bid at Part V, Section D. 
3 3 4 ~ .  Oyog, "Final Decision on Future of Çapitalists' Charter' Defemd" (1998) 90/91 ïhird World 
Resurgence 27 at 27. 
335~bid at 27. 
336~bid Also see Scoffielci, supra note 33 1 where the US. position was quoted to Ms. Barshefsky. a U.S. 
Trade Representative, as  being that the MAI was "sirnply not good enough" and "unbalanced and 
rejudiciat". Ms. Barshefsb did not clariS, this position 
97T. Corcoran, "The MAI is Dead. Cheers!", The Globe and Mail (25 March 1998). 
338n~eneva's Trade Convention" (23 May 1998) The Economist 18 at 18. 
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argue for a revision of the GATT 1994/WTO system, given the position of the CTE such 
an event appears to be extremely unlikely. Instead, the dominant liberalised trade and 
investment regirnes of the world have succeeded in maintainhg the marginalisation of 
environmental concems and initiatives, in the form of MEAs. The CTEs' expressed 
reluctance to remedy this situation, and negotiators' subsequent avoidance of this issue in 
relation to the MAI, leads to the conclusion that MEAs will continue to be applied in a 
world dominated by trade and investment policy. 
Liberaikation not only colows those environmental initiatives of the past but also of the 
future. International environmentai law is therefore being formed and evaluated in an 
atmosphere which is antithetical to i t  How will emerging MEAs deal with this problem 
and is there suficient political will to draft exemptions to the GATT 1994/WTO or MAI 
documents? An analysis of two emerging chernical management initiatives will provide 
an answer to this inquiry by examining the tension between the mitigation of 
environmental h m  and the protection of trade. 
4.0 Prior Informed Consent 
The increasing global use of chemicals and pesticides has led to heightened international 
concem regarding their associated health and environmental nsks both in the developing 
and developed states. Initiaily, the trade in hazardous chemicals and pesticides began to 
change due to the efforts of the OECD, through its Complementary Information 
Exchange Procedure, the United Nations Environment Programme, using the 
International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals, the European Economic 
Community, using labelling requirements and later bans, and by NGOs, under the Pan 
Action Network and the Coalition Against Dangerous Exports."g The response to these 
initiatives by developing state govemments, industry and pesticide consumers, was 
discouraging in light of the growing recognition that it was a problem which required a 
global solution."O 
This recognition led to the creation of two voluntary chernical management instruments, 
the International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides341 in 1985, 
as approved by the United Nations Food and Agriculturai Organisation (FA0),342 and the 
33q~ee J.H. Colopy, "Poisoning the Developing World: The Expottation of Unregistered and Severely 
Ressicted Pesticides fiom the United States" (1995) 13 J. Env. L. 167; KA. Goldberg, "Efforts to Prevent 
Misuse of Pesticides Exported to Developing Countries: Progressing Beyond Regulation and Notification" 
( 1985) 12 Ecology L.Q. 1025; R Hill, "Probiems and Policy for Pesticide Exports to Less Developed 
Countries" (1988) 28 Nat'l Res. J. 699; MA. Kablack, "Pesticide Abuses in Third World Countries and a 
Model for Refonn" (1991) Boston College Third World L. J. 277; H-W. Micklitz, "International Regulation 
and Control of the Production and Use of ChemicaIs and Pesticides: Perspectives for a Convention" (1992) 
Mich. J. Int'l L. 653; and, C. Uram, "International Regulation of the Sale and Use of Pesticides" (1990) 10 
Northwestem J. int'l L. & Bus. 460. 
"O~oldberg, ibid at 1051 and Hill, ibid at 720. 
lntern~iomi Code, supra note 126. 
%%ne author commented that this action by the F A 0  was in fact duplicitous as they had previously 
"advocated the sale and use of restrïcted pesticides in the world market". In Kablack, supra note 339 at 
300. 
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London Guidelines for the Exchange of lnformatr'on in International Trade" in 1987, as 
adopted by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Both of these 
instruments were designed to increase state access to information about chemicals and 
pesticides, and to therefore enable them to "assess the nsks associated with the use of 
chemicais in their own countries" .344 
In 1989, UNEP and the FA0 amended the International Code and the London Guidelines 
to include the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) procedure which was designed to: 
improve the protection of human heaith and the environment from the 
potentiai adverse effects of certain chemicals, recognising the limitations 
of some countries in not having sficient IegaYregulatory systems or the 
fmanciai and human resources to gather the necessary information and to 
make and implement informed decisions concerning the use of chemicals 
in their nationai situation245 
The PIC procedure, originally the conception of the OECD," is implemented by the 
FAO/UNEP Joint Programme for the Operation of PIC.Y' As of December 1997, 154 
stateswg have registered with the FA0 and UNEP to take part in the voluntary 
programme. 
 ondo don Guirleines for the Exchange of ln/ormation on Chernieah in International Trade (as amended), 
1987, cited to H. Hohmann, ed,  Basic Documents of Intermtional Environmental Law, vol, 1 (London: 
Graham & Trotman, 1992) 157 Fereinafter Londm Guidelines]. 
3 4 4 ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  PIC - A Brief Ovetview of Whaf It Is and How It Operates (visited 29 November 1997) 
dittpJ/irptc.unep.ch/pic/volpic/h3 .htm b at 1 Fereinafter Brief Overview]. 
3 4 S ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  Implementation of the ExExisg, Voluntary P K  Procedure (visited 28 Novem ber 1 997) c 
h //irpt~.unep,ch/pic/volpic/h2~htmb at 1 Fereinafter implemeniation]. iz", e origin of the PIC procedure was in an Expert Group on Information Exchange related to Export of 
Hazardous Chemicals, who in 1982 proposed a NO-step notification process. The fmt step being the 
notification of export together with infonnation regarding regufatory actions, restricted uses and a means to 
obtain additional information. The second step was to provide any additionally requested infonnation. See 
Goldberg, supra note 339 at 1040; Hill, supra note 339 at 714; and Miller, supra note 205 at 209. 
"'UNEP, PIC: Priw Informed Consentfi Certain Hazardozrs Chemicals in Inter~rional Trade (visited 
28 Novembet 1997) dittp://irptc.wiep.ch/pid> at 1. 
"UNEP. PIC - Uphte on Implementation as of 31 December 1997 (visited 3 August 1998) 
dittp://irptc.unep.ch/pidvolpic/h4.html at 1. 
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Since 1995 negotiations have been underway for the cirafting of a legally binding 
international instrument which would combine both chernical and pesticide management 
within one agreement. Before evaluathg the latest negotiations and draft in this process, 
it is usetùl to examine both the International Code and the London Guidelines, to 
determine how different the draft convention is fiom the voluntary regime. 
4.1 The FA0 International Code 
The purpose of the International Code is to "provide a practical framework for the 
control of pesticidesW.349 In its preamble, it acknowledges both the need for concern over 
increasing global pesticide use, and of the inevitability of such an increase. 
Recognizing that increased food production is a high priority need in many 
parts of the world and that this need cannot be met without the use of 
indispensable agricultural inputs such as pesticides. 
Acknowledging that pesticides can be hazardous to humans and the 
environment and that immediate action must be taken by al1 concemed, 
including govemments, manufactures {sic), traders and users, to 
eliminate, as far as possible and without the scope of their responsibility, 
unreasonable risks, not only in the country of ongin but also in countries 
to which pesticides may be exportedF (emphasis in original) 
The preamble also acknowledges that pesticide use will likely continue although attempts 
to utilise biological and integrated pest management are being rnade.351 
The substance of the International Code is found within its twelve articles. Its objectives 
are stated as follows: 
... to set forth responsibilities and establish voluntary standards of conduct 
for public and private entities engaged in or affecthg the distribution and 
349~nternati~na~ Code, supra note 126 at 173, preamble. 
350~bid 
351 1bid 
use of pesticides, particularly where there is no or an inadequate national 
law to regulate pesticides.352 
To achieve this it describes the shared responsibility of society and is addressed to 
various actors, including: 
... international organizations; govemments of exporting and importing 
countries; industry, including manufacturers, trade associations, 
formulators and distributors; users; and public sector organizations such as 
environmental groups, consumer groups and trade unions.3" 
The standards of conduct to expected fiom these actors are to: 
Flncourage responsible and generaily accepted trade practices; 
[Alssist countnes which have not yet established controls designed to 
regulate the quality and suitability of pesticide products needed in that 
country and to address the safe handling and use of such products; 
[Plromote practices which encourage the safe and efficient use of 
pesticides, including minimising adverse effects on humans and the 
environment and preventing accidental poisoning kom hproper handling; 
[Elnsure that pesticides are used effectively for the improvement of 
agricultural production and of huma. animal and plant health.3M 
In Article 2 the defuiitions are Iisted. Of interest are those for 'pesticidef,3*5 'bannedf,356 
'severely restri~ted','~~ and for 'prïor information consent' and the 'pnor informed consent 
procedure'. The latter two are defmed in the following way: 
3521bid. at 174, article 1.1. 
353Ibid at 174, article 1.4. 
3S4fbid at 174, article 1.5. 
355~he  t m 'pesticide' is defined as: 
mean[ing] any substance or mixture of substances intended for preventing, destroy ing or 
controlling any pst, including vectors of human or animal disease, unwanted species of 
plants or animals causing h m  during or otherwise interfering with the production, 
processing, storage, transportation, or marketing of food, agricultura1 commodities, 
wood, wood products or animal feedstuffs, or which may be adrninistered to animals for 
the control of insects, arachnids or ofher pests in or on their bodies. The tenn includes 
substances intended for use as a plant growth regulator, defoliant, desiccant, or agent for 
thinning h i t  or preventing the premature fall of fruit, and substances applied to crops 
either before or afier harvest to protect the comrnodity from deterioration during storage 
and transport, 
Ibid. at 175-6, article 2. 
3S6~he terrn 'banne8 is defined as: 
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Pnor Information Consent (PIC) refers to the p ~ c i p l e  that international 
shipment of a pesticide that is banned or severely restricted in order to 
protect human health or the environment should not proceed without the 
agreement, where such agreement exists, or contrary to the decision of the 
designated national authority358 in the participating importing country. 
Pnor Infomed Consent Procedure (PIC procedure) means the procedure 
for formally obtaining and disseminating the decisions of importing 
countries as to whether they wish to receive further shipments of 
pesticides that have been banned or severely restricted..359 
Article 3 of the International Code sets out specific aspects of pesticide management. It 
acknowledges the authority of govemments, and directs them to "regdate the distribution 
and use of pesticides" and m e r  directs govemments of exporthg states to both provide 
technical assistance to developing states who may require it, and to "ensure that good 
trading practices are followed" .360 
Industry is directed to utilise the International Code as a standard for the "manufacture, 
distribution and advertising of pesticides", taking into account the special circumstances 
of some developing states, and further directs that manufacturers and traders should 
supply only those pesticides "of adequate quality, packaged and labelled as appropriate" 
and to try to reduce hazards to users by paying attention to "formulations, presentation, 
mean[ingJ a pesticide for which all registered uses have been prohibited by final 
government or regulatory action, or for which al1 requests for registration or equivalent 
action for ail uses have, for heaIth or environmental reasons, not been granted. 
lbid at 175, article 2. 
3 5 7 ~ h e  t rm 'severely restricted' is defined as: 
a Iimited ban - mean[ing] a pesticide for which virtually al1 registered uses have been 
prohibited by finai governent regu latory action but certain speci fic registered use or 
uses remain authorized. 
lbid at 177, articIe 2. 
358~he  t rm 'designated national authority' is not defined in the text of the agreement. However, it has been 
described in CMEP literature as being a focal point within a nation-state for the operation of the PIC 
rocedure. See Brief Overview, supra note 344 at 2. 
P591ntern~ti~naI Code, sup note 126 at 176, article 2. 
360~bid at 177, articles 3.1,3.3. 
packaging and labelling"M1 In addition, ïndustry was directed to provide user-fiendly 
instructions and information regardhg the use of the substance and, to stay uiformed both 
of the use of, and any associated problems with, the substances after being obtained by 
consumers.362 
Articles 4 through 8 list specific suggestions for states and industry regarding the testing 
of pesticides,3" measures to reduce health hazards? appropnate regulatory and 
technical requirements,365 the availability and use of pesticides266 and their distribution 
and sale267 
Article 9, titled 'Information Exchange and Prior Informed Consent' establishes the 
operation of the PIC procedure.368 Governments which make a control action to ban, or 
severely restrict, a pesticide are to inform the FA0 of their decision as soon as possible. 
The FA0 will then notiQ the designated national authonties (DNAs) of other states of 
the control action.369 Of key importance to the PIC procedure is the timeliness of the 
information exchange, because its provision allows other states to "assess the risks 
associated with the pesticides, and to make timely and informed decisions as to the 
3611bid. at 177, articles 32,3.4.1,3.4.2. 
3621bid at 177, articies 3.4.3,3.4.4. 
3631bid at 178, article 4. 
3641bid at 179, article S. 
3651bid at 180, article 6. 
3661bid at 18 1, article 7. 
3671bid at 18 1, article 8. 
368~t  is interesting to note that when the Interdonat Code was fmt drafted it contained a PIC procedure 
but that it was deleted from article 9 phor to acceptance of the Irzfernationai Code in 1985- In 1987, 
fol1owing a FA0 Conference "the PIC provisions were adopted in principte, despite heavy lobbying against 
them by representatives corn the agrochemical industry and deveIoped countries". In J. Picarazzi, 
"Regulating the Exports of Hazardous Pesticides: In Search of an Ecological World Oder" (1989) XV(2) 
Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 433 at 447 and Urani, supra note 339 at 47 1-3. 
3691~ernafionai Code. supra note 126 at 182, article 9.1. 
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importation and use of the pesticides concemed, taking into account local, public health, 
economic, environmental and administrative conditions".37* 
An exchange of information is also required between a state exporting a banned, or 
severely restricted pesticide, and the state irnporting it. When the pesticide is to be 
exported, the exporting govenunent is to supply the DNA of the importing state with 
relevant information in order to both idorm them that an export wiii occur, and to remind 
them of the earlier notification regarding the status of the pesticide.37' This notification is 
to take place with the fust export following the control action, and at any tirne that there 
is new information or a new condition in regard to the original control action.372 
The PIC procedure is applicable to d l  pesticides which have been banned, or severely 
restricted, for health or environmental reasons.J73 Govermnents receiving a control 
action notification from the FA0 are to advise the FA0 of their decision regarding the 
friture use of the pesticide within their state, and to: 
[Elnsure that govemmental measures or actions taken with regard to an 
imported pesticide for which information has been received are not more 
restrictive than those applied to the same pesticide produced domesticaily 
or imported from a country other than the one that supplied the 
information; 
[Elnsure that such a decision is not used inconsistently with the provisions 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GArn.374 
This inclusion of an article speciQing the relationship between a control action 
notification and the global trading system is interesting because it places the Inrernoiional 
37016id. at 183, article 9.2. 
3711bid at 183, articles 93,9.4. 
3721bid at 183, article 9.5. 
)"lbid at 183, article 9.7. 
374~bid at 1 84, article 9.10.2,9.10.3. 
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Code within the economic hienuchy of global interests. Because these articles could be 
construed as a justification for restraining trade, they have been clearly drafted to remove 
any such interpretation. 
The remaining three articles of the International Code speciS: the correct labelling, 
packaging, storage, and disposal of pesticides;375 acceptable advertising p r a ~ t i c e s ; ~ ~ ~  and, 
the means of monitoring the observance of the International Code.377 
Control actions for both the International Code and the London Guidelines are entered 
into a database by the Joint Secretariat of FAORMEP?* At present, any chemical or 
pesticide banned or severely restricted in at least one state after January 1, 1992 is 
eiigible for inclusion in the PIC procedure. For those banned or severely restricted pnor 
to this date, they must have k e n  made subject to a control action by at least 5 or more 
states.379 
4.2 The London Guidefines 
The second voluntary chemical management instrument, referred to above, is the London 
Guidelines. Although similar to the International Code, the London Guidelines deal with 
chemical as opposed to pesticide management, and were designed to be both 
complementary and utilised in a "non-duplicative manner" with the International 
Code? 
375~bid. at 184, article 10. 
376~bid at 185, article I 1. 
3771bid at 1 86, article 12. 
3R~rief0verview, supra note 344 at 2. 
3791bid 
380~ondon Guidelines, supro note 343 at 157, Introduction, paragraph 7. 
In the introduction to the London Guidehes, it states that they were developed for 
govemments "with a view to assisting them in the process of increasing chemicai d e t y  
in al1 countries through the exchange of information on chemicals in international 
trade1'.38' They are further characterised as being "general in nature and...aimed at 
enhancing the sound management of chemicals through the exchange of scientific, 
tec hnical and legal information" .3" 
The tenn 'chernical' is defined as: 
... mean[ing] a chemical substance whether by itself or in a mixture or 
preparation, whether manufactured or obtained from nature and includes 
such substances as industnal chemicals and pesticides;JB 
The defulltions for 'banned chemical'3W and 'severely restricted chemicalq85 are similar to 
those found within the International Code, as are those for 'prior informed consent' and 
'prior informed consent procedure'. 
"Prior informed consent" (PIC) refers to the prhciple that international 
shipment of a chemical is banned or severely restricted in order to protect 
human health or the environment should not proceed without the 
agreement, where such agreement exists, or contrary to the decision, of the 
designated national authority in the importing (emphasis in 
original). 
"Prior informed consent procedure" (PIC procedure) means the procedure 
for formally obtaining and disseminating the decisions of importing 
38 [lbid. at Introduction, paragmph 1 . 
382ibid a 157, Introduction, paragraph 2. 
383ibid at 158, anicle !(a). 
384The term 'banned chemical': 
means a chemical which has, for health or environmental reasons, k e n  prohibited for all 
uses by final govenunental regulatory action; 
Ibid at 158, article l(b). 
385nie term 'seve~ly resbicted chemicaf: 
means a chemical for which, for health or environmental reasons, virtually al1 uses have 
been prohibited nationally by final governmental regulatory action, but for which certain 
speci fic uses remain authorized; 
Ibid at 158, article I(c). 
386ibid. at 158. article I(g). 
countries as to whether they wish to receive fuhire shipments of chemicals 
which have been banned or severely restricted. A specific procedure was 
established for selecting chemicals for initial implementation of the PIC 
procedures. These include chemicds which have k e n  previously banned 
or severely restricted as weil as certain pesticide formulations which are 
acutely toxic ...387 (emphasis in original). 
The six general principles of the London Guidelines state a need for al1 states who import 
or export chemicals to protect human health and the environment through an exchange of 
information on chemicals.3" States are expected to act in accordance with P ~ c i p l e  21 
of the Stockholm Declaratiorr'89, and ensure that national measures taken to regulate 
chemicals should not create unnecessary obstacles to trade.3w National measures taken 
for an imported chemical are not to be more strenuous than those used for domestically 
produced chemicals or for those imported fiom a state other than the one which provided 
the control action information.39' States are aiso expected to share their kn~wledg&~~ 
and, to improve their national legislative and regdatory systems, their national registers 
of toxic chemicals, and any manuals, directories and documentation related to chemical 
trade .393 
3871bid at 158, article I(h). 
3881bid at 158, article 2(a). 
3g9Ibid. at 1 58, article 2(b). Ptinciple 2 1 states: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of 
International law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pwsuant to their own 
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause darnage to the envitonment of other States or of areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
Stockholm Declmation of the United Nations Con&ence on the Human Emironment, 5 lune 1972, U.N. 
Doc.A/CONF.48/ 14, (1972) 1 1 1.L.M. 14 16. 
3g0~ondon Guidelines, supra note 343 at 158, article 2(c). 
3911bid at 159, article 2(d), 
3921bid at 159, article 2(e). 
393lbid. at 159, article 2(9. 
Some chemicals are expressly exempted fiom inclusion under the Guidelines. These are: 
phannaceuticals; radioactive materials; chemicals imported for research or analysis in 
quantities unlikely to cause harm to human health or the environment; reasonable 
amounts of chemicals imported as personal or household effects; and, food additivedg4 
States are allowed to choose, however, if they wish to apply the London Guidelines to 
pharmaceuticals and food additives.395 
Article 5 specifies the institutional arrangements of the Guidelines, such as the 
development by üNEP and the FA0 of a single information exchange system for states 
to receive and comrnunicate information under the PIC procedure.3% UNEP is directed 
to "share with FA0 the operational responsibility of the PIC procedure and jointly 
manage and implement common elements including the selection of chemicals" .397 This 
article also describes the designation by each state of a national authority "competent to 
perform the administrative functions related to the exchange of information and decisions 
regarding importation of chemicals included in the PIC proced~.re".3~~ 
The designated national authority should be authorized to communicate. 
directly or as provided by national law or regulation, with designated 
national authorities of other States and with international organizations 
concerned to exchange information, to make and communicate decisions 
regarding chemicals included in the PIC procedure and to subrnit reports 
at the request of such States or on its own initiative;399 
States are directed to supply the name and address of their DNA to the International 
Register of Potentially Toxic Chernicals (IRPTC).W The IRPTC in tum was to maintain 
394~&id at 159, article 3. 
395~bid at 159, footnote 1 .  
3%lbid at 159, article 5.1. 
3971bid at 160, article 5 2 .  
3981bid at 160, article 5.4. 
3991bid. at 160, article 5.5. 
Joo~bid at 160, article 5.7. 
a directory of DNAs, to be disseminated to states,401 and to cosrdinate the work of the 
DNAs. In addition, the IRPTC was to develop recommendations on the means of making 
the Guidelines effective, to act as a liaison among the various acton and, to review the 
implernentation of the Guidelines by providing reports on its effectiveness.402 
Part II of the London Guidelines specifies the procedures for notification and the 
operation of the PIC procedure. Notification of a control action is to be made by the 
DNA to the IRPTC as soon as practicable after it has been taken, with suficient 
information, so that it may be disseminated by the IRPTC to other DNAs to enable them 
to evaluate the risks associated with their own continued use of the banned or severely 
restricted chemicals."3 States so notified have the opportunity of participating in the PIC 
procedure, whereby the IRPTC will record and convey their decisions regarding the 
future importation of chernicals into their state? The response from a DNA to a 
notification of a control action is to be received by the lRPTC within 90 days?s The 
IRPTC then inforrns the other DNAs of the importing states' decisions in a "timely 
fashion" $06 
If a chernical subject to the PIC procedure is to be exported, than the exporting state 
should provide the DNA of the importing state with a reminder of the control action and 
"to alert it to the fact that an export will occur or is occurring"."7 This information 
should be provided with the fust shipment following the control action, and perïodically 
40'lbid at 160, article 5.8. 
4021bid at 160, article 5.9. 
4031bid at 161, article 6. 
4w1bid at 161-2, article 7.1. 
4051bid at 162, article 7.3(a). 
406~bid at 163, article 7,4(a). 
40716id. at 163, article 8(a),(b). 
thereafter, or in the event that any new information relating to the control action is 
taken.408 The Guidelines also provide specific instructions for DNAs regarding their 
functions in relation to irnports and exportS.* 
Part III of the London Guidelines provides additional recommendations to states: 
For the protection of hunian health and the environment, States should 
facilitate: 
(i) The exchange of scientific information (including toxicological and 
safety data) and technical, economic and legal information concemiog the 
management of chemicals, particularly through designated national 
govemmental authorities and through intergovernmental organizations as 
appropriate; 
(ii) The provision upon request of technical advice and assistance 
conceming the management of chemicals to other States, on a bilateral or 
multilateral basis, taking into account the special needs of developing 
countries.4~0 
Additional recommendations regarding the classification, labelling and packaging of 
chernicals41 and technical assistance412 are also provided. This latter article directs the 
IRPTC to: 
... encourage funding agencies, such as the development banks and United 
Nations Development Programme, and bilateral donors to provide 
training, technical assistance and funding for institutional strengthening 
and should further encourage other United Nations organizations to 
strengthen their activities related to safe management of chemicals;413 
States are also encouraged to provide technical assistance to developing states in relation 
to the development of infrastructure and capacity for chernical rnanagement.4'4 Special 
408~bid at 164. article 8(e). 
409ibid at 164-5, article 12. 
'Oibid at 166, article 13. 
41 Ibid at 166-7, article 14. 
412~bid at 167, article 15. 
413~bid at 167, article 15(a). 
414~bid at 167, article 1 S(b). 
attention is requested for those states "without any regdatory procedures on chernicals in 
developing a regime for their contr01".~~5 The essentid elements of technical assistance 
by many developing states is M e r  specified.416 
The annexes of the London Guidelines provide the forms to be utilised by DNAs for a 
control action,417 a response to a control action by an importing s ta tesbmd export 
infor~nation.~19 Annexes also establish the procedure to be followed for the initial 
identification of chernicals for inclusion in the PIC procedure,420 and the information to 
be included in a PIC guidance document321 
4.3 Critiquing the Voluntary Instruments 
The International Code and the London Guidelines while capable of critique in retrospect 
were certainly perceived to be advantageous when they were first adopted, 
notwithstanding their voluntary legd statu. An article authored in 1990 states: 
making the Code legally binding would not significantly advance its goal 
of promoting international regulations to ensure safe use of pesticides in 
ail countries. The resources at this stage might be better spent on 
scientific and educational programs designed to close the gap, using the 
FA0 Code as a beacon, rather than on efforts to try to eliminate the gap 
through legal declaration.4* 
- 
4151bid at 167, article 15(c). 
4161bid at 167, ar&icIe 15(d). 
4171bid at 168, annex 1. 
4181bid at 17 1, annex IV. 
4191bid at 172, annex V. 
4201bid at 169, annex II. 
4211bid at 170, annex III. 
4z~ram, supra note 339 at 477. 
The Internorional Code was also favourably portrayed by another author who stated "[a111 
effective code of conduct would provide a basis for civic courage and rn0rality".~~3 
These accolades are arguably equally applicable to the London Guidelines. 
Another favourable point is the inclusion within the International Code of directives 
aimed toward industry and other actors, in addition to those directed toward governments. 
Such an inclusion recognises the complexity of the problems associated with pesticide 
trade, and the fùtility of attempting to challenge the sfatus quo when not al1 of the actors 
are addressed. While the London Guidelines was directed solely toward governments, in 
1994 CMEP concluded the Code of Ethics on the International Trade in Chernicals. a 
voluntary instrument directed toward industry and other private sector parties.J24 
Through the implementation of the Code of Ethics private sector parties were to help 
achieve the objectives of the London Guidelines by "goveming standards of conduct in 
the production and management of chernicals in international tradem.JZ In August 1994 
UNEP distributed the Code of Ethics to 185 industry and business associations and 77 
NGOs, but its adoption by these groups remained limited as of July 1 9 9 8 F  
W l e  the International Code and the London Guidelines did illustrate an international 
recognition of the need for change, they have proven to not be as effective as once hoped. 
Evidence for this point, at least in relation to the International Code, can be found in a 
4U~icarazi, supra note 368 at 462. 
4 2 4 ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  Code of Ethics on the International Trade in Chemicals, cited to (visited 8 September 1998) 
~hnp~/ i~ tc .une~:ch /e~ ics />  [hereinafter Code of Ethics]. 
42'~bid. at Part 1, article 1 .  
4 2 6 ~ s  of July 1, 1998 the following private sector parties had notified UNEP o f  their decisions to apply the 
Code of Ethics: Ewopean Chemical hdustry Council; European Ferti lizer Manufacturers Association; 
Japan Responsible Care Council; Spanish Chemical Industry Federation; Earthcare Afica; and, the 
International Union o f  Pure and Applied Chernisûy. See UNEP, Report on the Staus of the Application of 
the Code of Ethics on the fnternafional Trade in Chemicafs, cited to (visited 8 September 1998) 
<http://irptc.unep.ch/ethics/english/rep-en 1 .htrn> at 2-5. 
survey conducted by the FA0 in 19969 Of the 177 states sent the questionnaire, 91 
responded to the 144 questions which were arranged according to the articles of the 
Iniernational Code."* The results of the questionnaire demonstrated an increased 
compliance with the ternis of the international Code, but deficiencies were also 
identified. 
National authorhies of several developing countries recognize that they 
lack and are strongly interested in acquiring the necessary expertise and 
basic infrastructure in evaluating risks and in risk management and risk 
reduction strategies, adapted to local conditions (sic}. Furthemore, at 
least half of those responding to the questionnaire indicate the need for 
technical assistance and increased goveniment support to strengthen their 
national capabilities and infrastnictures necessary to operate effectively 
their pesticide control schemes {sic). Therefore, there appears to be a 
continuing need to further strengthen efforts to assist countries to 
implement the various provisions of the Pesticides Code of C o n d u ~ t . ~ ~ ~  
The most obvious critique of both the International Code and the London Guidelines is 
the fact that they are voluntary and as such, have no means of ensuring compliance or of 
taking punitive measures against uncooperative states. 
A second point is that they fail to provide a funding mechanism to assist developing 
states to take part in the PIC process. While the London Guidelines do recognise the 
special needs which some states may have, especially those without any national 
4 2 7 ~ ~ ~ ,  Analysis of Government Responîes to he Second Questionnaire on the State of lmplemenfution of 
the International Co& of Conhct on the Difiribution and Use of Pestici'cies, (1996) cited to (visited 27 
August 1998) 
~http~/~~~.fao.orglWAICENT/FaoInfolAgricu ... PP/Pesticid/ManagelQuesWintro.htm#obj2q~ 
[hereinafter Analysis]. The first survey was conducted in 1986. For a discussion of this questionnaire see 
ibid at 2-3. 
428~6id at 3. 
429i6id. at 4.  For specific information about the survey see FAO,  Tabular Summary of Resulfs, (1996) cited 
to (visited 27 August 1998) 
~http~l~~~.fao.org/WAICENT/FaoInfo/Agricu ... PP/Pesticimanage/ques Wtab.htm>. 
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chemical management system of their own, it fails to do more than "encourage" donors to 
financially as& these states. 
One author cntiqued the drafters of the International Code for the failure to include the 
precautionary principle.430 Reliance for this assertion was placed upon an interpretation 
of the precautionary principle found in the Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import 
N>lo Africa and the Control of T'ramboundPs, Movement and Management of Hazardous 
Wastes Within AfricaP31 The logic of this is that the precautionary principle would 
prevent the use of harmful chemicais even before there is scientific proof that a given 
chemical would prove hamiful to the environrnent.432 This same argument can aiso be 
advanced in relation to the London Guidelines. 
A fourth comment c m  be made regarding the relationship of these two instruments to 
international trade. Neither of these documents places a limitation on the trade of 
chernicals or pesticides falling under the PIC procedure. Instead, they both expressly 
state that they should not be construed in any manner which would provide such a 
justification. In this way, although these instruments both recognise the environmental 
- - - - 
4 3 0 ~ . ~ .  Baender, "Pesticides and Precaution: The Bamako Convention as a Mode1 for an International 
Convention on Pesticides Regulationn (1991) 24 Int'l L, & Politics 557. 
431 ~ a m a k o  Convernion on the Ban of the irnport into Afiica and the C o n r d  of Tranrboundary Movernent 
and Management of Hazardorrs Wasfes Within Afiica, 30 January 1991, (1991) 30 I.L.M. 773, cited to 
(visited 17 August 1998) <http://www.tufts.edu/fI etcher/muIti/text Fereinafler Bamako Convewion]. 
The precautionary principle is defined at article 4(3Xf) of the Bamako Convention as: 
Each part. shall saive to adopt and implement the preventative. precautionary approach 
to pollution problems which entails, inter-alia, preventing the release into the 
environment of substances which may cause h m  to humans or the environment without 
waiting for scientific proof regarding such h m .  The parties shall CO-operate with each 
other in taking the appropriate measures to implement the precautionary principle to 
pollution prevention through the application of clean production methods, rather than the 
pursuit of a permissible emissions approach based on assimilative assumptions. 
432while the precautionary pnnciple is dealt with in a cursory fashion here. it is discussed in more detail 
iater in this chapter, see footnote 580 and accompanying text. 
harm which is incidental to the use of pesticides and chemicals, they do not evidence any 
intention on the part of the international community to delineate such a h m .  From an 
environmentai perspective these instruments may not go far enough, as a limitation on 
trade itself may be a wise environmental choice. 
Another factor is the difference in breadth of coverage of actors between the two 
instruments. While the international Code purports to be addressed to numerous actors, 
both public and private, the London Guidelines have been drafted to reflect a concem 
only with governmental actors. Knowing the dificulty of binding private actors under 
international instruments, and recognising that these two documents are volmtary, does 
not remove the need to address the actions of private actors, such as industry. The fact 
that the London Guidelines does not address industry's involvement in chernical trade, is 
a large gap in its credibility as a valid environmental tool. This sentiment is echoed in the 
words of one author who states that "[tlhe best prospect for international regdation is an 
approach that relies on notification procedures and on concepts of shared responsibility 
between manufacturers and govemment agencies" 9 
Finally, the instruments may also exhibit a naiveté regarding the ability of states 
themselves to provide technical assistance. As has been discussed earlier, MNCs are the 
actors who hold the majority of intellectual property nghts for most of the technical 
information required by developing states. This is not information which c m  be handed 
to these states by anyone other than MNCs. 
. -- . - - - - .- 
433~ ick l i tq  supra note 339 at 697. 
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In short, while these two instruments have provided a badine for international action, in 
the late 1990s they fail to provide sufficient assistance to states given the magnitude of 
known environmental and health concerns. A legally binding instrument is now required 
to alter the problems associated with the international trade of chemicals and pesticides. 
4.4 Negotiaiing a New PIC Convention 
Since the initial drafting and adoption of the International Code and the London 
Guidelines, UNCED was held in 1992. The acceptance of Agenda 21 at this conference 
by the world community evidenced a new concern for the proper handling of 
environmental concems. This plan of action expressly dealt with trade in toxic 
c hemicals. 
4.41 Agenda 2 1 
Chapter 19, of Agenda 21, entitled "Environmentally Sound Management of Toxic 
Chemicals, Including Prevention of Illegal International Traffk in Toxic and Dangerous 
Products" establishes the world's perspective on chemical management in 1 9 9 2 9  The 
Introduction of this Chapter states: "[a] substantial use of chemicals is essential to meet 
the social and economic goals of the world cornmunity and today's best practice 
demonstrates that they can be used widely in a cost-effective manner and with a high 
degree of safety"."s To achieve this end, six programme areas for change were 
proposed: 
(a) Expanding and accelerating international assessrnent of chemical risks; 
(b) Hannonization of classification and labelling of chemicals; 
(c) Information exchange on toxic chemicals and chernical risks; 
a4~genda 21, supra note 65 at Chapter 19. 
43516id at Chapter 19, paragraph 19.1. 
(d) Establishment of risk reduction programmes; 
(e) S trengthening of national capabilities and capaci ties for management 
of chernicds; 
(f) Prevention of illegal international trac in toxic and dangerous 
produc ts.436 
The success of these programme areas was characterised as being dependent upon an 
international will to work and CO-ordinate activities, including "identification and 
application of technical, scientific, educational and fmancial means, in particular for 
developing countnes" 337 
Agenda 2 1 expressly acknowledged the role of industry in chemical management. 
The broadest possible awareness of chemical risks is a prerequisite for 
achieving chemical safety. The principle of the right of the community 
and of workers to know those risks should be recognised. However, the 
right to know the identity of hazardous ingredients should be balanced 
with industry's right to protect confidential business information ... The 
industry initiative on responsible care and product stewardship should be 
developed and promoted. Industry should apply adequate standards of 
operation in al1 countries in order not to damage hurnan health and the 
environment.438 
While this recognition of the mitigative role industry is important, it pales in cornparison 
with the contents of the drafi Code of Con&, which would have placed more binding 
obligations upon industry conduct. Agenda 21 therefore indicates a shift in political will 
away From the regulation of industry. 
Of the six programme areas, the exchange of information on toxic chemicals and 
chemical risks is of particular interest. Although the use of the London Guidelines is 
acknowledged in the text, there remains concem over the continuing export of banned or 
436~bid at Chapter 19. paragraph 19.4. 
437~bid at Chapter 19, paragraph 19.5. 
4381bid. at Chapter 19, paragraph 19.8. 
severely restricted chemicals to developing states.439 The text also acknowledges various 
international initiatives in relation to chernical management040 and states 
"[n]otwithstanding the importance of the PIC procedure, information exchange on d l  
chernicals is neces~ary".~i This cd1 to provide information for ail chemicals envisions a 
much more transparent system than that provided under either the International Code or 
the London Guidelines. 
The objectives of the programme are stated as: 
(a) To promote intensified exchange of information on chernical safety, 
use and ernissions among al1 involved parties; 
(b) To achieve by the year 2000, as feasible, full participation in an 
implementation of the PIC procedure, including possible mandatory 
applications through legally binding instruments contained in the amended 
London Guidelines and in the FA0 International Code of Conduct, taking 
into account the expenence gained within the PIC procedure.** 
The Chapter than proceeds to outline the various actions which need to be undertaken in 
relation to the programme by governments and international organisations, with the 
cooperation of industry. In the context of management directives to strengthen rational 
and international information exchange networks, to provide technical cooperation to 
those states in need of assistance, and to implernent the existing PIC procedures while 
working toward the conclusion of legally-binding instruments, are given.443 In relation to 
data and information, the need for the creation of information networks in developing 
states, in addition to improving existing networks is expressed? Knowledge on 
severely restricted and banned chemicals to importing nations is to be provided, as is 
43glbid at Chapter 19, paragraph 1 9.35. 
"Olbid at Chapter 19, pamgraph 19.36. 
"llbid at Chapter 19, paragraph 19.37. 
*2/bid. at Chapter 19, pmgraph 19.38. 
43~bid at Chapter 19, paragraph 19.39. 
4441bid at Chapter 19, paragraph 19.40. 
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information required to assess risks to health and the environmentP45 In addition the 
chapter specifies the requirements for international and regional CO-operation and CO- 
ordinatiofl and, for fuiancing and cost evaluation.447 
What Agenda 21 does not do is assert the need to take a proactive stance on chernical 
management. While this cm be reduced to a need to accommodate the tensions between 
various negotiators, it can also be said that it is a faiture to utilise the precautionary 
principle as it is found in Principle 15 of the Rio Declarafion- The statement found 
within paragraph 19.37, regarding the need for an exchange of information on al1 
chemicals, may have been a vague attempt at incorporating this principle. 
The international community, acting upon the directive of Agenda 21 to provide a more 
mandatory scheme of regulation before the year 2000, began to initiate the process. It 
began at the 107th Session of the FA0 Council, where it was "agreed that the FA0 
Secretariat should proceed with the preparation of a drafl PIC convention as part of the 
current FAO/LMEP programme on PIC" in CO-operation with other interested actors.49 
This was followed by the UNEP Goveming Council Decision 18/12, made at its 
Eighteenth Session, in May 1995PM This Decision states that having taken into account 
445 1bid 
461bid at Chapter 19, paragraph 19-42. 
"'1bid at Chapter 19, paragraph 1 9.43. 
48Principle 15 states: 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be wideIy appiied 
by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shal1 not be used as a reason for postponing cost- 
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1 3 lune 1 992, LN, Doc. NCONF. 1 5 1 /S/Rev. 1 ,3  1 
I.L.M. 874, cited to S.P. Johnson, The firth Sumrnit: the United Nufions Conference on Environment and 
Deve[opment (UNCED) (London: Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) 1 17 at 120, Principle 1 5. 
%EP, Deveiopment of an Internuîionuiiy Legaliy Binding Inst~(menu (visited 29 Novern ber 1 997) 
dittpY/irptc.unep.ch/pic/h2.htmI> at 1 mereinafier Deweloprnen~]. 
JsO1bid 
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Agenda 21, and the FA0 Decision, the Executive Director of UNEP is to convene, 
working in conjunction with the FAO, govemments, and international organizations, "an 
intergovernmental negotiating cornmittee, with a mandate to prepare an international 
legally binding instrument for the application of the prior informed consent procedure for 
certain hazardous chernicals in international trade" .451 
The fvst meeting of the Intergovemmental Negotiating Cornmittee (INC) took place in 
Bmsels on March 1 1 - 1 5, 1996.452 This meeting was attended by " 1 94 Delegates from 
80 Govements, the European Commission and a number of UN Organs, Speciaiised 
Agencies. IGOs [Intergovemmental Organisations] and NGOs won-governmental 
Organisations]".453 At this session the INC agreed on the Rules of Procedure and 
"compieted a preliminary review of a drafl outline of the hiture agreement".454 A 
working group was aiso formed to commence selection of the chernicals which would be 
covered by the convention.4Ss 
The second meeting of the MC was held in Nairobi on September 16-20, 1996.456 At this 
meeting technical and legal drafting working groups were formed, and 24 pages of ciraft 
convention text was developed.457 One element of disagreement arnong delegates at this 
meeting was whether the convention should mirror the existing voluntary regime or, 
4 5 1 U N ~ ~ ,  UNEP Governing Council Dechion IS/Z2, (1 995). cited to (visited 29 November 1997) 
&ttpY/irptc.unep.ch/pic/h5. hm l> at 1-2, paragraph 1 meminafier /8/I 21. 
452~evelopmenr, supra note 449 at 1. 
4 a U N ~ ~ ,  UNEP Chemicals: Dewlopment of an IntermtionaI Legally Biding I ~ l r u m e n &  on Prior 
Informed Consent (PIC) for Certain Harardous Chemicals in international Trade (visited 4 December 
1 997) chttpY/irptc.unep.ch/pid> at f bereinafier UNEP Chemicals]. 
4541bid. 
4ss Ibid 
456~evelopment, supra note 449 at 2. 
4 5 7 ~ ~ ~  Chemicafs, supro note 453 at 1. 
alternatively, if its scope should be developed to "allow some flexibility in order to 
include the possibility of considering measures beyond the existing PIC pr0cedure".~5* 
In the Decision of  the 1 1 Ith FA0 Council Meeting, made October 10, 1996, the Council 
"expressed its satisfaction with the progress on the PIC negotiations".4" They also 
discussed the mandate of the INC and whether it should be broadened to negotiate a 
fkamework Convention on chernical management46° Such a Convention would then deal 
with both pnor informed consent chemicals and those chemicals which are capable of 
being classified as persistent organic pollutants (POPs). As the Council members were 
unable to agree whether or not the mandate should be broadened, it was decided to leave 
the MC with its original mandate."' To this end the INC was directed to focus "its 
attention on the elaboration of practical and operational procedures to impiement the PIC 
procedure".J62 At the Nineteenth Session of the UNEP Goveming Council, the MC 
mandate was also M e r  confmed.463 
The third meeting of the INC was in Geneva on May 26-30,1997PsJ The issues 
addressed at this session were: 
the respective obligations of importing and exporting countries, and how 
to identiQ the types of chemicals to include in the agreement ... the cnteria 
4581bid 
4 5 9 ~ ~ ~ ,  Decbion of the I 1 1 th FA0 Council Meeting: Report on the Progrers of Negotiarions of an 
International tegally-Binding Instrument for the Application ofthe Prior Injbrrned Cornent (PIC) 
Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Traak, ( 1 W6), cited to (visited 
29 November 1997) <http~lirptc.unep.ch/pic/fao 1 I 1 en.html> at 1 [hereinafter I l  I th Councilj. 
460 Ibid. 
46 ' Ibid 
" Ib id at 2, paragraph 5. 
4 6 3 U N ~ ~ ,  Decisions Adopted &y the Governing Council at ifs Nineteenth Session: 19/13A. Dewlopment of 
an International Legally Binding Instrument for the Application of the Prior lnformed Corsent Procehre 
for Certain Hazardozis Chmiculs and Pesticides in International Trade, (1 997), cited to (visited 29 
November 1997) <http~lirptc.unep.ch/pic/gcpic-e-htmb at 2, paragraph 1 Fereinafter 1 9/i3A]. 
4"~evelopment, supra note 449 at 2. 
for selecting the specific chemicals; the d e s  for notifjhg exporters of 
banned or severely restricted chemicals and pesticides and hazardous 
pesticide formulations; the designation of competent national authorities; 
the use of  risk assessments; classification, packaging and labelling 
requirements; technical assistance; and hancial mechanisms.~~ 
The fourth MC meeting was held in Rome, on October 20-24, 1997. At this session, 
more than two-thirds of the drafl provisions were provisionally endorsed by the 
Cornmittee membersP66 At the f i a  and final, MC session held in Brussels from March 
9-14, 1998,a7 95 states468 and the European Community were in attendance.*9 It was 
also attended by United Nations bodies and speciaiised agencie~,~~O intergovemmental 
organisations,~7~ and non-govemmentai organisationsJ* 
M 5 ~ ~  Chemicais, supra note 453 at 2. In addition see "Prior Infonned Consent TaIks to Address 
Which Pesticides to include, Data Required" (1997) 20(18) Int'l Env. Rep. 821, and "Agreement on Drafi 
PIC Text Sets Stage For International Treaty Later This Year" (1997) 20(12) Int'l Env. Rep. 551. 
4 6 6 ~ ~ ~ ~  Chemicais, ibid. 
J67~eport o/rhe htergowrnmental h'egoti~ting Cornmirtee for an Internutioml Legafiy Binding Inrrnmenr 
for the Application of the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chernicals and 
Pesticiaks in International Trade on the Work of Its F@h k s i o n  UNEP/FAO/PIC/MC.5/3, (1 7 March 
1998), cited to (visited 25 July 1998) d i r t p ~ / w w w . f a o . o r g l a 9 / a g p / a g p p / p e s t i c i ~  at 1
hereinafler PIC INC.51. 
L8The States in attendance were: Algeria, Angola, Antisua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia Australia, 
Austria, Barbados, Belanis, Belgium, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, 
Chile, China, Colornbia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivorie, Cuba, Czech Republic, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, 
France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungaxy, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic 
of ), Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lesotho, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, 
Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Narnibia, Nepat, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, 
Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peni, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Rornania, 
Russian Federation, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Afnca, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem 
Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. See ibid at 3, paragraph 16. 
469~bid at 3. 
470~he United Nations bodies and specialised agencies in attendance were: Secretariat of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, United Nations Institute for Training and Research and the World Trade 
Organisation. See ibid at 4, paragraph 17. 
471The intergovernmentnl organisations in attendance were: the Afncan Caribbean Pacitic Gmup and the 
Gulf Cooperation Council. See ibid at 4, paragraph 18. 
472The non-governmental organisations present were: the Chemical Manufacturers Association, Consumers 
International, European Chemical industry Council, Foundation for Advancements in Science and 
Education, Global Cmp Protection Federation, HeaIth and Environment Watch, Internat ional Council on 
Metals and the Environment, International Federation of Phannaceutical Manufacturers Association, 
International Institute for the Sociology of Law and the Pesticides Trust. See ibid at 4, paragraph 19. 
4.5 The Druft Convention and O Critique 
During the negotiations, the Chair of the MC, Ms. Maria Celina de Azevedo Rodngues, 
of Brazil, "stressed that the purpose of the preamble was to reflect what had k e n  left out 
of the articles" of the convention973 Therefore, its preamble differs fiom those found in 
its voluntary predecessors, and includes paragraphs which recall Chapter 19 of Agenda 
21 by titie and acknowledge the voluntary PIC procedure found in the Internaiional Code 
and the London Guidelines.474 The prearnble also directs that the needs of both 
developing States and of those in transition must be considered, mentions the need for 
appropriate packaging and labelling of substances and recognises that "trade and 
environmental policies should be munially s u p p o a i v e " P 7 5  It M e r  emphasises that its 
terms should not be "interpreted as implying in any way a change in the rights and 
obligations of a Party under any existing international agreement applying to chernicals in 
international trade or environmental protection" and, that the preamble "is not intended to 
create a hierarchy between this Convention and other international agreements" 
The three paragraphs which concem trade issues refiect the tension regarding the 
relationship between this Convention and the GATT 1994/WTO system, and the 
negotiations surrounding the adoption of this wording apparently provided "one of the 
tensest moments of lNCS"P77 Although delegates stated that the inclusion of this 
language will not prejudge their fùture positions in international forums and negotiations 
4 7 3 ~ .  Chasek, et al., e& "Report of the F i f i  Session o f  the MC for an International Legally Binding 
Instrument for the Application of  the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chernicals 
and Pesticides in International Trade" (1998) 15(4) Earth Neg. Bulletin, cited to (visited 25 July 1998) 
~http://www.mbne~mb.ca/linkages/downloac/enb 1504e.txt> 1 at 5 [hereinafter Fgh Session]. 
4 7 4 ~ ~ ~  INCS, supra note 467 at 14. 
4751bid at 14-5. 
4761bid at 15. 
477 ~ i j h  Session, supra note 473 at 25. 
deding with trade and environmentai issuesp78 it is difficult to believe otherwise. This 
Convention provides such a close and obvious nexus between trade and environment, that 
if the Parties had wished to demonstrate an intention to alter the current baiancing of 
power between these two policy arenas they could have done so. The fact that many of 
them believed that the inclusion of the preambular language was simply a preventative 
measure based "on the fear that the Convention might be used as an excuse to take WTO- 
inconsistent rneasures or that the perception of a hierarchy between different agreements 
might be createdW479 demonstrates their desire to retain trade supremacy. 
It is interesting to note that previous drafts of the Convention contained articles dealing 
with "phase-outs and trade bans" and also "control of trade with non-parties1'.48* These 
articles would have been counter to GATT 1994/WTO goals, and if included, would have 
been interpreted as being an expression of intent that the PIC Convention should restrict 
trade, if it had not been for the presence of another clause which specifically stated that 
"any conflict between the Convention and the WTO rules would be settled in favour of 
the latter".48i Some delegates expressed "surprise and concem that the wording could 
allow international trade rules to override the provisions of the Convention" while others 
felt that the former delegates were not "properly briefed on the trade implications of a 
legally binding PIC proced~re".~" The fact that delegates saw no need to retain these 
clauses within the fmal drafi M e r  illustrates their confidence in the supremacy of trade. 
- - 
4781bid 
4791bid. at 25. 
4 8 0 ~ .  Chasek, et ai., eds., "Report of the Third Session of the MC for an International Legally Binding 
instrument for the Application of the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals 
and Pesticides in International Trade" (1997) 15(2) Earth Neg. Bulletin, cited to 
<hnp://~~~~.mbnet.mb.caninkages/downIoad/anb1502e.a<~ 1 at 19 [hereinafler Third Sersion]. 
48g'lbid at 29. 
4 8 2 ~ .  Chasek, et ai.. eds., "Report of the Fourth Session of the MC for an International Legally Binding 
Instrument for the Application of the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Wazardous Chemicab 
and Pesticides in International Trade" (27 October 1997) 15(3) Earth Neg. Bulletin, cited to (visited 25 July 
94 
By agreeing upon the current prearnble language, and by removing the previously drafted 
articles, there is an expressed intention by the Parties that the GATT 1994/WTO system 
will retain suprernacy over this MEA. ïhis interpretation is predicated upon the prhciple 
that a legal instrument must be interpreted within the context established by its' Preamble 
and cannot, therefore, be found to be inconsistent with GATT f 994/WTO- 
The objective of the Convention is found in article 1 : 
The objective of this Convention is to promote shared responsibility and 
cooperative efforts among Parties in the international trade of certain 
hazardous chemicals in order to protect human health and the environment 
from potential harm and to contribute to their environmentaily sound use, 
by facilitating information exchange about their characteristics, by 
providing for a national decision-making process on their import and 
export and by disseminating these decisions to Partie~.~*3 
Article 2 of the drafi lists the definitions. Of interest are those for ~hernical,~w banned 
chernicals8s severely restricted chemical,486 and a newly added terni, severely hazardous 
1 998) <httpd/www.m b n e ~ m  b.ca/l inkages/downIoad/asc/enb 1SO3e. txt> 1 at 23 Fereinafler Fourth 
Session]. Also see Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Cornmittee for an international Legaliy 
Binding Instrument for the Application of the Prior infrmed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous 
Chernicals and Pesricides in Intermiunai Trade on the Work of its Fourth Session, 
LMEP/FAO/PIC/MC.4/2, (4 November 1997)- cited to (visited 2 December 1997) 
<httpdlirptc.unep.ch/pic/> at 8, where one delegate expressed a reservation with the deletion of article 14 
which proposed control of trade with non-Parties, noting that a similar provision existed in the Busel 
Convention. 
483 PIC I m ,  supra note 467 at 15, article 1. 
484~he t nn 'chemical': 
means a substance whether by itself or in a mixture or preparation and whether 
manufactured or obtained h m  nature, but does not include any living organism. It 
consists of the following categories: pesticide (including severely hazardous pesticide 
formulations) and industrial; 
Ibid at 15, article 2(a). 
4 8 5 ~ e  term 'banned chemical': 
Ibid at 
means a chemical al1 uses of which within one or more categories have been prohibited 
by final regulatory action, in order to protect hurnan health or the environment. It 
includes a chemical that has been refused approval for first-time use or has been 
withdtawn by industry either h m  the domestic market or fiom further consideration in 
the domestic approval process ad where there is clear evidence that such action has been 
taken in order to protect human health or the environment; 
15, article 2(b). 
pesticide for1nulation.~87 These definitions are similar to those used under the voluntary 
r eg ime .  Missing, however, is the extensive defmition of a pesticide. Under the 
International Code the terni 'pesticide' is defined extensively489 whereas under the current 
definition of 'chernical', the meaning of 'pesticide' is left unexplained. 
Another defdtion worthy of mention is that of 'Party'. This is defined as "mean[ing] a 
State or regional economic integration organization that has consented to be bound by 
this Convention and for which the Convention is in force".490 This can be contrasted with 
the breadth of the actors listed as being essential for the implementation of the 
International Code?' While such a definition of Party is consistent with international 
law, the implementation and success of this Convention will be predicated upon the 
cornpliance and actions of many actors, in particular MNCs who remain outside the 
boundaries of this Convention. Their liability for inappropriate acts in association with 
chemicals is not addressed by this MEA. 
486The term 'severely mtricted chemical': 
means a chemical virtually al1 use of which within one or more categories has been 
prohibited by final regulatory action in order to protect human health or the environment, 
but for which certain specific uses remain allowed. It includes a chemical that has, for 
virtually al1 use, been refused approval or been withdrawn by industry either fiom the 
domestic market or fiom fûrther consideration in the domestic approval process, and 
where there is clear evidence that such action has been taken in order to protect human 
health or the environment; 
ibid. at 15-6, article 2(c). 
487The term 'severely hazardous pesticide formulation': 
means a chemical fomulated for pesticidal use that produces severe health or 
environmental effects observable within a short period of time after single or multiple 
exposure, under conditions of use; 
ibid at 16, article 2(d). 
4 M ~ e e  footnotes 356,357,383,384,385, and accompanying text 
489~ee foomote 355 and accompanying texr 
4 9 0 ~ ~ ~  INC5, supm note 467 at 16, article 2(g). 
4 9 1 ~ e e  footnote 353 and accompanying text. 
Article 3 of the draft sets out the scope of the Convention. The Convention will not apply 
to: narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; radioactive materials; wastes; chemical 
weapons; pharmaceuticals; food additives; food; "chernicals in quantities not likely to 
affect human health or the environment provided they are imported" either for research or 
analytical purposes, or for an individual's persona1 use, in quantities appropriate for such 
a use? 
Article 4 specifies the selection and reporting of DNAs to the Secretariat of the 
Convention, and article 5 sets out the procedures for banned or severely restricted 
chemicalsP93 The latter article provides that when a state makes a final regulatory 
ac tionPw 
they are to notie the Secretariat of that action no later than 90 days following the action 
taking effect.495 The Secretariat in tum will fonvard the information to the other 
Parties.496 In addition, every six months the Secretariat will forward to the Parties a 
synopsis of al1 information which they have received regarding final regulatory 
ac tions.497 
A chemical will be made subject to the PIC procedure when notification has been 
received of a final regulatory action in at les t  two of the global PIC regions498 and the 
Chemical Review Cornmittee has ascertained that the chemical meets the criteria listed in 
4 9 2 ~  IC INCS, supro note 467 at 16-7, article 3(2). 
4g31bid at 1 7, articles 4, 5. 
49j~he temi 'final regulatory action': 
means an action taken by a Party, which does not require subsequent regulatory action by 
that Party, the purpose of which is to ban or severely restrict a chemical; 
Ibid at 16, article 2(e). 
"qbid at 17, article 5(1). 
496~&id at 18, article 5(3). 
4971bid at 1 8, article 5(4). 
498~he PIC regions will be set at the fim Conference of the Parîies. See Ibid at 18, article 5(5). 
A ~ e x  11,499 such that it can be listed in Annex III as a chemical to which the PIC 
procedure applies5? 
The text conceming the number of notifications required for a chemical to be included in 
the PIC procedure was the subject of much negotiation.501 The discussion focused upon 
whether it was necessary for the Secretariat to have received notification f?om two PIC 
regions, or whether one would be suffiicient." Several delegations "agreed that one or 
more notifications warranted a triggerhg of the PIC procedure, regardless of the number 
of regions"? Some of these delegates were from developing states (Philippines, 
Panama, Indonesia, Argentina), which rnay be part of the reason for their concem. 
Developing states, if they are grouped into PIC regions together, and have fewer 
infrastructural means to analyse chemical characteristics, may be less likely to issue final 
regulatory actions. In this way, the admittance of a harmful chemical into the PIC 
procedure may take longer than desired. It is interesting that the states supporting the 
drafied text requiring two PIC regions include the United States, European Cornrnunity, 
Canada and India.sm The basis of their argument was that it "would reflect a broader 
concem and ensure that chemicals put on the PIC list had support in a global context".505 
In contrast, the industry lobby at the negotiations did not want a substance placed in 
annex III until "five countnes fiom three different regions of the world [had] banned 
499~nnex II sets out the steps required to place a chemical under the PIC procedure. This includes: 
confirmation of the final regdatory action; establishing that the regulatory action has been made on the 
basis of a nsk evaluation based upon scientific data; ascertain whether the final regulatory action is an 
appropriate basis to merit the listing of the chemical in Annex II1 (lists al1 chemicals subject to the PIC 
procedure); and, not list the chemical on the basis of its having been intentionaiiy misused. See Ibid. at 36, 
annex II. 
500~bid at 18, article 5(5),(6). 
~ # h  Session, supra note 473 at 9. 
502~bid 
s03 Ibid 
W b i d  
5051bid 
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it".SM Until the fust Conference of the Parties, it was agreed that the FA0 list of seven 
regions would be used as a mode1 for the PIC regions.m7 
Article 6 describes the procedures for severely hazardous pesticide formulations available 
to developing states and states with an economy in transition.so8 This article was 
designed to assist developing states and those with economies in transition, to quickly 
include hazardous pesticide formulations within annex III? While some negotiations 
took place surrounding whether the article should be available to al1 Parties, the original 
text was retained out of recognition that developing states have less capacity to respond 
to a hazardous pesticide incident than developed states do.510 
For any chernical which the Chemical Review Cornmittee decides to list in Annex III,5I1 
a decision guidance document (DGD) rnust be prepared.512 The DGD is then reviewed at 
a Conference of the Parties, where a decision will be made regarding the inclusion of the 
5 0 6 ~ .  Grandi, "'Watch List' Mechanism A pproved by Nations Working on Chemical Trade Treaty " ( 1 997) 
20(22) Int'l Env. Rep. 993 at 993 [hereinafter "Watch List"]. 
507~@h Session, supra note 473 at 9. 
508~iC INC.5, supra note 467 at 18-9, article 6. 
SOgF@h Session, supra note 473 at 9. 
5lolbid at 10. 
[Chemicals presently listed in annex III are: 2,4,5-T, Aldrin, Captafol, Chlordane, Chlordimeform, 
Chlorobenzilate, DDT, Dieldrin, Dinoseb and Dinoseb Salts, 12-dibromoethane (EDB), Fiuorocetamide, 
HCH (mixed isomers), Heptachlor, Hexachlorobenzene, Lindane, Mercury Compounds (including 
inorganic mercury compounds, alkyl mercury compounds and akyloxyalkyl and aryl mercury compounds), 
Pentachlorophenol, Monocrotophos (soluble liquid formulations of the substance which exceed 600g active 
ingredient per litre), Methamidophos (soluble liquid formulations of the substance which exceed 600 g 
active ingredient per litre), Phosphamidon (soluble liquid formuIations of the substance which exceed 
1 OOOg active ingredient per litre), Methyl-Parathion (certain formulations of parathion methyl emulsifiable 
concentrates with 19.5%, 40%, 50%. 60% active ingredient and dus& containing 1.5%, 2% and 3% active 
ingredient), Parathion (al1 formulations - aerosols, dustable powder, emulsifable concentrate, granules and 
wettable powders - of bis substance are included, except capsule suspensions), Crocidolite, 
Polybrominated biphenyls (PBB), Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB), Polychlorinated terphenyls (PCT), and 
Tris (2,3-dibromopropyl) phosphate. In this list the first 17 substances are pesticides, the next 5 are 
severely hazardous pesticide formulations, and the last 5 are industrial chemicals. See PIC INC5, supra 
note 467 at 37, annex III. 
l2lbid at 19, article 7( 1). 
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chernical in Amex III. Following this decision, a copy of the DGD will be sent to the 
Parties.513 Those chemicals presently listed under the voluntary regime of the 
Infernafional Code and the London Guidelines will be included in Annex III as long as 
they meet ail of the requirements for being Iisted and a Conference of the Parties 
approves their inclusion.51J It is anticipated that at l e s t  another 50 chemicals will be 
added in the future.515 Chernicals may also be removed from annex III in accordance 
with article 9.5'6 
Article 10 specifies the obligations of importing states for chemicals listed in annex III. 
Parties, within nine months following the receipt of a DGD must reply to the Secretariat 
with their decision regarding the future importation of the chemical.5'7 Responses can 
range from consenting to future importation518 to not consenting to any future 
importations,519 or to consenting with specifications.520 Parties are also allowed to issue 
an interim decision.521 Every six months the Secretariat will communkate a listing of ail 
of the responses which it has received, as well as the administrative or legislative 
measures upon which they have been based, where that information is available. 522 The 
Secretariat will also provide the Parties with a listing of those states which have failed to 
respond-s* 
5131bid at 19, article 7(2),(3). 
514~bid at 19, article 8. 
5"~angemus", s u p  note 94. 
f 1 6 ~ ~ ~  lm, supra note 467 at 19-20, article 9. 
517~bid at 20, article 1 O(2). 
5181bid at 20, article 10(4)(a)(i). 
I9Ibid at 2 1, article 1 0(4)(a)(ii). 
s20~bid at 2 1, article 10(4)(a)(iii). 
52 Ibid at 2 1 ,  article 1 0(4)(b). 
5Ul&id at 2 1 ,  article 1 O( 1 0). 
5231&id 
Article 1 1 sets out the obligations for the export of a chemical listed in annex III. Parties 
are directed to take appropriate Iegislative and administrative measures to ensure that no 
Iater than six months following the receipt of a response, exporters comply with the 
decisions in the response.524 Article 11 also further delineates the obligations of 
exporting Parties where importing Parties have failed to respond or have responded 
inadequate1y.m While this article does direct Parties to ensure that appropriate 
legislative measures are placed into effect with regard to chemical exportation, it fails to 
direct Parties to bind industry in relation to their broader involvement with chemical 
trade.526 
Export notifications to importing Parties are dso required when the exporting Party 
exports a chernical for which it has taken a final regulatory action, thereby banning or 
severely restricted the use of the chemical within its own temt0ry.5~~ The export 
notification is to be provided with the first shipment following the final regulatory action, 
and also with the first shiprnent in a calendar year and the fust shipment following any 
adjustrnents to theu final regulatory action.528 The importing Party must acknowledge 
receipt of the export notification within thirty days of its being sent by the exporter, and 
in the event that there is no response the exporter must send a second notification.529 The 
obligations for Parties under this article cease when a chemical is listed under annex III, 
the importing party has responded to the Secretariat in accordance with article 10, and, 
524~bid. at 22, articte I 1(1 fi). 
S2S~bid a 22, article 1 l(2). 
52bThis issue is discussed later in this chapter, see fornote 576 and accompanying text. 
5 2 7 ~ 1 ~  INC5, s u p  note 467 at 23, article 12(1). The requirements for an export notification are set out in 
annex V of the ciraft Convention. See ibid at 4 1 ,  annex V. 
528~bid ai 23, article 12(2),(3). 
529~6id ai 23. article 12(4). 
the Secretariat has distributed the responses to the Parties.530 The information which 
must accompany exports of chernicals is specified in article 13."' 
Article 14 provides for the exchange of information between the Parties, and directs that 
Parties should facilitate the exchange of "scientific, technical, economic and legal 
infonnation" including "toxicological, ecotoxicological and safety information" in 
accordance with the tenor of the Convention.532 Parties are allowed to protect 
confidential information but article 14(3) lists information which cannot be claimed as 
confidential under the terms of the Convention, including information found in annexes 
Im and IV53'$ a chernical's expiry date, information related to precautionary measures, 
and summary results from toxicological and ecotoxicoIogical tests.95 
Negotiation took place surrounding whether production and expiration dates should be 
regarded as confidential.53Wne delegate stated that this information was not always 
available and suggested adding the text "where applicable and available"F7 Several 
delegates felt that this would preclude the transparency required in the Convention, and 
noted that it was hard to believe "that a manufacturer [did] not have these dates, and 
[ M e r ]  noted the importance of these dates for developing countries when importing 
chernicals".fl* A compromise was reached with the inclusion of the expiry date as not 
5301bid at 23, article I2(5). 
5311bid at 23, article 13. 
532~bid at 24, article 14(1)(a). 
533~nnex 1 sets out the requirements for a notification to the Secretariat of a final reguiaiory action taken 
by a Party, and specifies that the properties, identifications and name of the chemicai, as well as details of 
the final regdatory action be provided. See ibid at 34, annex 1. 
53J~nnex IV sets out the information and criteria required in order to list a banned or severely restricted 
chernical in annex III. See ibid at 39, annex IV. 
535fbid at 24-5, article 14 (3). 
5 3 6 ~ 8 h  Session, supra note 473 at 13. 
5371bid at 14. 
538ibid. at 14. 
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being confidential, and a new subparagraph 14(4) stating that the production date is 
"normally not considered to be confidential" .539 
Article 15 discusses the implementation of the Convention. It directs Parties to take the 
necessary measures to ensure that their national infrastructure and institutions wiIl 
effectively carry out the intention of the Convention, including any alteration required 
in their national legislation or administrative measures. Additionally, Parties may 
establish national data banks and registen on chemicals, encourage industry to promote 
chemical safety, and promote voluntary agreements with other states, having taken into 
account article 16 which deals with technical assistance.540 
Article 16 titled 'Technicd Assistance' states: 
The Parties shall, taking into account in particular the needs of developing 
countries and countries with economies in transition, cooperate in 
promoting technical assistance for the development of infrastructure and 
the capacity necessary to manage chemicals to enable implementation of 
this Convent ion. Parties with more advanced programmes for reg ulat ing 
chemicals should provide technical assistance, including training to other 
Parties in developing their infrastructure and capacity to manage 
chemicals throughout their life-cycle."l 
This small article can be contrasted with the much more detaiIed article on Technical 
Assistance found in the London Guidelines.s42 While the London Guidelines were 
5391bid, and PIC INCS, supra note 467 at 25, article 14(4). 
5 4 0 ~ ~ ~  INC5, ibid at 25, article 1 5( 1). 
54 l 1bid at 26, article 1 6. 
542~ondon GuideIines, supra note 343 at 167, article 1 5: 
(a) IRPTC should encourage fünding agencies, such as the development banks and the 
United Nations Development Programme, and biiateral banks to provide training, 
technical assistance and hding  for institutional strengthening and should fiirttier 
encourage other United Nations organizations to strengthen their activities related to safe 
management of chemicals; 
(b) States w ith more advanced chemical regdatory programmes should provide technical 
assistance to other countries in developing inffastnicture and capacity to manage 
criticised as king unrealistic because they do not recognise that much of this technology, 
information and expertise is within the hands of industry,j43 the Convention is even less 
expansive on this issue. This may be because there is now a recognition that under the 
present global economic and political system, there is no political will to achieve such 
assistance anyway . 
The issue of cornpliance with the Convention, and the institutional mechanisms to ded 
with non-cornpliance, are matters which have k e n  left for the Conference of the Parties 
chemicals within their countries, including implementation of the provisions of these 
Guidelines. Developing counties with more advanced systems should be particuIarIy 
encouraged to provide technical assistance to other developing countries with no, or less, 
advanced, systems of chemicals management. To the extent possible, donor countries 
and institutions and recipient countries should inform IRPTC of al1 such technical 
assistance activities; 
(c) Special attention should be devoted by technical assistance and fiuiding authorities to 
those countries without any regdatory procedures on chemicals in developing a regime 
for their control; 
(d) Essential elements of technical assistance needed by developing countries for the 
management of chernicals include: 
(i) Strengthening existing infrastructure and institutions; 
(ii) provisions for the interc hange of experts, including short missions, Ciom 
developed countries and vice versa and in particular fiom one developing country to 
another for the purposes of: 
a Sharing each other's experience and exchanging ideas; 
b. Advising on analysis of information on chemical risks and benefits, conducting 
environmental impact assessment, and disposing of unusable products safely; 
c. Sharing information on new products and alternatives; 
d. Ascertaining research and development requirements for local pesticide efficacy 
studies and development of alternatives; 
e. Assisting one another in dealing with practicaI diEculties in implementing these 
Guidelines; 
(iii) Training to inciude: 
a. Technical workshops on a local, regional ad international level; 
b. Awareness campaigns on the safe management of chemicals for industrial 
workers, customs oficials and doctors; 
c. Opportunities for decision makers in developing countries to study systems in 
countries which have been successfully implementing these Guidelines. 
543~ee Section 4 3  of this thesis. 
to decide? The remaining articles primarily deai with administrative aspects of the 
Convention. Article 18 details the establishment of the Conference of the Parties, 
matters to be handled, and fiiture Coderence of the Parties' guidelines."' Article 19 
establishes the Secretariat and its duties." The settlement of disputes is found in article 
20, where Parties are accorded the nght to settle disputes either through recouse to 
arbitration or the International Court of Justice.547 If the Parties elect upon ratification to 
not choose either of these two alternatives, and are unable to settle the dispute amongst 
themselves, the dispute will be submitted to a conciliation commission, who will render a 
report with recornmendations.w This latter article also required extensive negotiations, 
because the addition of this text extended the means of dispute resolution farther than that 
found in previous MEAS." 
Articles 21-30 of the Convention deal with the technical matters incidental to its 
implementation.j50 
On the final day of negotiations, the Chair proposed that the Convention, to be signed in 
Rotterdam, The Netherlands, be known as "The Rotterdam Convention on the Prior 
Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chernicals and Pesticides in 
International Trade"?" It is scheduled to be signed in September 1998.jR Until the PIC 
Convention has been ratified by 50 states it will not corne into force? This is expected 
"PIC INC5, supra note 467 at 26, micle 17. 
5451bid at 26-7, article 18. 
5461bid at 27-8, article 19. 
"?lbid at 28-9, article 20(2). 
"8ibid at 28-9, article 20(6). 
F@h Session, supra note 473 at 1 7. 
5 5 0 ~ ~ ~  INC.5, supra note 467 at 29-33, articles 2 1-30. 
55 I F$h Session, supra note 473 at 23. 
552ibid at 26. 
S 5 3 ~ ~ ~  INC5, supra note 467 at 32, article 26(1). 
to take several years, and therefore, during the interim period, a voluntaxy non-binding 
agreement which mirmrs the PIC Convention will be used.sH 
An overall critique of this Convention begins with the observation that it "does not 
significantiy exceed the scope of the existing voluntary framework"? This Convention 
does not cure any of the issues previously highlighted as being problematic with the 
voluntary regime. While two critiques regarding the nexus between this MEA and the 
GATT 1994/WTO system, and the inadequate inclusion of technology transfer 
provisions, have been discussed above, the foilowing cornments can also be made about 
the draft Convention. 
First, the failure to provide a mandatory means of dispute resolution has been criticised as 
it is feared that it will allow Parties "to circumvent their obligations"*~6 under the 
Convention. If this is true the Convention rnay be little different in practice than its 
voluntary predecessors. Delegates did argue that conciliation commissions have proven 
to be "extremely effective in resolving disputes in other areas of international law, such 
as in trade and amis contro1",SS7 and while this may be the case, it is the subject nature of 
the Convention which should dictate that a more stringent and mandatory dispute 
mechanism be required. In this sense, it is the magnitude of the h m  to be avoided 
which is worthy of consideration. The decision to adopt this sort of dispute resolution 
can be characterised as being directly proportional to the amount of political will directed 
Ss4~. Kirwin. "Countries Agree on Final DraR of Prior Infomed Consent Treaty" (1998) 2 l(6) Int'l Env. 
Rep. 245 Fereinafter "Countries Agree"]. 
5 5 s ~ $ h  Sesrion, supra note 473 at 24. 
556~bid at 25. 
557~bid 
toward achieving its aims. If states were intent upon meeting the terms of the Convention 
themselves, they would not be 'fearfùi' of having a mandatory dispute settiement process. 
Another critique of the Convention is that it is silent with respect to the needs of 
developing states to fùnding. Without a funding mechanism, the Convention's benefits 
may not actually be available for developing states? What is needed is a funding 
mechanism similar to that found in the Montreal Protocol.ss9 This MEA created a 
Multilateral Fund (MLF) which was fmanced by contributions nom the Parties, and was 
available to those Parties to the agreement who were both developing states and met 
certain specifications set out in the agreement.'" The purpose of the MLF was directed 
toward ensuring cornpliance by developing states with the measures of the MEA.561 
While the success of the MLF has been a matter of debate,SQ its inclusion expressly 
recognised a need to assist some of the Parties to meet the overall goal of the Protocol. 
The inclusion in the Montreal Protocol of the following article provides a due  to the 
absence of such a mechanism in the ciraft PIC Convention. 
The financial mechanism set out in this Article is without prejudice to any 
other future arrangements that may be developed with respect to other 
environmental issues.563 
It may well be that the Parties themselves have found that the critiques surrounding the 
MLF are justified, and have therefore opted to refrain from the creation of a similar 
mechanism in the current MEA. 
5581bid. at 24. 
S59~ontreol Protocof, supra note 106 at article 10. 
560~rticle 5 of  the Montreai Prolocol sets out the characteristics of developing nation-states for its own 
urposes. 
g61 Monfred Protocof, supra note 1 O6 at article 10(1). 
5 6 2 ~ .  Khosla, "The Montreal Pmtocol: the Fint Decade of the Fim Global Environmental Agreement" 
( 1 997) 7(lO) Dev. Alternatives 1 ; B. Rich, Mortgaging the W h :  The Worfd Bank, Environmental 
Impoverishmenr and the Crish of Developmenf (London: Earthscan, 1994) at 278; and, M.S. Soroos, "The 
Thin Blue Line: Preserving the Atmosphere as a Global Commons" (1998) 40(2) Env. 7. 
563 ~ on t rea f  Protocof, supra note 1 O6 at article 1 O(10). 
The absence of a funding mechanism is also interesting because the need for one was 
discussed by the INC at their third session? At that tirne article 1 9 was titled 'Financial 
Resources and Mechanisms', and LJNEP presented a summary of options for mechanisms 
which could be used, as found in various other ME AS."^ Suggested options were: 
providing for administrative costs, provisions goveming financial 
resources and mechanisms for technical and financiai cooperation, and 
institutional arrangements for the financial mechanism and operational 
procedures for fmancial resources." 
In the ensuing discussion the delegations acknowledged the need for f i c i a l  resources, 
and the desire to avoid a Convention based solely on voluntary ~ontributions.5~~ The 
Chair, having taken into account the comments of the delegations, stated that there 
"would have to be at least one paragraph refemng to financial mechanisrns, although 
there did not have to be a detailed budgetm.568 A contact group was formed to consider 
the various options and to develop a text.569 This group later reported that two 
mechanisms would be required: one for administrative costs, and one for fmancial and 
technical assistance.570 The issue of whether the contributions should be voluntary or 
mandatory remained contested.571 This issue was not discussed at the fourth INC 
session,5n and the negotiations for the fifth session provide no insight into their absence 
from the draft text.573 It is possible that this is a matter which will be handled by the 
Conference of the Parties.574 It is worth noting that when some developing states 
564~hird session, supra note 480 at 25. 
s6s~bid 
566fbid 
5671bid at 26. 
568~bid 
569~bid 
570/bid at 27. 
57 Ibid. 
572~owfh Session, supra note 482 at 16. 
573 fiJh Session, supra note 473. 
5 7 4 ~ ~ ~  IiVC.5, supra note 467 at 32-3, article 18(5)(c). This article states: 
"stressed the importance of strengthening the innasrnichire of developing countries to 
enable implementation of the Convention, and suggested speciQing the technical and 
financial needs of developing countries" under article 16, the Chair stated "that al1 needs 
are implicit in the text"." It is to be hoped that a more concrete recognition of the 
hancial needs of developing states will be forthcoming. 
A third critique c m  be made regarding the silence of this Convention regarding the role 
of MNCs in the trade of chemicals. In large part the success of this Convention will 
depend upon industry acceptance and adherence to its principles. Even though they are 
not bound directly, industry has been mentioned in two areas of the Convention: in article 
1 1 (l)(b) which requires nations-states to take adequate legislative and administrative 
measures to control exporters; and, in article 15(l)(b), which requires the encouragement 
of chemical safety by industry.576 What this Convention fails to do is expressly recognise 
the extent to which industry itself controls those factors upon which the success of the 
Convention is predicated, such as product information and technology. This lack of 
attention to the impact of industry and its controlling presence over the heart of the 
subject matter may prove to be a fateful choice for this chemical management regime.s77 
This lack of direction to industry can also be contrasted with the extensiveness of specific 
directions to industry found in the International Code. Not only were actors other than 
governments targeted by this Code, but there are nurnerous references to the requirement 
The Conference of  the Parties shall keep under continuous review and evaluation the 
implementation of this Convention. It shall perform the fbnctions assigned to it by the 
Convention and, to this end, shall: 
(c) Consider and undertake any additional action that may be required for the 
achievement of  the objectives of the Convention. 
S 7 S ~ f l h  Session, supra note 473 at 15. 
576~ee  previous text at footnotes 526 and 540. 
577~his  i  discussed in greater detail in Section 5.4 of  this thesis. 
of industry CO-operation and of direct obligations placed upon them.*78 The intention of 
the International Code with respect to industry is found in article 12.3, where it states: 
The pesticide industry should cooperate fully in the observance of  this 
Code and promote the principles and ethics expressed by the Code, 
irrespective of a govemment's ability to observe the Code.s79 
The fact that the International Code was drafted at a time when the Code of Conduct was 
also being drafted may partially explain the acceptability to negotiators of the direct 
references to industry. 
A fourth cornent  can also be made which mirrors one made earlier in relation to the 
Inrerrzational Code and its failure to ernploy the precautionary p r i n ~ i p l e . ~ ~ ~  The PIC 
Convention fails to include mention of the precautionary principle. The precautionary 
pnnciple has been applied in other MEAs, such as the Montreal ProtocoP8[ and the 
United Nations Framework Convention on  CZimate Change .58* It has also been applied 
578~ee Internori~na~Code~suuprnote 126atarticles 1,32,3.4,3.6,3.8,3.10,4.1,4.5,52,5.3,5J,61, 
8.1, 102, 1 0.3, 1 1.1, 12.1, and 12-3. While this may be attributable to the fact that the i n te rna t io~ l  Code 
was non-binding, other international instruments have placed obligations upon third parties. See Section 
5.4 of this thesis. 
5791bid at 186, article 12.3. 
S80~ee footnote 430 and accompanying text. 
""The pream ble states: 
Determined to protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary measures to control 
equitably total global emissions of substances that delete it... 
Montreal Protucol, supra note 106 at 37, preamble. 
582~rticle 3.3 states: 
The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the 
causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of fiil1 scientific certainty shouId not be used as a 
reason for postponing such measwes, taking into account that policies and measures to 
deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the 
lowest possible cost. To achieve this, such policies and rneasures should take into 
account different socio-economic contexts, be comprehensive, cover al1 devant sources, 
sinks and reservoin of greenhouse gases and adaptation, and compromise al1 economic 
sectors. Efforts ta address climate change may be carried out cooperatively by interested 
Parties. 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May I992,3 1 1.L.M. 848, cited to ( 1 w3) 
Touro. J. Transn'l L. 177 at 183, article 3 3  bereinafter Climate Chmge Convention]. 
in combination with a consent procedure, such as in the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic.583 Whiie the 
precautionary principle is complex5" and therefore perhaps difficult to enshrine in a 
MEA, its presence in the OSPAR Convention, as combined with a notification procedure, 
has k e n  described both as a successfid partnerships85 and a necessary one because "the 
need for anticipation and assessment of the possible outcornes of any pianned action" is 
"fundamental to the application of the precautionary prin~iple".58~ As such, the principle 
should have been included in the present MEA. 
It is likely that some negotiators of the PIC Convention would find the inclusion of such a 
principle to be deleterious to trade interests.587 In contrast, the PIC procedure achieves 
the opposite. It allows both the trade and use of hannful chemicals. Therefore, the PIC 
S83~he consent or Pnor Justification Pmcedure is implemented by the Oslo Commission under the 
Convention, "whereby substances may only be introduced if it has k e n  indicated with an acceptable 
margin of uncertainty that they do not cause h m  to the environment". See O. McIntyre & T. Mosedale, 
"The Precautionary Principle a a Nom of Customary International Law" (1997) 9(2) J. Env. L. 22 1 at 225 
[hereinaiter Mclntyre], and see Park Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
North-Eust Atlantic, 22 September 1992, (1 993) 32 I.L.M. 1068, cited to (visited 16 August 1998) 
<http://sedac.cies in.org/pidb/texts/acrc/MEofNE.txt.hûnI~ mereinafier OSPA R Convention]. The 
provisions dealing with the transmission of information are found in articles 6, 8-10.22-3. The 
precautionaq pri&iple, in article 2(2Xa) smtes: 
The Conmcting Parties shall apply: 
(a) the precautionary principle, by virtue of which preventive measures are to be taken 
when there are reasoiable &OUI& for concern that substances or energy introduced, 
dkctly or indirectly, into the marine environment rnay bring about hazards to human 
health, h m  ~ivin~~resources and marine ecosysterns, damage amenities or interfere with 
other legitimate uses of the sea, even when there is n o  conclusive evidence of a causal 
relationship between the inputs and the effects; 
S84~or a discussion of the precautionary principle see Mclntyre, ibid; J. Moffet, "Legislative Options for 
Implementing the Precautionary Principle" (1996-97) 7 J.E.L.P. 157; and, T. O'Riordan & J. Carneron, eds., 
Interpreting the Precaurionary Princrj>le (London: Earthscan, 1994). 
585~c~ntyre, ibid at 225. 
586~bid at 238. 
587~ollowing a recent proposal in the U.S. to incorporate the precautionary principle into decision-making, 
it was characterised by the chemical industry as "antagonistic toward sound science, has its origins in 
instinct and feeling, and threatens the entire chemical industry ". See B. Hileman, "Preautionary Principle: 
As Defined Recently, the Principle Provides a New Guide to U.S. Environmental Policy" (1998) 76(6) 
Chem. & Eng. News 16 at 16. 
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procedure as an aid to environmentai protection is extremely limited. Al1 it achieves is a 
warning for States when enough global scientific evidence has been obtained which 
indicates that a chernicd is harmfiil - it never mandates that the accumulation of such a 
volume of information requires a ban on their use.588 
A f d  critique can be made regarding what the Convention does not say. By looking at 
the negotiation process issues which appear to have been sidelined or negotiated away, 
become apparent. Of interest is the presence in a former dmft of an article titled 'Liability 
and Compensation'. Not only was the inclusion of such an article debated, but whether a 
liability and compensation regime could be developed or, whether a future Conference of 
the Parties should address the matter.589 Although discussed at the third INC, this article 
was not mentioned in later negotiation reports. The presence of such an article could 
have had far reaching implications, even for industry. 
A second chemical management convention is presently being drafted and will deal with 
a set of chemicals whose environmental effects are, without doubt, devastating. It is with 
interest that the preliminary negotiations of the POPs Convention will be examined, 
because this set of chemicals necessitates a strong political will in order to ensure that the 
magnitude of the harm is adequately addressed. While the draft PIC Convention has its 
failings, it in generai deais with a less serious environmental threat. In this context, the 
POPs Convention should surpass the strides made in negotiating the PIC Convention. 
S88~ome n gotiators expmsed dismay that the PIC Convention did not ban the chemicals, but noted that it 
had been necessary for them to compromise their position after other nation-states had argues that such a 
ban would be both unrealistic and unfair to their interests. A chemical in contention was DDT which is 
used several nation-sîates, including Brazil and India as a means to control the spread of malaria See 
"Countries Agree", supra note 554, and "Watch List", supra note 506. 
5 8 9 ~ ~ e s s h ,  supra note 480 at 27. 
5.0 Persistent Organic Pollutants 
Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) is the t e m  used to refer to a set of chemicals which 
have a distinguishing set of characteriçtics. 
Persistent organic pollutants ... are organic compounds of natural or 
anthropogenic ongin that resist photolytic, chemical and biological 
degradation. They are charactensed by low water solubility and hi& lipid 
solubility, resulting in bioaccumulation in fatty tissues of Living 
organisms. POPs are semi-volatile and therefore, able to move long 
distances in the atmosphere, and are also transported in the environment in 
low concentrations by movement of fresh and marine waters, resulting in 
widespread distribution across the earth, including regions where they 
have never k e n  used.290 
POPs have become a topic of global concern due to their serious environmental and 
health effects. These substances have been shown to have toxic effects on animal 
reproduction, development and immunological function? In addition, they have been 
observed to cause reduced immunity in infants and children, developmental 
abnormalities, neuro behavioural impairment, cancer and tumour growth, 592 bkth de fects 
and reduced male sperm countsY 
S 9 0 1 ~ ~ ~ ,  lntergovemmental Forum on Chernical Safety, IFCS Ad Hoc Working Group on Persistent 
Organic Pollutants Meeting Final Report on 21-22 June 1996, Manila, Philippines, 
IFCS/WG.POPs/REPORT. 1 ( 1 996), cited to UNEP, Prepmation ofan lnrernational Legalfy Binding 
Imtmment for Implementing Infernational Action on Certain Persistent O r g d c  Pollutants, 
LMEP/POPs/MC. I/MF/4 ( 1998) (visited 25 July 1998) 
dittp://irptc.unep.ch/POPSSIncmclCC I/inf4.htm> at 3, paragraph 1, 
5 9 1 ~ .  Wania & D. MacKay, 'Tracking fhe Distribution of Persistent Organic Pollutants: Control Snategies 
for these Contaminants Will Require a Better Understanding of How They Move Around the Globe" 
(1996) 30(9) Env. Sci. & Tech. 390 A. 
5 9 2 ~ .  Ritter, K.R. Solomon & J. Forgei, Persistent Organic Pollutants: An Asrersmenr Report on: DDT- 
A ldrin- Dieldrin- Encfrin-Chi orhne- Heptachlor- Hexachlorbenzene- Mirer- Taraphene- Po fych lorinated 
B@henyls-Diaxins and Furam (Prepared for the International Programme on Chemical Safety, 1995) 
(visited 29 November 1997) dittp~/irptc.unep.ch/pops/indx.htms>, Introduction at 1. 
5 9 3 ~ .  Pruzin, "UN/ECE Drafi Protocol on Heavy Metals, Persistent Organic Pollutants Concluded" (1998) 
21(4) Int'l Env, Rep. 141 [hereinafter "UNECE Draft"]. 
The international community rn0bilised5~~ to seek a legal means to control the use of 
POPs as the nsks associated with them were increasingly identified."s States first 
considered whether the mandate of the PIC Convention could be broadened to also 
regulate POPs. This is evidenced by Decision 18/12, of the Eighteenth Session of the 
LMEP Governing Council, wherein the Executive Director of UNEP was requested to 
organise a Govemment-designated group of experts "to consider, takuig into account the 
work done in al1 forums ... and recommend what M e r  measures are needed to reduce the 
risks fiom a limited number of hazardous chemicals, either within or beyond the scope of 
[the] existing prior inf'ormed consent proced~re".~% The results of this inquiry were to be 
reported to the W E P  Goveming Council at its Nineteenth Sessi0n.59~ 
The Decision also directed that at the Nineteenth Session, the UNEP Governing Council, 
having heard the recommendations of the government-designated group of experts, 
... should give consideration to the need to develop M e r  measures, 
within or beyond the pnor informed consent procedure, to reduce the risks 
from a limited nurnber of hazardous chemicais, including the possibility 
that the mandate of the intergovemmental negotiating cornmittee for the 
5 9 4 ~ n  October 23, 1995, the European Union, Iceland and Norway proposed that a global POPs treaty be 
negotiated, see C. Hogue, "EU, Iceland, Norway Cal1 for Treaty to Control Persistent Organic Pollutants" 
(1995) 18(22) Int'l Env. Rep. 8 19, and C. Hogue, "Countries Seek Treaty to Curb or Halt Emissions, 
Production of Some Chemicals" (1 995) 18(23) Int'l Env. Rep. 856. In the past five years the international 
community has discussed the impact of POPs in several different forums, including: the Parties to the 
Barcefona Convention fir the Protection ofthe Mediterranean Sea Againsi Pollution in June 1995; at the 
International Experts Meeting on Persistent Organic Pollutants: Towards Global Action in June 1995; The 
Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Programme of Action in October-November 1995; and, 
the North Amencan Commission for Environmental Cooperation's Sound Management of Chemicals 
Initiative in October 1995. For a discussion of these initiatives see UNEP, Status Report on UNEPLF and 
Other Refated Activities on Persistenl Organic Pollutants (POPs) (visited 25 July 1998) < 
http://irptc.unep.ch/pops/indxhtms/status.htmI~ [hereinafter Slutus Report], and D. Vanderzwaag, 
"International Law and Arctic Marine Conservation and Protection: A Slushy, ShiAing Seascape" (1997) 9 
Georgetown Int'l Env. L. Rev. 303. 
5 9 s U N ~ ~ ,  Persisrent Organic PolIutants: Introduction (visited 29 Novem ber 1 997) < 
h ~/irptc.unep.ch/pops/intrd) 1 .html> at 1. '2' 59 1181 2. supra note 45 1 at 2, paragraph 2. 
59716id at 2. 
legally binding prior informed consent procedure be extended to provide a 
basis for development of such measures-598 
This decision to unite the two emerging instruments within a framework chernical 
management instrument was later discarded by both FA0599 and W P , W  and the PIC 
and POPs Conventions have, as a consequence, been developed separately nom each 
0ther.W' However, Decision 19/13 D of the UNEP Goveming Council did direct that the 
two instruments be developed "in a manner that ensures eficiency and coherence".m 
Also at the Eighteenth Session of the UNEP Governing Council, Decision 18/32 was 
adopted, wherein it was requested that the Inter-Organisation Programme for the Sound 
Management of Chemicals (IOMC), dong with the International Programme on 
Chemical Safety (IPCS), the Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety (IFCS) and an 
A d  Hoc Working Group, commence an assessment of a short-list of POPs603 already 
being reviewed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE).W 
The IFCS were further invited to develop recornmendations and information for a 
"possible decision regarding an appropriate international legai mechanism", after having 
taken into account the different circumstances of developing States by consolidating 
5981bid. at 2, paragraph 3. 
599 1 11th Councii, supra note 459 at 1. 
" 1  9/13~, supra note 463 at 2, paragraph 1. 
  or more discussion on rhis point see C. Hogue, "UNEP Official Says Linking Global Pacts on 
Chemicals Would Enswe Coordination" (1996) lg(l9) Int'l Env, Rep. 808. 
M 2 U N ~ ~ ,  Decisions Adopted by the Governing Council at Its Nineteenth Session. 19/130: Enhanced 
Coherence and Eflciency Among International Activifies Related to Chemicals ( 1  997). cited to (visited 29 
November 1997) <ht~p://irptc.unep.ch/pic/fiirmer/gcfram-e.htm1> at 1, 
603~he UNECE commenced negotiations for a Protocol on POPs to their Convention on Long-Range 
Trunsboundary Air Pollution in 1995. The twelve POPs targeted for action were: PCBs, dioxins, furans, 
aldn'n. dieldrin, DDT, endrin, chiordane, hexachlombenzene, mirex, toxaphene, and heptachlor. See 
UNEP, Decision 18/32 of the UNEP Governing Council: Persktent Organic Polfutanis (1995) cited to 
(visited 25 July 1998) dittpY/@tc.unep.ch/pops/indxhtms/gc 1832en.htmb at 1-2 bereinafier 18/32], and 
Status Report, supra note 594 at 1. 
6ai18/32, ibid at 1. paragraph 1. 
existing information on POPs and by analysing their relevant transport pathways, dong 
with their origin, transport, and deposition.605 In addition, considerations relevant to 
POPs production such as their sources, benefits and nsks, their availability and the 
availability of any substitutes, and the means to reduce a d o r  eliminate the emissions, 
discharges and losses of POPs was to be assessedP06 
In October 1995 UNEP, on behalf of the IOMC, established an IOMC Ad Hoc Working 
Group on POPs.607 This Working Group was given the responsibility to develop a work 
plan, which included the identification of resource needs.608 It was M e r  proposed that 
the Working Group would include representatives, aside from the Chair, fiom the IOMC 
organisations, from the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, from four 
States of each of the five United Nations regions, and from industry and public interest 
groups.609 Other interested parties were also welcomed as observen to the process.610 
Recognising a need for increased information regarding the assessrnent of POPs, the 
Executive Director of UNEP, together with the President of the IFCS, sent requests to 
Govemments and international organisations for POPs case studies in January 1 996.611 
This information was later collated into a report for presentation at the first session of the 
POPs Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee.612 
60518/32, supra note 603 at 2, paragraphs I(a),@). 
606/bid at 2, paragraphs 1 (c),(d). 
6 0 7 ~ t a t ~  Report, supra note 594 at 3, paragraph 8. 
6081bid 
6 0 9 1 ~ ~ ~ ,  supra note 590 at 5, paragraph 8. 
io/bid 
61 l~tatu.s Report, supra note 594 at 3, paragraph 10. 
612~ee UNEP, Conrideration of Possible Criteria for Identlfying Furlier Persistent Orgmic Pollutants pr 
Candicla~esfor Intermtiond Action, UNEP/POPS/MC. 1/6, ( 1 W8), cited to (visited 25 Jul y 1 998) 
<http~///uptc.unep.ch~pops/POPs-InmC- l/inc 1 -6.htm> Fereinafter ConsiCieration]. 
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The IOMC A d  Hoc Working Group later secured agreement on its work plan at the 
second meeting of the Inter-Sessional Group of the IFCS, in March 1 9 9 6 F  At this time 
it was reconstituted as the IFCS A d  Hoc Working Group on POPs and was requested to 
continue its "assessrnent process and to develop recommendations and Somat ion  on 
international actionn.614 Participants at the meeting agreed that work "on the science of 
chemistry and toxicity and the global transport of POPs should be conthued ..." with 
additional work to be done on the "risk/benefit equation and on substitutes for present 
POPs and the possible consequences of their use".615 
In June 1996, two meetings to discuss POPs were convened in Manila, the Phi1ippinesP16 
The first was an experts' meeting, and this together with the collected Govemment 
information fiom UNEP, became the basis of discussion at the second meeting. At the 
latter meeting, held by the IFCS A d  Hoc Working Group, "a report containing 
information and recornmendations on international action" was developed for 
presentation to the UNEP Governing Council at its Nineteenth Session.617 
The IFCS Ad Hoc Working Group on Persistent Organic Pollutants Meeting Final 
Report represented the work of representatives of "32 countries, 7 non-govemmental 
organizations and 7 intergovernmental organizations".618 Predicated upon the mandate 
received from Decision 18/32, the IFCS A d  Hoc Working Group developed several 
general recommendations, including the following: 
6 1 3 1 ~ ~ ~ ,  supra note 590 at 5, paragraph 9(c). 
6141bid at 6, paragmph 9(e). 
615"~lobal Initiative on POPs Progressing; Format for Pact to be Appmved in 1997" (1996) 19(6) Int'l Env. 
Re -209 at 209. 2' 6' Status Report, supm note 594 at 3, paragraph 9, and IFCS, supro note 590 at 6, paragraphs 9(g), (h). 
6 i 7 ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  ibid at 6, paragraph 9(h). See ais0 "U.N. Urged to Negotiate Treaty on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants" (1996) 19(19) Int'I Env. Rep. 808. 
6 1 8 1 ~ ~ ~ ,  ibid at 2. 
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that tiere was sufficient information to conclude a need for international action on the 
12 specified POPs and that it required a legally binding instrument; 
that different approaches were required for the three categories of POPs (pesticides, 
industrial chemicals, and unintentionally produced by-products and contaminants); 
that there was a need for the generation of scientific criteria and a procedure for the 
identification of additional POPs; 
that the elements of the UNECE protocol should be considered in the development of 
the instrument; 
that measures were required for the development and sharing of information about 
POPs; and, 
that the full participation of developing States was essential and necessitated 
provisions on technical assistance, capacity building and funding.619 
At the Nineteenth Session of the UNEP Goveming Council, Decision 19/13 C endoned 
the findings and recornmendations of the IFCS A d  Hoc Working Group, and stated that: 
... immediate international action should be initiated to protect hurnan 
health and the environment through measures which will reduce and/or 
eliminate ... the emissions and discharges of the twelve persistent organic 
pollutants specified in Goveming Council decision 1 8/32620 and, where 
appropriate, eliminate production and subsequently the remaining use of 
those persistent organic pollutants that are intentionally produced;62l 
The Decision aiso directed that the international action should include: 
6191bid, at 7-10. 
62%ese twelve POPs are also found in the üN/ECE protocol, see footnotes 600,639. 
621 UNEP. Decisions Adopted by the Governing Council at its Nineteenth Session: 19/13C. International 
Action to Protect Human Health and the Environment Through Memures Which Wiff Reduce a d o r  
Efimimte Emissiom and Discharges of Persistent Organic Po f futants, h c  fuding the Dwe fopment of an 
International Legaffy Binding Imtmment, (1997), cited to (visited 29 November 1997) < 
httpJ/irptc.unep.ch/pops/> at 2, paragraph 4 bereinafter 1 W I  3CJ. 
(a) Use of separate, differentiated approaches to take action on pesticides, 
industrial chemicals, and unintentionally produced by-products and 
contarninants; 
(b) Use of transition periods, with phased implementation for various 
proposed actions; 
(c) Careful and efficient management of existing stocks of the specified 
persistent organic pollutants and, where necessary and feasible, their 
elhination; 
(d) Training in enforcement and monitoring of use to discourage the 
misuse of persistent organic pollutant pesticides; 
(e) Remediation of contarninated sites and environmental reservoirs, 
where feasible and practicable, taking into account national and regional 
considerations in the light of the global significance of the problem;6= 
In addition, possible trade impacts, and other socio-econornic factors were to be taken 
into consideration in the development and implementation of the international 
initiative.63 
To achieve its aims, the Decision requested that the Executive Director of UNEP 
convene, with assistance from other affliated organisations, such as the World Health 
Organisation (WHO), an Intergovemmental Negotiating Cornmittee (INC) with a 
mandate to prepare an international legally binding instrument for the initially specified 
twelve POPs.624 In doing so they were directed to take into consideration the work of the 
UNECE in the development of the üN/ECE protocol on P O P S . ~ ~ ~  
In addition, the Executive Director of UNEP was requested to initiate immediate action 
on the recommendations of the report, which was to include: 
6*fbid. at 2. paragraph 5.  
6U~bid at 2. paragraph 7(e). 
624~bid at 2, paragraph 8. 
62sfbid at 3, paragraph 10. 
development and sharing of information on POPs; 
monitoring and evaluating the success of any strategies; 
improving the availability of information and expertise; 
providing guidance for alternatives to POPs; 
assisting 6 t h  the identification of PCBs and the means for their destruction; and, 
identifjring dioxins and furans and how to manage them.626 
In February 1997, it was decided that the IFCS A d  Hoc Working Group would continue 
to provide support until the first MC meeting.627 During 1997-1998, UNEP together 
with the IFCS have conducted regional awareness raising workshops in Central and 
Eastern Europe, Asia and the Pacific, Afnca, Central America and the Caribbean, South 
America and West Asia.628 In a Resolution of 5-14 May 1997, the Fiftieth World Health 
Assembly endorsed the recommendations of the IFCS A d  Hoc Working Group, and 
requested that the Director General of the WHO, actively participate in the INC for a 
Iegally binding instrument on POPs.629 
5.1 The UNECE POPs Protocol 
Remembering Decision 19/13 C of the UNEP Governing Council, which recornrnended 
that "due consideration" be given to the work of the UNECE in their development of a 
a6/bid. at 3-4, paragrap h 1 3. 
6 2 7 ~ t u t ~  Report, s u p  note 594 at 4, paragraph 15. 
6281bid at 4, paragraph 16. 
629 w HA, Resolution WHAiiO. 13. on the Promotion of Chemicai Safity, With Special Attention to Persktent 
Organic Pollutants Adopted by the Fifrieth World Health Assembly, Held in Geneva 5- 14 May 1997, WHA 
Res. 50.13 (1997) cited to UNEP, heparation of an International Legaliy Binding Instrument for 
Impfementing International Action on Certain Persistent Organic Pollutants, UNEPPOPSANC. 1 /iNF/6 
(1997) (visited 25 July 1998) 
dittp~/i~tc.unep.ch/pops/POPs-InclMc- 1 /inf6.htm> at 3, paragraph 3. 
regional protocol on persistent organic pollutants,63* it is prudent to start any 
consideration of the future POPs Convention with an examination of this work. 
In 1983 the UNECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution entered 
into force.631 Negotiations632 for a protocol on POPs took eight years to complete,633 and 
on June 24, 1998, it was signed by 32 states634 and the European Community, at the 
'Environment for Europe' Ministerial Conference held in Aarhus, Denmark. This 
protocol will be administered by the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, including 
countries of Western and Eastern Europe as well as Canada and the United State~."~ 
5.1.1 An Overview of the Provisions 
The preamble to the protoc01636 mentions the need to alleviate the harm fiom POPs and 
acknowledges their peculiar characteristics. It also specificaily mentions the international 
legal principles upon which it is based: 
WI.?C, supra note 62 1 at 3, paragraph 10. 
63 UNIEC E, Convention on Long-Range Transbounahry Air Pollution (visited 5 August 1 998) 
< h t r p ~ l ~ ~ ~ . u n e c e . o r g / e n v h p ~ h  I .hm> at 1. 
a 2 ~ o r  information regarding the negotiation process for this protocol see: "U.N. Working Gmup Offen 
Draft Text for Persistent Organic Pollutants" (1995) 18(14) Int'l Env. Rep. 604; "Group Moves on Three 
Areas of Treaty on Long-Range Transbound;uy Air Pollution" (1 995) l8(2O) Int'l Env. Rep. 754; "Texts of 
POPs, NOx, Heavy Metals Protocols Planned for Completion No Later Than 1998" (1 996) l9(25) Int'l Env. 
Rep. 1093; "Progress on POPs Makes Conclusion of Protocol by 1998 Likely, Oficial Says" (1997) 20(3) 
Int'l Env. Rep. 98; and, J. Cohen, "POPs Protoc01 With 15-1 8 Substances Expected to be Finalized by Early 
1998" (1997) 20(9) Int'l Env. Rep. 4 15. 
6 3 3 " U N / ~ ~ ~  Draft", supra note 593, and D. Pruzin, "Environment Ministers Sign Protocols On Heavy 
MetaIs, Organic Pollutants" (1998) 21(14) Int'I Env. Rep. 663 bereinafter "Sign Protocois"]. 
634~hese States were: Austria, Belgiurn, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem Ireland, and the United States of 
Amesica. See UNECE, Environment for Europe: 32 Countries and the European Cornmuni@ Sign Two 
New Protocols to the Convention on Long-Range Transbouruhry Air Pollution, Press Release 
ECE/ENV/98/13 (1 998), cited to (visited 5 August 1998) ~http~/www.unece.org/pressl98env 13e.htm> at 
1. 
6 3 5 " ~ ~ ~ ,  POPs Accords Progressing" (1998) 21(2) Int'l Env. Rep. 76. 
6 3 6 U N / ~ ~ ~ ,  Dr@ Protocol to the Convention on Long-Range Transbounahy Air Pollution on Perskteru 
Organic Pollutants, EB.AI W 1 99812, (1 W8), cited to UNEP, Prepuration of an International Legally 
Resolved to take rneasures to anticipate, prevent or minimise ernissions 
from persistent organic pollutants, taking into account the application of 
the precautionary approach, as set forth in principle 15 of the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, 
R e a f f i g  that States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to 
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmentai and 
development policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within 
their jurisdiction or control do not c a w  darnage to the environment of 
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdictior@ 
The preamble also notes the importance of private and non-governmental actors' 
knowledge of POPs, available alternatives and abatement techniques, and therefore of 
their role in alleviating the POPs problem.*8 It also states that the rneasures taken in 
cornpliance with the protocol should not interfere arbitrarily or unjustifiably with t r ~ t d e . ~ ~ ~  
The term 'persistent organic pollutants' is defmed in the protocol as: 
... organic substances that (i) possess toxic characteristics; (ii) are 
persistent; (iii) bioaccumulate; (iv) are prone to long-range transboundary 
atmospheric transport and deposition; and (v) are likely to cause 
significant adverse human health or envuonmental effects near to and 
distant tiorn their sources;640 
The objective of the protocol "is to control, reduce or eliminate discharges, emissions and 
losses of persistent organic pollutants".@l Parties are therefore directed to eliminate the 
Binding Instrument for Implemenling International Action on Certain Persistent Organic Pollufants, 
UNEP/POPS/iNC. IlINFl3, (1998), (visited 25 July 1998) 
chnp:l/irptc.unep.c h/pops/P0PsSInc/MCC 1 /inf3 .hm> at 3, pream ble [hereinafter UWECE ProtocoCJ. The 
protoc01 is not yet in force. Sixteen signatories are required to ratiQ the protocol before it cornes into 
force, and this is expected to take at least a year. See "Sign Protocols" supra note 633 at 663, and UAVECE 
Prorocol, ibid at 15, article 18. 
637 UN/ECE Prorocol, ibid 
6381bid at 4, pream ble. 
6391bid 
6401bid at 5, article 1. 
@lIbid at 5, article 2. 
production and use of substances found in annex 1,642 restrict the substances found in 
annex II,a3 and to reduce total emissions of substances found in annex 11194 Article 4 
sets out the exemptions which may be invoked by parties for the measures to be 
undertaken under article 3. Exemptions exist for laboratory or reference-sized quantities 
of POPs, for other specified forms of research with POPs, to manage a public emergency 
with a POP or, for a minor application of a POP by a Party.us After applying for an 
exemption, the Party must provide specific information to the Secretariat within ninety 
days.w 
Article 5 provides for the exchange of information and technology. It directs Parties to 
facilitate such a process through their national laws, regulations and practices, and 
through the promotion of "contacts and cooperation among organizations and individuals 
in the private and public sectors that are capable of providing technology, design and 
engineering services, equipment or financeU."7 Parties are also to facilitate exchange and 
access to, information on alternatives and the risks of these substances, compile and 
update information held by their DNAs which are engaged in other initiatives, and to 
exchange information on activities in other international forumsP48 The protocol M e r  
stipulates that the creation of public awareness is required to meet its airnsF9 
642ibid at 5 ,  article 3(l Xa). Substances listed in annex 1 are: Aldrin, Chlordane, Chlordecone, DDT, 
Dieldrin, Endrin, Heptachlor, Hexabromobiphenyt, Hexachlorobenzene, Mirex, PCB, and Toxaphene. The 
annex States any conditions for theu elimination. See ibid at 15-8, annex 1. 
643ibid at 6, article 3(I Xc). Substances listed in annex II are: DDT, HCH, and PCB. Although some of 
these substances are listed in annex 1, they are also found in annex 11 with specific restrictions on their use. 
See ibid at 18-20, annex II. 
644ibid at 6, article 5(a). The substances listed in this annex are: PAHs, DioxinslFums, and 
Hexachlorobenzene. The reference year for the reduction of the emissions of these substances is also 
provided. See ibid at 20- 1, annex III. 
64516id at 7-8, article 4(1),(2). 
646~6id at 8, article 4(3). 
"'1bid at 9, article S(a) 
u8ibid at 9, article S(b),(c),(d). 
6491bid at 9, article 6. 
Article 7 States that Parties shall within six months of the protocol entering into force 
"develop strategies, policies and programmes in order to discharge its obligations"Ps0 To 
this end they are to: 
encourage the use of environmentally sound management techniques to ail aspects of 
"use, production, release, processing, distribution, handling, transport and 
reprocessing of substances"; 
encourage implementation of management programmes to reduce emissions; consider 
the adoption of other policies; 
"make determined efforts" to reduce substances contained as contaminants in other 
substances; and, 
to consider the ability to propose additional substances for coverage.651 
Other articles direct Parties to encourage research, development, monitoring and co- 
operationoz and to report information, according to their own laws of c ~ ~ d e n t i a l i t y ,  to 
the secretariat.6" Parties are able to review any collected information, the progress under 
the protocol, and the effectiveness of the protocol measures.654 The cornpliance of the 
Parties will be reviewed regularly,655 and disputes can be settled by the International 
Court of Justice, through arbitration, or by a conciliation commission.656 
650fbid at 10, article 7(1). 
6511bid at 10, article 7(2). 
652/bid at 10, article 8. 
6531bid at 1 1 ,  article 9. 
6541bid. at 12, article 10. 
6551bid at 12, article 1 1. 
6561bid at 12-3, article 12, 
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The remaining articles speciQ the relationship of the annexes to the protocol6*7 and the 
implementation of the protocol.658 in addition to annexes 1, II and III, annexes nurnbered 
IV to VIII are also appended to the protocol,659 with numbers V and VI being 
recommendatory in character.660 A ~ e x  IV is titled 'Litnit Values for PCDDIF From 
Major Stationary SourcesI.661 Annex V discusses 'Best Available Techniques to Control 
Emissions of Persistent Orgaoic Pollutants fiom Major Stationary Sources'662 and annex 
VI the Tirnescales for the Application of Limit Values and Best Available Techniques to 
New and Existing Stationary Sources1-  Annex VI1 prescribes 'Recommended Control 
Measures for Reducing Emissions of Persistent Organic PoIl~tants',66~ and annex VIII 
'Major Stationary Source categories1.665 
51.2 The A ndysis 
A starting point for analysis is with the inclusion of the precautionary principle in the 
preamble. In this location it results in a generalisation of the principle to the entire text of 
the protocol, as contrasted with being an explicit provision which the Parties m u t  meet. 
An express provision c m  be found in other environmental instruments, such as the 
Bamako Convention .666 
6s7ibid at 13, article 13. 
658/bid at 13-5, articles 14-20. 
6 5 9 ~ u e  to the very technical nature of these annexes, their contents are not discussed here but merely 
identified by title. 
M~UN/ECE Protocoi, supro note 636 at 13, article I 3. 
6611bid at 2 1, annex IV. 
M2~6id at 22, annex V. 
6631bid at 5 1, annex VI. 
664~bid at 5 1,  annex VII, 
665ibid at 56, annex VIII. 
666~ee footnote 43 1 and associated text. 
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Because the preamble is the only place in the text where the precautionary principle is 
mentioned, it becomes necessary to draw an inference of the application of the principle 
from the rest of the text. This is difficult to do. Although the protocol contains 
requirements for Parties to eliminate, restrict and reduce the use of POPs,~7 exemptions 
are permissible668 and the directions to Parties regarding the development of their 
strategies, policies and programmes are couched in terms of "encourage", "consider" and 
of "make determined effortsW.M9 If  the precautionary p ~ c i p l e  is to be implemented, the 
use of a stronger directive text toward the Parties should be evidenced. It therefore 
appears that the precautionary principle, as stated in the Rio Decl~rution,6~0 
notwithstanding being mentioned in the preamble, is not borne out by the protocol text. 
Other concems can also be highlighted. The protocol does not provide a means of 
ensuring cornpliance with its terms, such as by placing a ban on trade with States who are 
non-signatones or who are Parties in breach of their Convention obligations. In contrast 
it only requires a review of the Parties' performances on a regular ba~is.6~' 
Another point worthy of mention is the fact that although the protocol does not place 
direct obligations upon industry, text found in the preamble and article 5 recognises the 
importance of their involvement. The preamble recognises that the knowledge held by 
industry is important to the success of the initiative, and article 5 recognises the need for 
"contacts and cooperationM672 with industry, yet the directive to Parties to develop this 
6 6 7 ~ N / E C ~  ProtocoI, supra note 636 at 6,  article 3. 
M8fbid at 7, article 4. 
66916id at 1 0, article 7. 
670~io Declaration. supra note 448 at 120, principle 15. 
67 UNIECE Protocool, supra note 636 at 12, article 1 1. 
6721bid. at 9, article 5.  
union is permissive. As such, it appears that the means of achieving such a nexus has 
remained elusive to negotiatoa and they have therefore marginalised this issue. 
The protocol dso  fails to provide any technical or financial assistance to Parties. This 
would appear to be a glming omission given that some of the mernben of the UNIECE 
are states with economies in transition, and in light of other MEAs which have included 
such provisions. 
In light of the foregoing, the protocol falls short of expectations. This is especially tnie 
given the serious nature of the substances king targeted. In contrast with the hard line of 
the Bamako Convention and the strong language of the Montreal Pr0tocolp7~ this 
protocol appears fiimsy and inept for dealing with the environmental and health risks to 
which it is directed. 
5.2 The Fimt INC Session 
The f ~ s t  INC was held in Montreal, Canada, from 29 June to 3 July 1998:'s and was 
attended by 93 statest76 9 United Nations bodies and specialised agen~ies,6~' 9 
intergovemmentai organisations,678 and 56 non-governmentai organi~ationsP~~ 
67316id at 10, article 7. 
674~he Conml Mesures found in article 2 of the Montreal Protocof are strongly worded: "Each Party 
shall ensure ..As calculated level of consumption of the controlled substances.-.does not exceed its 
calculated level of consumption in f 986". See Montreal Protocof, supra note 106 at article 2(1),(2),(3),(4). 
6 7 S U N ~ ~ ,  Information Kit Montreal i998 (visited 25 July 1998) 
~http://irptc.unep.ch/pops/POP~~IndpressreIeedinfokite.bl at I Fereinafier Infimation Kit]. The 
second session of the MC is tentatively scheduled for February 7- 12, 1999, in Geneva, Switzerland. It is 
anticipated that five sessions will be required to complete the drafk convention. See UNEP, Cdendar of 
Events (visited 25 July 1998) <http://irptc.unep.ch/pops/newsO I.htm> and "Delegates Begin Work on U.N. 
Treaty to Eliminate Persistent Organic Pollutants" (1998) 2 I(l4) Int'l Env. Rep. 66 1 hereinafier 
" Delegates"]. 
676~he following states were in aitendance: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina., Armenia, Australia 
Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belanis, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, Chad, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dernocratic Republic of the 
Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, 
At that time delegates cornmenced negotiations for a POPs Convention for twelve POPs 
identified as requiring urgent action: Aldrin, Chlordane, DDT, Dieldrin, Dioxins, Endrin, 
Furans, Heptachlor, Hexachlorobenzene, Mirex, Polychlorinated Biphenyis, and 
Toxaphene.a* 
Gambia, Georgia, Gemany, Ghana, Guinea, Iceland, hdia, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, 
Italy, Jordan, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Kuwait, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Netherfands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, 
Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Senegal, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Afnca, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab 
Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, W n e ,  United Kingdom of Great B h i n  and Northem Ireland, 
United States of America, Uruguay, Vietnam, and Zambia See Report of the Intergovernmental 
Negoriuting Cornmittee for an In~er~t ionaf  Legaliy Binding Insrnunent for Implementing International 
Action on Certain Persistent Organi'c PolZu~ants on the Work of Its Fint Session, UNEP/POPS/MC. 117, 
(1998), cited to (visited 25 July 1998) ~http~lirptc.unep.ch~pops/POPsSInc/MCCIIinc 1 finalreport-e.htm> 
at 3 mereinafier POPs INCI]. 
677~he  following United Nations bodies and specialised agencies were in anendance: Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, Economic Commission for Europe, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the 
United Nations, United Nations Industrial Development Organisation, World Health Organisation, 
Secretariat of the Global Environmental Facility, Secretariat of the Multilateral Fund for the 
Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, Secretariat of the Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, and Secretariat of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity. See ibid 
678~he  following intergovemmental organisations were in attendance: Arab League Educational Cultural 
and Scientific Organisation, Commission for Environmental Co-operation, European Commission, 
European Environmental Bureau, Intergovemmental Authority on Development, Intergovernmental Forum 
on Chemical Safety, International Joint Commission, Regional Organisation for the Protection of the 
Marine Environment, and South Pacific Regional Environment Programme. See ibid 
679~he non-govemmental organisations in anendance wen: Action Network for Alternatives to 
Agrochernicafs, Canadian Environmental Law Association, Canadian Polar Commission, CEC 
International Partners, Centre for Independent Ecological Expertise, Centre for International Environmental 
Law, Chemical Manufacturers Association, Clean Water Action Council of N.E. Wisconsin inc., Coalition 
pour un Magnola Propre, College of Medicine, University of the Philippines, Columbia University, 
Commonweal, Consumers International, Council of Yukon First Nations, Defence Pest Management, 
Denendeh National Office, Edison Electrical Institute, Environmental Justice Networking Forum, European 
Chemical Industry Council, Federacion Argentina de C h a r a s  de la Industria Quimica y Petroquirnica, 
Friends of the Earth, German Association for the United Nations, GIobal Crop Protection Federation, 
Global Environmental Issues, Great Lakes United, Greenpeace International, Health and Environment 
Watch, Indigenous Environmental Network, International Council of Chemical Associations, International 
Indian Treaty Council, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Japan Chemical Industry Association, McGiII 
University, Mexican Action Network on Pesticides and their Alternatives, Mexican National Institute of 
Public Health, Mouvement au Courant, Multinationals Resource Centre, Observatorio de Conflictos 
Ambientales, Pesticide Action Network, Pesticide Action Network AFrica, Physicians for Social 
Responsibility - USA, Sierra Club du Canada, Sierra Legal Defence Fund, Simon Fraser University, 
Société pour Vaincre la Pollution, STOP - Montreal, Teslin Thirgit Council, Université du Québec ii 
Montréal, University of Missouri, W. Alton Jones Foundation, Women's Environment and Development 
Organisation, World Chlorine Council, World Conservation Union, World Federation of Public Health 
Associations, and World Wildlife Fund International. See ibid at 3-4. 
6801nformation Kit, supra note 675 at 3-5. 
In the opening remarks to the session, Mr. Klaus Topfer, Executive Director of UNEP, is 
reported to have commented that: 
[a] global POPs Convention had to promote a shifi away from the 
production and use of POPs and the processes that generated them. As 
such, the chernical industry had to be seen as part of the solution, for it 
was there that new and safer alternative chemicals, processes and 
technologies had to be f0und.68~ 
A summary of the opening comments by delegates reflected several considerations which 
they wanted the negotiations and fuial Convention to address. Some of these were: 
a desire for the completion of the instrument by the year 2000; 
the need to establish an expert group to determine d e r i a  and a procedure for the 
future inclusion of POPs; 
use of the precautionary principle; 
use of the UNECE protocol as a guide; 
the addition of other POPs substances682 already identified, in addition to the fint 
twelve; 
tec hnical and fmancial assistance for develo ping states; 
a financial mechanism, such as that found in the Montreal Protocol; 
a ban on trade in POPs, as well as the international movements of them, except for 
destruction purposes; 
that the Convention should be complementary to other international instruments; 
a life-cycle identification of POPs, as well as a differentiated approach for the three 
POPs categories (pesticides, industrial chernicals and unintentionally produced by- 
products and contaminants); and, 
68 l POPS INCI, supra note 676 at 3. 
6gtThese substances were: chlordecone, hexabrornobiphenyl, hexachlorocyclohexane, polyaromatic 
hydrocarbons, short-chained parafins, and pentachlorophenol. See Ibid. at 6, paragraph 29. 
a suggestion for the graduai phase-out of the substances.683 
Following these introductory statements, the delegates discussed prelirninary articles for 
inclusion in the POPs Convention. The M C  agreed that there wodd be a prearnble, and 
articles for defuiitions and objectives, but that their contents wodd be discussed at a later 
session.684 The INC then considered measures to reduce ancilor eliminate releases of 
POPs into the environment.685 In relation to this they discussed control measures used in 
other MEAs, and in the LJNIECE protocol, the need for compiling information on 
"existing production, use, stockpiles and release into the environment for each of the 
twelve POPs identified in the Cornmittee's mandate", and the need to group POPs into 
their three categories.686 
A review of other MEAs reveals that although some of them deal with the reduction of 
chemical production, use or release (Framework Convention on CZimate Change687 and 
Mmtreal ProtocoP*), or with some of the sarne chernicals (Basel Convention689 and PIC 
Con~ention6~0), but that only the UNECE Protocol is directly related to the draft 
Convention.691 However, it has also been noted that the WN/ECE protocol only deais 
683~bid. at 6-7, paragraphs 26-35. 
684~bid at 7, paragraph 3 7. 
685~bid at 7. 
686~bid. at 7, paragraph 39. 
687~limate Change, supra note 582. 
688~ontreaI Protocol, supra note 106. 
689~arel Convention, supra note 223. 
**P~c INC5, supra note 467. 
691 UNEP, Possible Substantive Articles of an International Legally Binding Instrument for lmplementing 
lnternatio~i Action on Certain Persistent Organic Pollutants, UN EP/POPS/MC. 114 ( 1 998), cited to 
(visited 25 July 1998) ~httpYlirptc.unep.ch/pops/POP~~Inc/MC~llinc 1-4,htm> at 3, paragraph 9 
[hereinafter Substanrive ArticIes]. 
130 
with POPs found in the air, and not in other media whkh the new Convention should 
address.692 
In relation to national plans and progress reports, the MC recognised that specific focal 
points for POPs in each state would be useful, but that it would have to be discussed afler 
the substantive provisions for the Convention were ~egotiated.~~3 
Negotiators also agreed that a procedure and mechanism for the future identification of 
additional POPs needed to be addressed and again mentioned that an expert group might 
be usefùl for this issue.6w It was also thought that this issue could be discussed in 
relation to the need to reduce and eliminate releases, dong with the management and 
disposal of stockpiles.69* In relation to the management and elirnination of stockpiles, it 
was M e r  observed that the adopted measures needed to be flexible so as to take "into 
account the unique situations of different developing countries".6% 
The INC decided to use a contact group to frame the terms of reference for an expert 
group who would "deveiop science-based criteria and a procedure for identifiing 
additional persistent organic pollutants as candidates for future international action"P97 
The contact group was able to achieve this, and f i e r  debate within the iNC, the Criteria 
Expert Group for Persistent Organic Pollutants was approved and its officers elected.698 
692ibid 
6 9 3 ~ ~ ~ s  INCI, upra note 676 at 7, paragraph 41. 
6941bid at 7. paragraph 42. 
69*~bid. af 8, paragraph 42-3. 
696~bid P 8, paragraph 43. 
6971bid at 1 1, paragraph 64. 
698~bid at 1 1-2, paragraphs 65-7 1 .  
The terms of reference for the Criteria Expert Group (CEG) are found in annex II of the 
final report of the MC'S first session.699 
The fust meeting of the CEG is scheduled for October 1998.'m At this thne it is likely 
that they will review the information previously requested from -tes by UNEP and the 
IFCS, in January 1996.701 The document prepared from this information, titled 
Consideration of Possible Criteria for Identzfiing Furrher Persistent Organic Pollutmts 
as Candidates for Inlemational Acti0n,~02 lists six cnteria to be applied: 
(a) Persistence: The ability to resist degradation in various media, such as 
air, soil, water and sediment, measured as half-life of the substance in the 
medium; 
(b) Bioaccumulation: The ability of a chemical to accumulate in living 
tissues to levels higher than those in the surrounding environment, 
expressed as the quotient between the concentration in the target tissue 
and the environmental concentration; 
(c) Toxicity: The ability of a chemical to cause injury to humans or the 
environment; 
(d) Volatility: The ability of a chemical to vaporize into air; 
(e) Measurements of the chernical in remote regions: Considered by some 
to be criticai for identiGing a chemical as a persistent organic pollutant of 
global concem; 
699~bid at 23-5, annex II. 
"Ibid at 12, paragraph 73. 
701~n the annex to the report is a list of states who replied. These are: Australia, Belarus, B&l, Camemon, 
Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lebanon, Lithuania, 
New Zealand, Niue, Nigeria, Paraguay, Philippines, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, S Iovakia, 
Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United States of America In addition 
information was also received h m  the following intergovernmental and non-govemmental sources: Color 
Pigments Manufacturers Association, European Union, International Council of Chemical Associations, 
International Council of Metals and the Environment, International Union of mÜ.e and Applied Chemistry, 
North American Commission for Environmental Co-operation. Oslo-Paris Convention, Society of 
Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, United 
Nations Environment Programme, and the World HeaIth Organisation. See Considerarion, supra note 6 12 
at 8-13. See also C. Hogue, "Talks on Global POPs Treaty to Include Process for Adding Compounds to 
Pact" (1 998) 2 l(13) Int'l Env. Rep. 610. 
702~omidera~ion, ibid 
(f) Bioavailability: This, based on field data or expert judgement, has aiso 
been proposed as a critenon for identieing POPs.703 
It is noted that some of the criteria c m  be deterrnined with reference to a cut-off value, 
whereas others will need a qualitative assessment.7w The report M e r  outlines that 
other factors, such as dispersion mechanisms, patterns of use, influences of marine 
transport, tropical climate, and the need to conserve biodiversity and protect endangered 
species, must be considered?Os In addition the recognition that socio-economic factors, 
such as the extent of development of the state, areas of use of a substance, and the 
stakeholders involved must be built into the process of POPs identification.7Ofj 
In addition, negotiators can reference the mechanism established under the PIC 
Convention for the addition of chemicals.707 In other MEAs, it is usually accomplished 
through an amendment to the agreement conducted at a Confierence of the Parties708 It is 
also likely that the CGE will be assessing additional information about the location of 
production facilities and the amounts of POPs they produce, following the recent 
revelation that Russia was still producing PCBs.709 The CMA as participants in the INC 
will likely submit their suggestions for the identification of POPs to the CGE. They have 
"pledged to help develop and implement a process for identifying persistent, 
bioaccumulative, toxic substances for control"?~o 
703~6id at 3, paragraph 5. 
704~6id 
705~6id at 6, paragraph 22. 
706~6id at 7, paragraph 27. 
707~ee footnote 5 1 1 and accompanying text 
708~u6stmtive Articles, supra note 69 1 at 5, paragraph 1 1. 
7 0 9 ~ .  Baggetta, *'Regional Treav Woufd Phase Out POPs; Plans for Bmader Pact Would Do the Sarne" 
( 1998) 2 1 ( 12) Int'l Env. Rep. 553. 
710"~hemicals Covered by Future Treaty Should be Toxic, Persistent, U.S. Group Says" (1995) 18(25) Int'l 
Env. Rep. 948 at 948. 
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The Chair of the MC, John Buccini, has stated that the treaty will only be drafted for the 
twelve identified POPs. Any additional POPs which meet the identification cnteria will 
be added to the Convention following the conclusion of the negotiations and the adoption 
of the ciraft text.711 Concern has been expressed that it is critical that the cntena do allow 
chernicals to be added, and do not act as an obstacle to extending the ambit of the 
C0nvention,~12 
The INC discussion also focused on the intended measure on information exchange.7" 
After discussing the importance of such a measure, the need for the dissemination of 
information, and for the compilation of technical information for the INC,714 it was 
decided that a contact group be formed. This contact group later reported that although 
they had been unable to agree on the tenns of reference for an information mechanism, 
that the UNEP Secretariat should be approached to undertake the task of compiiing such 
information, for the MC, prior to the next session.715 
It was also recognised that measures dealing with public information, awareness and 
education were required. Views were expressed that without these measures the 
Convention would have little utility at the local Ievel, that the UNIECE protocol measures 
could serve as a model, and that the public should have access to any inventory activities 
of the INC and of the fùture Convention.7'6 
l"~e~egates", upra note 675. 
712~aggena, supra note 709. 
7 1 3 ~ ~ ~ s  INCI, supra note 675 at 8, paragraphs 44-8. 
7141bid. at 8. paragraph 44. 
5 ~ b i d  at 8. paragraph 46-7. 
7i 6 ~ b i d  at 8, paragraph 49. 
In regard to research, development and monitoring, it was stated that in addition to the 
required research on the POPs substances, research should cover current practices and 
options for disposal, and also alternatives to POPs.7'7 Research was also stated to be 
required for the issue of the transboundary movement of POPs substances intended for 
research.718 
Discussion also ensued around the issues of technical assistance, and fuiancial resources 
and mechanisms.719 Two broad topics were discussed: the identification of areas 
requiring technical and fuiancial assistance, and the identification of sources of this 
assistance. In relation to the former, negotiators stressed the importance of technical 
assistance to developing States and to those with economies in transition. Suppon was 
found in the MC for the provision of technical and financial assistance in the following 
... compiling inventories; capacity building; monitoring the environmental 
and health impacts of POPs; public education; identifiing and obtaining 
alternatives, including recapturing indigenous knowledge; pilot projects; 
information exchange; import and export controls; technology transfer; 
and, destroying or disposing of obsolete stocks in an environrnentally 
sound manner.720 
The importance of familiarishg themselves with al1 of the currently available sources of 
technical and financial assistance was discussed, as well as the need to obtain more 
information on these, and possible under-utilised sources which could be made 
available.721 Presentations were made by representatives of the FAO, the Global 
'17/bid at 8, paragraph 50. 
*/bid 
l 9/bid at 9. paragraphs 5 1 -2. 
Ro16id. at 1 O, paragraph 59. 
"'lbid at 10. paragraph 60. 
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Environment Facility, the United Nations Industrial Deveiopment Organisation and the 
WHO, regarding the types of assistance which these organisations couid provide." 
In response to this, the MC requested the Secretariat to provide the second session of the 
INC with three documents detailing existing programmes providing technical and 
financial assistance in relation to chernical management, a review of "possible costs 
associated with potential areas of technical and financial assistance" which could be 
associated with the POPs Convention, and a description of existing multilateral 
mechanisms for technical and financial assistance .?23 
At the request of severai memben of the INC, a subsidiary body was then established to 
deal with the implementation aspects of the technical assistance and financial matters 
pertaining to developing states and those with economies in transition.*4 
Examples of technical assistance and financial funding articles can be found in several 
MEAS." However, the PIC Convention is silent with respect to a financial mechanism, 
and the UNIECE protocol is silent for both technical assistance and financial 
mechanisrns. In the event that negotiators decide to turn to another MEA, perhaps it will 
N~bid  at I O, paragraph 6 1. 
m ~ b i d  at 10, paragraph 62. 
* 4 ~ ~ P s  INCl, supra note 676 at 10, paragraph 63. The implementation issues to be handled by this 
subsidiary body, as defined by John ~uccini, Chair of the M C  are: 
identi@ provisions to the convention that will address measures required to implement 
the convention, including such possible aspects as technology transfer, financial aspects, 
and national and regional experiences and strategies to reduce andor eliminate POPs. 
"Delegates", supra note 675 at 662. 
mSu6stantive Articles, s u p  note 69 1 at 6, paragmphs 16-7. The Conventions referred to are the 
Montreal Protocol, the draft PIC Convention, the B d  Convention, the Climate Change Convention, the 
United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, and the United Nationr Convention to Combat 
Desertification in Those Corntries Experiencing Serious Drought a d o r  Desertflcation Particdarly in 
Afica. 
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be to the Montreal Protocol whose general intent to ban, or reduce use of, hazardous 
substances is similar to the intent of the emerging POPs Convention. 
Further measures which require discussion, along with the final provisions of the 
Convention, are those which deal with cornpliance, senlement of disputes, and 
institutional arrangements.726 
Other proposed provisions included measures for POPs inventory requirements, liability 
and compensation, remediation and clean-up of contaminated sites, sales and trade, 
regional CO-operation, and tmnsportation, storage and distribution.727 The INC requested 
the Secretariat to prepare a document for the next session M e r  speciming these 
provisions for possible incl~ion.~28 
In addition to al1 of the foregoing issues, the INC must also stay appnsed of the 
interrelationship between the POPs Convention and the other international and regional 
environmental instruments with which it wili interact.ng 
5.3 A Critique for the Future 
An examination of the international community's initial attempts to resolve the 
environmental and health risks of POPs suggests the future scope of the Convention. 
First, it appears likely that the UNIECE protocol will be used as a b a i s  for the 
7 2 6 ~ ~ f  s I N C I .  supra note 676 at 9, paragraph 53. 
"fbid at 9, paragraphs 54-7. 
n81bid. at 9, paragraph 58. 
R 9 ~  summary was prepared by UNEP of other Iegally binding instruments which may be relevant to the 
future im plementation of the POPs Convention. See UNEP, Summary of Certain MultiIateraf Legafly 
Binding Instrumenrs Relevant to an International Legally Binding Instrument/or Implementing 
International Action on Certain Persistent Organic Pollutanis, UNEP/POPS/MC. 1 13 ( 1 W8), cited to 
(visited 25 July 1998) ~http~lirptc.unep.ch/pps/P0PsSInc/MCCl / i n  1-3 .hm>. 
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international agreement. But in doing so, it will be interesting to observe whether or not 
negotiators will be stricter with the management of POPs than negotiators for the 
UNECE protocol were. As discussed earlier, the protocol did not strictly apply the 
precautionary principle, did not inchde technical assistance or funding provisions for its 
Parties, and did not provide enforcement mechanisms to ensure Party cornpliance. 
It is also likely the PIC Convention will play a large role in the cirafting of the POPs 
Convention. The fact that it was recently completed and that the UNEP Goveming 
Council, in Decision 19/13 D, highlighted the need for the interrelationship between the 
two instniments,730 may result in PIC articles foreshadowing those for POPs. If this is 
the case, than the absence of the precautionary principle, the scant attention paid to the 
need for technical assistance, and the failure to address financial assistance for 
developing states and for those with economies in transition, may again prove to be 
problematic. The relationship between the two Conventions is important because some 
of the chemicals which fa11 under the PIC procedure will also be subject to the terms of 
the POPs Convention.731 
Related to this issue is the ability of the POPs Convention to ban or phase-out DDT."2 
This pesticide is still being used in several developing states, and notwithstanding its 
toxic qualities, continues to provide an inexpensive means of controlling 
730~ee footnote 602 and accompanying text. 
73 '~ee a listing of chemicals for these Conventions x e  fmtnotes 5 1 1 and 680, and accornpanying t e a .  
n 2 ~ .  Hileman, "Pollutant Con ference Smiggles With DDT Ban" (1998) 76(27) Chem. & Eng. News 4 
[hereinafter "Pollutant Conference"] and "Delegates", supra note 675. 
733 WHO statistics state that in 1997 over 40% of the world's population are at risk h m  malaria present in 
100 states and territories. As one of the leading causes of death h m  infectious diseases, it accounted for 
between 1.5-2.7 million deaths. See WHO, Division of Control of Tropical Diseases, Mafwia Prevention 
and Conrrol(1998) cited to (visited 27 August 1998) ~http~l~~~.who,int/ctdlhtmUmalariahtmI~, and 
WHO, Fi/sr Factsfiom the World H d t h  Report 1998, (1 998) cited to (visited 27 August 1 998) 
<http~/~~~.who.int/whr/1998/factse.htrn>. 
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Even the WHO is only requesting that DDT be reduced and not eli1ninated.~34 The Chair 
of the POPs INC, John Buccini stated "DDT in my view is probably the hardest issue to 
deal with ... With other pesticides we will find, ultimately, reasonable approaches to phase 
out their use and elirninate stocksn.n* Of the eleven other POPs, only PCBs continue to 
be manufactured, and Russia has promised to halt production by 2005.*6 
It would be prudent for negotiators to take the directness of purpose of both the Montreal 
Protocol and the Bamako Convention into serious consideration. These instruments each 
deal with environmental hamis resulting fiom the use of hazardous substances, which is 
what the POPs Convention m u t  do. The other Iinkage between these three instruments 
is the seriousness of the subject matter with which they deal, and the transboundary 
nature of the risks. The inclusion of the precautionary p ~ c i p i e  in the POPs Convention 
would provide a M e r  similarity between these three Conventions. 
In order for negotiators of the POPs Convention to accept the precautionq principle 
they must reject risk assessment as the best means to combat environmental h m .  While 
risk assessment attempts "to address the issues of scientific uncertainty in a procedural 
manner", the precautionary principle in contrast, "recognizes the reality that science will 
not provide clear policy prescriptions and that criteria need to be developed to 
systematically address the resultant uncertainties in the policy pr0cess".~3~ It has been 
suggested that in order to effectively implement the precautionary principle policies must 
n4"~ollutant Conference", supra note 732 at 5. 
n5~ohn Buccini, Chair of the MC, as quoted in "Delegates", supra note 675 at 66 1. 
736"~011~tant Conference", supra note 732. 
7 3 7 ~ .  von Moltke, "The Relationship Behween Policy, Science, Technology. Economics and Law in the 
lmplementation of the Precautionary Principle" in D. Freestone & E. Hey, eds., The Precautionmy 
Principle and Iruernafiom/ L m :  The Challenge of lmplementation (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1996) 97 at 100, 101. 
recognise the domains which circumscribe it namely those of science, technology, 
econornics and law, and contributions nom al1 of these areas is required? 
Science, to be effective from a precautionary stand-point, must be utilised in an 
anticipatory fashion or, for example, as a "biological early warning ~ y s t e m " . ~ ~ ~  By 
utilising techniques which assess biological damage at the cellular level, science can be 
used to ascertain whether there is a need for concern in areas which are suspected as 
being polluted.740 While this is but one anticipatory technique, a focus on precaution 
would encourage the development of others. By approaching POPs in such a fashion, the 
suspicion of a problern could be addressed more rapidly than waiting for a detailed risk 
analysis of the hazard. The hi& standard of scientific proof required in risk anaiysis 
allows hazards to continue unchecked, while a lowenng of this standard would allow 
hazards to be constrained much quicker. 
A precautionary approach also requires a need to shifi the burden of demonstrating 
environmental harm from those affected to those who produce and manufacture the 
substances. As previously discussed, the OSPAR Convention utilises a Pnor Justification 
Procedure which requires a demonstration that hami will not occur, within an acceptable 
margin of uncertainty, prior to the release of a substance into the en~ironment.~~' Such 
an approach then places the burden of establishing cornpliance upon those who have the 
knowledge, finance and technological means to remedy the situation. 
*81bid, at 108. 
7 3 9 ~ - ~ .  Mee, "Scientific Methods and the Precautionary RUiciple" in D. Freestone & E. Hey, eds.. The 
Precautionory Principfe and International L m  The Challenge of Impfernentarion (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 1996) 109 at 127. 
7401bid at 127-8. 
741~c~ntyre, supra note 583 at 225. 
In addition, the precautionary approach requires the active participation of pe0ple.~~2 
This has been discussed in relation to the peoples' of the Arctic whose indigenous 
organisations have been recognised as a required influence for effective international 
environrnental policies.743 In a sllnilar mamer the peoples' of the developing states may 
dso find that NGO participation c m  prove to be an effective stimulant to chernical 
management The influence which peoples' organisations can bring to decision-making 
has already been discussed in the context of the MAI? Recent attempts at forming 
networks of developed and developing states' environmental NGOs rnay also prove 
useful in this regard because aithough the programme orientation and organisational 
environrnents of these two NGO factions is different, their relative strengths and 
weaknesses may prove to be complernentary while lobbying for international 
environmental law reforms.745 Negotiators must therefore remain cognisant of the 
demands of civil society, and heed the directives of the UNEP Report on Coderat ion 
of Possible Criteria for Identz$ing Further Persistent Organic Pollu~ants as Candidates 
for Internntional Action which specifically recognises the need to address socio- 
economic considerations of ~ t a t e s . ~ ~ ~  
Even if the precautionary principle is not included in the Convention's text, the extent to 
which the Expert Criteria Group will be able to incorporate socio-economic 
considerations into the identification of additional POPs is crucial. This is because the 
" ~ e e  J. Gupta, "Glocalization: The Precautionary Principle and Public Participation" in D. Freestone Bi E. 
Hey, eds., The Precautionmy Principle and Infernational Law: The Challenge oflmplementation (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996) 23 1 .  
743~andemvaag, supra note 594 at 344. 
744~ee foomote 295 and accompanying text. 
745~or a discussion of this topic see R Cowling, "NGDOs, NGO Networks and the Preservation of 
Autonomy: Evaluating the Impetus Toward Institutionalisation" (FacuIty of Politics of Alternative 
Development Strategies, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, 1996) [unpublished]. 
746~ee Consideration, supra note 6 12 at 7. paragraph 27. 
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difiering conditions found in states means that a single, inflexible solution c m o t  be 
applied effectively in a global context. 
In the opening comments to the fmt INC session, Mr. Klaus Tapfer, Executive Director 
of UNEP, commented that the chernical industry had to be seen as part of the solution. 
However, nowhere in the draft articles is there a provision which achieves such an aim. 
In fact, none of the MEAs recommended for consideration to the INC contains such a 
provision. This is a concem because the nature of this form of environmental nsk 
necessitates a legal remedy which can balance the various social, political and economic 
interests present in the international community. 
One suggestion for such a balancing can be found in the assignment of liability to 
industry present in other international instruments. The utility of this will be analysed 
next. 
5.4 The Imposition of Liabiiity 
The aim in such an undertaking is to make industry visible in a legal sense. While 
industry takes part in MEA negotiations,747 they remain largely invisible in the fmal texts. 
This was not aiways the case, as evidenced by the difference between instruments such as 
the Code ofConduct748 and the International C0de74~, and the current approaches found 
in chemicai management instruments. 
- -  .. - 
747~er  industry groups in attendance at the PIC and POPs MC sessions, see footnotes 472 and 679. 
748~ee foomote 305 and accompanying text. 
749~ee footnote 578 and accompanying text. 
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What is required is an express recognition of the environmental role of these actors, 
especially since many of them are now economically more powerful than some states.750 
The required reconceptualisation of environmental law is simply a realignment of it in 
accordance with the changing socio-economic conditions found in the world today. 
Globalisation as supported by liberalisation policies aitea the traditional power structures 
of the world, and MEAs must be negotiated with express recognition of this fact. Our 
current conceptualisation of MEAs results in a faise dichotomy. It requires states, 
following ratification of a MEA, to utilise fmmcial, technical, legai, and infiastructural 
means to ensure that the terrns of  the treaty are met. This is, however, problematic. Not 
al1 states, aside fiom political will to do so, have the means of accomplishing an MEA's 
goals, and negotiators aware of this reality are likely less anaid to water-dom provisions 
of an MEA on the theory that a general provision is better than no provision at dl. 
Therefore, a hybndisation of public and private law is required. Such a new species of 
MEA would bind private actors at the international level, outright. Now, having stated 
the optimal goal, the achievable reality is likely different. But two steps can be taken 
which may eventually lead to such a desired result. 
The first step toward such a goal cm be made by drafting environmental Conventions 
which impose strict requirements upon states to implement national legislation, 
reguiations, poiicies or other administrative instruments, directly imposing strong 
controls on industry actors.751 Such an imposition should not be a matter for state 
discretion, nor the subject of Convention reservations. The previous examination of the 
750See footnote 30 and accompanying text. 
7Si~he Bamako Convention provides an example of this wherein Parties are directed to impose strict 
Iiability upon the generators of hazardous wastes which have been improperly disposed of. See Bamako 
Comention, supra note 43 1 at article 4(3)(b). 
PIC Convention and the UNECE POPs Convention revealed that they both failed to 
regulate industry in this way. In both of these Conventions the directives to States in 
relation to industry are couched in very permissive language.7Q 
A second step is the imposition of liability upon the chemical industry through the use of 
chemical management Conventions. While corporations have already been held 
accountable in their home state for actions committed in others,753 an international 
imposition of liability is a different matter. However, international law can be drafted so 
as to impose liability upon industry, as has been done in relation to nuclear accidents7" 
and oil pollution damage. 755 The nuclear accident instruments are predicated upon 
7 S 2 ~ l ~  INC5, supra note 467 at article 1 S(l)(b), and UN/ECE Protocol, supra note 636 at article 7. Set 
also footnotes 576 and 672, and accompanying text. 
753~n 1990 Dow Chemical Company and Shell Oil Company were sued by Costa Rican banana workers 
who claimed that they had suffered serious menta1 and physicaf problems, as well as  irreversible stenlity 
afier handIing DBCP manufactured and exported by the defendant corporations. For an account of this 
case see CoIopy, supra note 339 at 2 12-218. Also see D. Mitchell, "Banana Workers Win Compensation in 
Pesticide Poisoning" (Spring/Summer 1997) 14(1&5) CHRIA News (visited 17 August 1998) 
<httpY~www.brown.edu/CoursedBio~C~mmunity~HeaIth I68C/chna/s97mitchelI.htrnl>; "The Price of 
Bananas" (12 March 1994) The Economist 48(1), and D. Redwood, "Split Decision on Bananas" (1997) 1 1 
The Sustainable Times 14. In another recent case, aithough not related to chemicals or pesticides, is a 
decision that a U.S. petroleum Company, Unocal, c m  stand trial in the U.S. for alIeged human rights abuses 
cornrnitted in B m a  See J. Greer, "US Petroleum Giant to Stand Trial Over Burma Atrocities" (1998) 
28(1) The Ecologist 34. 
754Third party liability is govemed by a series of instruments: Viennu Convention on Civil Liabilityfor 
Nuclear Damage, 2 1 May 1963, cited to (visited 6 August 1998) 
<httpY/www.iaea.or.at/wor ldatom/gIance/legaMiabiIi~. h t m  [hereinafter Vienna Convention on Civil 
Liabiliry J ; Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (as amended), 29 July 
1 960, cited to (visited 8 August 1 998) <http:l/www .neaFr/htmUIaw/nIparis-conv.htmI> [hereinafter Park 
Convention]; Brussels Supplementary Convention to the Par3  Convention (as amended), 3 1 January 1963, 
cited to (visited 8 August 1 998) <httpY/~~~.neafr/htmulawln1bni~seIs~html [ ereinafter Brussels 
Convention]; Joint Prorocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and Paris Convention, 
2 1 September 1988, cited to (visited 6 August 1998) 
~http:/lwww.iaea.or.at/worl~tom/glan~dega~liabili~.htm~; Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention 
on Civil Liabifity for Nuclear Damage, 1 2 Septem ber 1 997, cited to (visited 6 August 1 998) 
< http ~/www.iaeaor.at/worIdatom/updates/nex I .html> [hereinafter Protocol to the Vienna Convention]; 
and Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuciear Damage, 1 2 September 1 997, cited to 
(visited 6 August 1998) <http:l/www.iaeaor.at/worIdatom/updates/anne~.html> Pereinafier 
Su piementary Compemation] . -P 73 Third party liability is governed by: the Internatid Convention on Civil Liubilityfor Oil Pollution 
Damage, 29 November 1969, cited to (visited 6 August 1998) 
~http:/lsedac.ciesin.or~pidb/texts/civilliabii.oiI.pollution.dage. 1969.html> Fereinafter Civil Liability 
for Oil Pollution Damuge]; Internationaf Convention on the Establishment ofan International Fund for 
principles which channel the liability exclusively to the operators of nuclear installations 
and make the operator strictly liable.756 In addition these instruments limit the liability in 
amount and in tirne, and require the operator to maintain adequate insurance to cover 
their liability.757 Similarly, for oil pollution damage, international conventions make 
"shipowners strictiy liable ... for oil pollution arising from laden tankers carrying persistent 
oil".758 A ship owner must constitute a fund for the extent of their liability,759 based 
upon the tonnage of their ship, which can be distributed to claimants in the event of an 
incident.760 In addition, an international fund, entitled The Internationai 0i1 Pollution 
Compensation Fund", was created out of contributions from cargo owners following the 
recognition that the economic burden of pollution damage should not be borne 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 18 December 197 1, cited to (visited 6 August 1998) 
~htrpYlsedac.ciesin.org/pidb/texts/intl.nd.oil.llution.e. 197 1 .hm[> mereinafter Fund for 
Compem~tion]. Two protocols were adopted in f 992 entitled the Protocol to the 1969 Convention on the 
Civil Liabiliry for Oil Pollution Dumage, 27 November 1992, cited to (1996) Int'l Env. Rep. 155 1, and the 
Protocol to the 1971 Convention on the Establishment of an inîernaiionul Fund for Compensaiion for Oil 
Pollution Damage, 27 November 1992, cited to (1996) 2 1 Int'l Env. Rep. 175 1. These two protocols 
superseded the 1984 protocols of the sarne narnes. While both the 1984 and 1992 protocols have the same 
substantive provisiork, the 1992 protocols have more lenient entry into force provisions. The future 
effectiveness of the 1984 protocois had been called into question when the U.S. Congress decided to reject 
them in favour of a unilaterd domestic approach which broadened liability. See E. GoId, ed., Maritime 
Aflairs: A World Hundbook, 2nd ed. (Harlow, Essex: Longman Current Affairs, 199 1). 
7 5 6 1 ~ ~ ~ ,  Civil Liabilityfor Nuclear Damage: internutional Framework (visited 6 August 1998) 
~httpYl~~~.iaea.or.at/worldatomlglance/legaV1iabi lity . h t m  at 1 ; Vienna Convention, supra note 754 at 
articles II, IV; Protucol to the Vienna Convention, supra note 754 at articles 4,6; and Paris Convention, 
su ra note 754 at articles 3,4,6.  4 75 IAEA, ibid ; Vienna Convention, ibid at art icles III, VI, VI 1; Protocol to the Vienna Convention, ibid 
at articles 5, 8-9;  Park Convention, ibid at articles 7,8; Brussels Convention, supra note 754 at article 3; 
and, Supplementary Compensation Convention, supra note 754 at articles II, III. 
7S8~old, supra note 755 at 252. See also Civil L iab i l i~ f i r  Oil Pollution Dumage, supra note 755 at article 
III(1): 
Except as provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, the owner of a ship at the time 
of an incident, or where the incident consists of a series ofoccurrences at the tie of the 
first such occurrence, shall be Iiable for any pollution damage caused by oil which has 
escaped or k e n  discharged from the ship as a result of the incident. 
750This is achieved by depositing a sum or by producing a bank or other guarantee, acceptable under the 
national Iegislation which appli& to the shipowner, "with the Court or oser comptent authority of any 
one of the Contract h g  states in w hich action is brought under Article IX". Civil Liabilityfor Oil Pollution 
Damage, supra note 742 at article V(3). This fund c m  even be constituted after an incident has occurred. 
See Ibid at article VI(1). 
760~bid at article V. 
exclusively by ship owners and that full compensation had previously not been available 
to victims.76' 
A third example of the imposition of strict liability can be found in a Convention 
negotiated by the Council of Europe, the Convention on Civil Liabiliîy for Dumuge 
Resultingfiorn Activities Dangerou [O the Emironment.762 The aim of this Convention 
is to provide compensation for environmental h m  caused by dangerous activities?J 
'Dangerous activities' are defmed as: 
mean[ingJ one or more of the following activities provided that it is 
performed professionally, including activities conducted by public 
authonties: 
(a) the production, handling, storage, use or discharge of one or more 
dangerous substances764 or any operation of a sirnilar nature dealing with 
such substances;765 
Furthemore, with the defuiition of 'environment' being broad,766 and an 'operator' defmed 
as "the person who exercises the control of a dangerous activityn,767 the strict liability 
imposed by the Convention encompasses severai economic activities. 
761~und/or Compensation. supra note 755 at prearnble, articles 2, 10. 
762~onvention on Civü Liabitity for Domage Resuiting Frorn Activities Dongerour to the Environment. 2 1 
June 1993, ETS No. 150, cited to (visited 6 August 1998) 
<http://www.tufls.edu/fletcher/multi/te~ [hereinafter Dangerous Activities 
Convention]. 
763 lbid at 1, article 1. 
7"4~he tenn 'dangerous substance is defmed as: 
(a) substances or preparations which have properties which constitute a significant risk 
for man, the environment or property. A substance or preparation which is explosive, 
oxidizing, extremely flammabIe, highly flammable, very toxic, toxic, harmful, corrosive. 
irritant, sensitizing, carcinogenic, mutagenic, toxic for reproduction or dangerous to the 
environment within the meaning of Annex 1, Part A to this Convention shall in any event 
be deerned to constitute such a M c ;  
See Ibid. at 2, article 2(2). 
7651bid at 2, article 2(1). 
766nie term 'environment' is defined as including: 
- natural resourccs both abiotic and biotic, such as air, water, soil, fauna and flora and 
the interaction between the sarne factors; 
- property which forrns part of the cultural heritage; and 
The operator ... shall be liable for the damage caused by the activity as a 
result of incidents at the t h e  or during the period when he was exercising 
the control of the activity.768 
While the Convention does provide limited exempti0ns~69 it still places a heavy onus 
upon industry to avoid environmental ham. Parties are to ensure that operators take part 
in a hancial security scheme, or have a financial guarantee, to cover their liability770 
These three examples highlight the creativity of international law in assigning 
responsibility for environmentai damage. It is not unreasonable to assume that part of the 
rationale for the development of these instruments was the perceived magnitude of the 
environmental h m  to be prevented, or at least mitigated. In the case of both nuclear 
accidents and oil spills the event is an extreme occurrence. In the case of the Dangeraüs 
Activities Cornenfion, events such as the Union Carbide disaster at Bophal India,771 likely 
contributed to its creation and design. 
There is a need to address environmental harms which are more subtle to rnonitor and 
detect, such as in the case of sorne POPs, where the cumulative effect of each emission or 
discharge, results in severe environmental damage. In such a situation legal causation is 
difficult, if not impossible to establish, and victims may be left without any legal 
- the characteristic aspects of the landscape. 
See Ibid at 3, article 2(10). 
767~bid at 3, article 2(5). 
768~bid at 5, article 6( 1). 
769~bid at 6, article 8. 
770~bid at 6, article 12. 
7710n December 3, 1884, a leak of methyl iscyanate fiom a Union Carbide plant blanketed the city of 
Bhopal, India, killing thousands and resdting-in on going deaths for the hundreds of thousands exVpsed to 
the chemical. See Pesticide Action Network North America, Thirteenth Anniversary of Bhopal Dikater (5 
Decem ber 1 997) (visited 1 0 August 1 998) <http://rtk.net/E 1 9365TS98>; L. Landskroner, Corporate 
IrresponsibiIity in the .4ftermarh of BhopaI ( 1 996) (visited 10 August 1 998) 
<http~l~~~.landskroner.com/cori~~~htm>; and, G. Cohen, Bhopal and the New World Order ( 1 994) 
(visited 1 0 August 1 998) <http:/l&net/E8734T66O>. 
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recourse. It is possible that the imposition of liability may provide a solution for this 
situation as well. 
Liability shouid be assigned to manufachuers of substances caught under the PIC and 
POPs Conventions, including those chexnicals which have been designated as banned or 
severely restncted substances. Such a regime could provide victim compensation 
through the use of a fund similar to those previously mentioned. This sort of legal 
development could also result in a greater adherence to the precautionary principle by 
industry , in their efforts to limit their future liability . 
6.0 Conclusions 
This thesis has endeavoured to explore the tensions inherent in the negotiation and 
implementation of chemical management MEAs. This analysis cornmenced with the 
recognition that risk assessrnent is no longer a preferred means of ensuring environmental 
protection and suggested that precaution and an over-ride of private interests might be 
more effective. The thesis then examined globalisation as a derivative of the inherent 
charactenstics of MNCs and demonstrated that globalisation is inextricably tied to MNC 
productivity. By then examining a case study of the chemical industry, the ties between 
profit and production, and the environmental ramifications of corporate decision-making 
became clearer. For the chemical industry the nexus between environmental harm and 
profit may be more obvious than that observed for other industry sectors, because of the 
very nature of the products in which they specialise. It is doubtful that many of their 
products are capable of being characterised as environmentally benign. 
The use of international instruments for the liberalisation of trade and FDI were then 
addressed so that the relationship between the agents of globalisation (MNCs) and 
liberalisation policies could be made explicit. The instruments used for the liberalisation 
of trade demonstrate the precedence accorded to trade over environmental concems. 
While this hierarchy between trade and environment has been established throughout the 
fifly years of the operation of the GATT/WTO system, it is perplexing that with the 
relatively recent identification of the seriousness of environmentai concerns, changes 
within the GATTlWTO system have not been made to reflect this. An additional 
hierarchical relationship between FDI and the environment was observed in the draft 
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MAI provisions. The value accorded to the maximisation of wealth in the MAI is 
obscene in relation to the lack of attention to environmental concems. 
The fact that the international community has not recognised the need to address in an 
international instrument the hierarchical relationship between environmental and 
tradelFDI concems is a grotesque oversight. When considered in the context of the 
magnitude of environmentai harms which now threaten global ecosystems it is at best a 
glaring omission. By ailowing the validity of national legislation to be assessed in a 
piecemeal fashion when it impedes trade or FDI interests, this gap -tes states fiom 
taking steps toward environmental protection when it may have an extratemtorial result. 
This in tuni undermines the logic of environmental protection which is to protect 
ecosystems, notwithstanding state borders. By insisting that the validity of national 
legislation be predicated upon the existence of a MEA for each isolated and specific 
incidence of environmental h m  creates an impossible situation. To draft MEAs in a 
timely environmental manner would therefore require a foresight of pending 
environmental harms which is impossible to possess. It is therefore suggested that 
environmental legislation should tnunp tradelFD1 concems when there is a pressing 
environmental need which necessitates such a decision, even if a specific MEA is not in 
existence. When an MEA is in existence it should be perceived as evidence of a 
sufficient international intention to protect the environment, and trade/FDI impacts 
incidental to the enforcement of the MEA should be ignored or accepted. 
The examination of the two emerging chernical management conventions assists in the 
illustration of this point. While the PIC Convention will guide states in their decision- 
making regarding trade in chernicals and pesticides, it does not take into consideration the 
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realities of the marketplace. The chernical industry which controls production, 
marketing, technology, and information about these substances remains relatively 
unchallenged. It might even be possible to suggest that industry is now better off. 
Corporations can now wait until national legislation is implemented thereby giving effect 
to the convention, and have in the interim k e n  fieed of any moral imperatives found in 
the International Code. In the context of the liberalisation po licies previously discussed, 
the PIC convention has been drafted so as to not place any constraints upon the current 
system of trade thmugh the careful negotiation of its articles. It therefore does not 
challenge the status quo. 
The subject matter of the POPs Convention, which is the environmental consequences 
caused by the continuing emission, discharge and use of POPs, requires a change in 
policy making. In this case it is not enough to continue in the traditional trade/FDI and 
environment hierarchical relationship, for if this Convention is to have an impact it must 
be drafted to take precedence. This is a situation in which public environmental interests 
must be accorded greater importance than private interests. One suggestion was for the 
imposition of liability on industry because it would assist in assigning responsibility for 
environmental damage, and therefore help to gain industry's cooperation. However, a 
more effective rneans would be an express provision within the Convention which clearly 
States that trade and FDI interests are to be interpreted as secondary to its environmental 
objectives. 
The PIC and POPs Conventions M e r  illustrate the fbtility of continuing to draft MEAs 
which fail to recognise the precautionary approach to environmentai protection. The 
nature of environmental harms in the late twentieth century require preventative means of 
action and this, coupled with the recognition that science and technology can support 
such a policy orientation, leaves linle excuse for its non-implementation. Many of the 
expressed inadequacies with these two Conventions can be readily addressed if a 
precautionary approach was adopted. The acceptance of this approach would relieve 
developing States fkom some of the financial and technological burdens of risk analysis 
and instead shift these burdens to industry. It aiso allows for the inclusion of alternative 
visions of environmentai policy by encouraging the recognition of socio-econornic 
conditions. This is achieved through the incorporation of state-specific and indigenou 
knowledge systems into decision-making. Furthemore, a precautionary approach 
recognises the finiteness of the environment and the need to include environmental 
frailties into economic decision-making. If the magnitude of harm generated by POPs is 
worthy of a MEA which is predicated upon risk analysis, negotiators should consider 
how much they wish to garnble on the extent of unknown harms being constrained by 
such an instrument. 
To conclude, the hture utility of MEAs depends upon the ability of negotiators, having 
taken into consideration al1 of their contextual tensions, to reach a suitable balancing of 
public and private interests. This may require re-negotiating the Final  Act7'* and 
developing a side-agreement on the protection of the environment or drafting MEAs with 
clauses which announce their supremacy over trade and FDI interests. What is certain is 
that the status quo is not an adequate basis upon which effective environmental 
protection c m  be undertaken. MEAs must no longer be designed to advance trade and 
FDI interests but rather should be effectively designed to advance environmental ones. 
The seriousness of the environmental harrns with which the world is now concerned 
772~inal Act, supra note 170. 
IS2 
requires change from a risk to a precautionary based system of decision-making. It is 
time to invert the trade/FDI and enWonmentai hierarchy by factoring in precaution and 
to embrace the thought "What a Wondemil World".m 
7 7 3 ~ . ~ .  Armstrong, "What a Wondefil World", song. 
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